PARTY POLITICS, RELIGION, & WOMEN'S LEADERSHIP

Lebanon in Comparative Perspective

FATIMA SBAITY KASSEM



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
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ISBN 978-1-349-46210-0 ISBN 978-1-137-33321-6 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781137333216



Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2013 978-1-137-33320-9

First published in 2013 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN®
in the United States—a division of St. Martin's Press LLC,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available from the Library of Congress.

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.

Design by Newgen Knowledge Works (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First

edition: December 2013

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

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PREFACE

The 2011 Arab uprisings reignited global interest in the role that religion, specifically Islam, plays in these countries' transition to democracy. Women stood side-by-side with men in freedom squares as despots were toppled. However, as Islamists gained electoral power, women conveniently disappeared from the political scene. Why and how does the rise of Islamists and Salafists to power influence women's legitimate right to share in leadership, decision-making, governance, and rebuilding democratic states? The theory of party religiosity and women's leadership this book advances can explain the frustrations of women following the outcome of free and fair parliamentary elections in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, and Libya. It explains why Salafists pose a threat for the rollback of women's rights in reforming and/or democratizing Arab countries. The epilogue to this book develops this argument.

Gender inequality is a pervasive global phenomenon in the public sphere, and particularly in parliamentary representation. Previous scholarship sought explanations in country-level development, political regimes, and electoral systems or society-level political culture and dominant religions. This book moves beyond domestic-level analysis to institutional party-level explanations for women's political leadership, especially female representation in parties' decision-making bodies. Political parties are the main vehicles—rather forklifts—for women's ascendance to leadership positions. This research focuses on interlinkages of political parties, institutional religiosity, and women's party leadership and nominations to public office. It offers a new theory of party religiosity to explain variations in women's leadership across parties and countries.

Party-level characteristics, especially religiosities and secularisms, influence women's chances in leadership within parties' inner structures. The root of the problematic of women's leadership lies in party

religiosity, which is hypothesized to explain variation in women's shares in parties' executive and legislative decision-making bodies. This is premised on a multivocal understanding of religions implying that there is a continuum of multiple religiosities and secularisms. Party religiosity refers to the religious components on parties' political platforms or the extent to which religion penetrates their agendas. The theory predicts that as religiosity in party platforms rises, women's leadership is more likely to fall. Thus, in extremist parties with more extensive religious goals, women's leadership is likely to prove stunted. These parties are hierarchical and less accommodating to women's leadership demands than parties of lower religiosity. Therefore, more secular and civil parties are superior for women's leadership than more religious parties.

This work combines quantitative and qualitative research, using single and multiple case studies. The theory is tested across 330 parties in a nonrandom sample of 26 countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe of Muslim-, Christian-, and Jewish-dominant faiths. It is then explored in-depth in multireligious and multiparty Lebanon, a Muslim-majority Arab country. Toward this end, an original and unique dataset on women in 330 relevant parties is compiled, which is a modest contribution to engendering political science. The dataset is available to researchers, feminists, and students of world religions and political parties on the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) website and archived with Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA), Pennsylvania State University.

The findings of this body of research are robust in that as religiosity increases, women's leadership falls. The theory travels. It is powerful, explanatory, predictive, and generalizable.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The idea of turning my doctoral dissertation into a book originated with Alfred Stepan and Lucy Goodhart, whom I was privileged to work under. For their guidance and encouragement, I will always be deeply grateful and forever indebted.

For how the book turned out, I owe much to the anonymous scholar tasked by Palgrave Macmillan to review my manuscript, offering a road map to revising it, which enriched the book significantly. I hope the book stands up to the expectations of the reviewer and Palgrave Macmillan.

Much appreciation goes to Lebanese party leaders, male and female members of parliament and government, and male and female party activists and practitioners, national scholars, and international experts who, despite their busy schedules, gave time and effort to respond to my questions. I am grateful for the rich information they provided. Without their kindness, patience, and cooperation, this work would not have been possible. I owe a lot to the national researchers who helped compile data on women in 312 parties in 25 countries in Africa, Asia, and Europe.

My gratitude also goes to my family and friends whose encouragement fueled my energy to go through this challenging but daunting task of writing for a totally different audience than for a dissertation committee.

Finally, I owe much to my two daughters, Hana and May, and my son, Ramzi, for their tolerance and loving support. Stepping into their father's shoes, they were always ready to be my second readers. I will forever be grateful for Hana's brilliant concept idea for the book cover. May's feedback and unfaltering encouragement were instrumental for realizing my dream. Having been an international civil servant for more than three decades, two of which focusing on Arab women's

issues, concerns, and advancement, I am touched that my work inspired Ramzi, a civil liberties advocate, to champion women's rights. Working on the book deprived me from enjoying my grandchildren, Yasmeen and Ferris, and from exercising my role as a grandmother: My apologies.

I dedicate this book to the memory of my late husband, Ziad Kassem, who was my source of intellectual motivation and inspiration.

I also dedicate this book to all those women who are determined that a "Women Spring" will eventually dawn on the Arab World.

Introduction

Four United Nations (UN) world conferences on women (New Mexico 1975; Copenhagen 1980; Nairobi 1985; and Beijing 1995) and an International Decade for Women (1975–1985) succeeded in raising gender awareness and narrowing gender gaps in education and economic participation, though unevenly across countries. However, gender inequality in the political domain remains a pervasive global phenomenon. Gains realized by women in the public sector lag behind their educational attainments, economic contributions, and professional achievements in the private sector. This conundrum of the mismatch between women's gains in the public and private sectors motivates this research on women's political leadership.

Comparative global studies point to a positive relationship between women's attainment of high-level education and their assumption of leadership and decision-making positions in the private and public sectors.[1] Georgia Duerst-Lahti (2006) finds that equal access to education and economic resources are prerequisites not only for improving women's socioeconomic status but also for politically empowering them. R. Anker (2005) maintains that gender gaps will narrow once a high share of women assumes leadership positions, which, ceteris paribus, will eventually drive the change toward gender equality. Empirical evidence shows that since 1975, women's economic performance improved once they attained higher levels of education. However, inconsistent with theoretical expectations, gender gaps in political representation remain wide.[2] These are most pronounced in developing and Arab countries, where sociocultural, demographic, and political characteristics are said to impede women's advancement and political empowerment.[3] Women's political leadership, broadly defined, remains low with wide variations across and within countries in the same region, and across political parties.

Feminists and political scientists argue that political parties are the main vehicles for women's political advancement.[4] Different parties offer women different opportunities. Why some parties are superior to others in advancing women to leadership is the central question this research addresses and aims to explain. This research moves beyond country-level and society-level to institutional-level analysis, focusing on political parties as women's entry level into the public political sphere. Understanding women's advancement to leadership positions within inner party echelons is important for explaining female parliamentary representation.[5] This has not been addressed by studies pitched at the country level, at least not in Arab countries, and is distinct from an analysis that looks only on female parliamentary representation, the most commonly invoked indicator for women's political participation. Because ultimate representation in elected office is also dependent on electoral systems and voters' preferences, it offers an incomplete snapshot of female leadership and may be a noisy signal of party attitudes toward women. Women's share in party leadership bodies and as nominees for public office—which may or may not result in electoral victory—are additional indicators of women's leadership that cannot be captured by data that only counts elected politicians.

The salience of religion seems to influence individual, institutional, and societal attitudes toward women. Various scholars posit that some religions are less hospitable, tolerant, and supportive of women's leadership than others. However, this research focuses not on distinctions between world religions per se, but on the intensity of religiosity built into parties' political platforms and its impact on women's leadership. Individual religiosity is "a measure of the intensity and importance of religious faith to an individual."[6] I distinguish between individual and institutional party religiosity. Party religiosity refers to the expanse of religious components in parties' political platforms. Dimensions of individual religiosity may refer to membership affiliation, piety, devoutness, doctrinal knowledge, commitment to ritual practices, and behavioral ethics (Casanova 1994: 26).

I argue that political parties with extensive religious platforms tend to have lower female leadership than the more secular parties. As the intensity of religiosity in party platforms rises, the share of women in leadership bodies falls. This is the theory advanced and developed in this book. I single out party religiosity as the core explanatory variable for women's leadership. The intensity of party religiosity is the extent to which religious goals penetrate parties' agendas. Leadership bodies within inner party structures may carry different names in different

parties, such as political commissions or politburos, supreme councils, and/or consultative or *shoura* committees. Essentially, these bodies discharge similar oversight, executive, and legislative functions. I focus on the share of women in these leadership bodies.

In developing the theory of party religiosity and women's leadership, I identify and explore factors driving those observed phenomena and test the theory. I employ a combined multiple and single case study approach by compiling an original dataset on women's leadership in 330 parties across 26 countries from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Asian developing countries, and Europe, where Islam, Christianity, and Judaism are the dominant religions. The statistical findings support the theory and establish that it travels across nations. This paves the ground for conducting in-depth research in Lebanon and linking the findings in the large (N = 330) to the small (n = 18) to shed light on interesting associations discovered in the cross-national comparative study. Lebanon offers a unique and interesting case study of the conundrum driving this research, notably, an overwhelming mismatch between women's high socioeconomic and dismally low political profiles. The quantitative and qualitative findings in Lebanon are robust in validating the theory of party religiosity and women's leadership: As party religiosity rises, women's leadership falls. The theory of party religiosity can explain variations in women's share in leadership bodies within inner party structures on their electoral lists for public office. It is a traveling theory, powerful, and robust. It has explanatory and predictive powers.

This body of research contributes to our understanding of the multiple forces that conspire to impede or enhance women's leadership within party echelons toward their representation in public office and the mutable role of religion among those forces. The original dataset on women in 330 political parties across 26 countries and the theory of party variation that this book advances are modest contributions to engendering political science discipline and to the study of women in politics, especially in the Muslim-majority and Arab countries.

Road Map to the Book

The book is in eight chapters with an introduction, concluding remarks, and an epilogue. The exposition of the main theoretical argument in chapter one is supported by chapter two summarizing statistical findings of a cross-national comparative study testing the theory of party

religiosity and women's leadership. This is followed by six chapters presenting complementary qualitative and quantitative evidence supporting the theory from the case study of Lebanon.

Chapter one lays out the observed phenomena motivating this research, notably, the lingering gender gaps in political leadership and representation. Previous scholarship largely ignored political parties as the main vehicles driving gains and losses in women's leadership. They sought explanations in country-level development, political regimes, and electoral systems, or society-level political culture and dominant religions. This chapter advances an institutional-level theory focusing on political parties as women's entry level into politics. Which parties are superior in advancing women to leadership is the main research question. The conceptual framework and contours of the theory of party religiosity and women's leadership and nominations for public office are laid out. Party religiosity is identified as a core explanatory variable. Party institutionalization is unpacked to identify other plausible variables besides party religiosity, notably, democratic practices, pluralism, female membership, strength, and denomination.

Chapter two summarizes the statistical findings of a cross-national comparative study of women's leadership in countries of dominant Muslim, Christian, and Jewish populations. Multivariate regression models for women's leadership and parliamentary nominations are estimated. The theory of party religiosity and women's leadership is found to travel: women are likelier to assume leadership in parties of lower than higher religiosity. However, party religiosity is not borne out for female parliamentary nominations. The association established between shares of female party membership, leadership, and nominations for parliament draws a linear career path for women in politics. Data compiled from party administrators constitute the nucleus for a global database on women in political parties. To my knowledge, this comprehensive, original dataset on women in political parties is not available elsewhere. This unique dataset is a modest but valuable contribution to comparativists, researchers, and feminists interested in Islam and women in politics in the Middle East and Arab countries. The encouraging statistical findings pave the way for the in-depth case study of Lebanon.

Chapter three justifies the case for Lebanon. An overwhelming mismatch between women's high socioeconomic and low political profiles makes the case for Lebanon. This is especially pronounced when comparing women of high socioeconomic profiles in Lebanon to other Arab countries, where female representation is much higher. In

addition, the multireligious society, multiple cross-cutting social and conflict-bearing religious cleavages, and a multiparty system with profusion of parties make Lebanon a unique, interesting, and compelling case study to test the theory of party religiosity and women's leadership. Toward this end, an original comprehensive dataset on women in 18 relevant parties (those occupying at least 1 percent in 2009 parliament) is compiled. This is based on 150 semistructured and structured interviews with party leaders, male and female elites, parliamentarians, and practitioners.

Chapter four examines party politics and the impact of the 15-year sectarian civil war on party religiosity and political culture via the lens of male and female party elites. The civil war widened religious cleavages, intensified extremism, reshaped the party system, shifted party memberships, and influenced political culture. Parties are split along the civil war timeline. Prewar parties are traditional and conservative; while postwar parties seem to be more liberal and modern toward women's leadership. Qualitative evidence supports the conceptual framework of the theory that party religiosity influences women's leadership and is most pronounced in Islamist extremist parties. Content analysis of mission statements and political platforms of the 18 relevant parties and rich information culled from interviewees are instrumental in classifying, labeling, and coding parties by religiosity. These are classified into secular, civil-confessional, and religious tolerant, conservative, and extremist parties. An ordinal measure of religiosity is developed to code parties along a 5-point continuum from 1 for highest religiosity to 5 for lowest religiosity. This chapter engages in the debate over public and private religion, challenging the argument that *deprivatization* enhances liberal democracy and by extension an egalitarian attitude toward women's leadership. Qualitative evidence shows that privatization of religion is more "women-friendly" than deprivatization, as in communal public Islam.

In chapter five, party institutionalization is unpacked to identify additional aspects, besides party religiosity, that may influence women's membership and leadership. Democratic practices in leadership transitions and decision making and pluralism in membership are examined. Information culled from male and female party officials shows that only 5 (2 are extremist parties) of the 18 relevant parties follow democratic process in leadership transitions and 12 parties involve women in decision making, though none is a religious party; 7 of the 18 parties have plural membership, mostly secular and some civil-confessional but none is a religious party. Qualitative evidence

drawn from elites in nonreligious parties supports the conception that democratic practices and pluralism attract women to join and promote them to leadership. Elites in religious parties have different conceptions of pluralism and most find it irrelevant for women's membership and leadership.

Chapter six examines political parties' mobilization strategies, modalities, and mechanisms targeting women. Parties find a special niche in women and target them to expand membership and outreach. The supply and demand for women in parties is contingent upon women's preferences to join voluntarily and parties' motivations to attract them. Thus, party religiosity is not hypothesized to influence female membership as it does their leadership chances. Average shares of female membership are highest in postwar than in prewar parties, as anticipated. However, secular parties of plural and democratic practices have lowest female membership, while religious parties of plural and democratic deficits have the highest shares. More precisely, Tayyar, Marada, and Hizbullah have mixed plural and democratic patterns but huge female memberships, which is inconsistent with expectations. Religious mobilization, state-of-the-art, and/or financial (including money for veiling possibilities) and in-kind incentives by affluent parties targeting women, especially the poor in rural and remote areas, can largely explain these results. Women are targeted because of their value-added to political parties. They are a *symbol of the modern*, embellish parties' public image, and make special contributions, including their less corruptibility. Parties maintain special women's wings as effective for mobilizing women and as electioneering mechanisms. These units marginalize and ghettoize women, keeping them away from decision making and party politics, thereby failing to create a critical mass for leadership. Some avant-guardiste civil-confessional and secular parties plan to dismantle women's wings and mainstream gender issues across sectors. Because of segregation between the sexes, religious parties retain these units hoping that over time a critical mass of women for leadership will be created.

Chapter seven explains women's leadership, exploring party religiosity as it informs party politics. Statistics show that average shares of women in leadership bodies are lowest in religious parties of highest religiosity and plural and democratic deficits; and highest in secular, plural, and democratic parties of lowest religiosity, as theorized. Variations across parties within party categories are depicted. Qualitative evidence substantiates these results. These dismiss contending arguments of endogeneity in the causal argument that it is not party religiosity that

explains variations in leadership bodies but self-selection, since women are less-educated in religious than nonreligious parties. The puzzle motivating this research highlights the high female to male enrollment ratio at university level. Qualitative evidence shows that in religious and nonreligious parties, there are highly and poorly educated women targeted by affluent parties. In fact, religious parties appoint women to leadership positions as heads of women's wings. Therefore, the low share of women in leadership bodies is not due to personal qualifications of women in religious parties, but party politics informed by party religiosity.

A multivariate regression model for women's leadership is estimated incorporating seven independent variables, reducing the degrees of freedom of the model and parsimony of the theory. Despite the small number of observations (n = 18), party religiosity emerges as highly statistically significant no matter what specifications are used in the model. Party pluralism and strength are statistically significant but not democracy and denomination. Findings show that, against expectations and contrary to statistical results in the cross-national study, female membership does not matter for leadership and is not a prerequisite for it. The model explains a large proportion of the variance in women's leadership across parties. This demonstrates that a religiosity argument is superior to country-level development, political and electoral systems, and/or society-level political culture and religion, or even women's educational level.

Chapter eight responds to the question whether women can break through the political glass ceiling, exploring female party nominations to public office. Statistics show that the share of female municipal candidates doubled between 2004 and 2010, while the corresponding share for parliaments is halved between 2005 and 2009; 10 of the 18 parties nominated women for municipalities compared to only 5, none of which is a religious party. Parties compete over many more seats for municipalities than for parliaments. Although a Bloc Vote (BV) electoral law governs both councils, it is nonconfessional and more women-friendly for municipalities than parliaments. Men are not willing to cede parliamentary seats to women, given lifelong prestige and financial and fringe benefits. Qualitative findings show that women's chances in winning are higher in municipalities than parliaments because parties collaborate with community and family networks and religious leaders to field candidates. Parties realize that municipalities as parliaments are a key to their electoral strength akin to women's wings. They nominate more women to compete with other parties.

Interviewees note that women are a less risky scenario for weaker parties, possess special skills for social and community development, and are less corruptible than men. Women possess local name recognition and are able to amass votes at smaller rural areas, in contrast to scholarly wisdom that larger districts work more for women's electability. The results of modeling support the theory that party religiosity, democracy, and female membership are statistically significant for female municipal nominations. Party democracy, denomination, and strength explain female parliamentary nominations, but party religiosity does not. These results are driven by (1) absence of variation on the religiosity variable in four of five parties nominating women; (2) reluctance of weaker parties to nominate women for fear of loss of precious parliamentary seats; (3) success of Christian-dominated parties to field more women to public office than Muslim-dominated parties; and (4) abstenance of Islamist (extremist) parties of highest religiosity to nominate women to both councils. Thus, municipalities constitute a breakthrough for women in politics, if they choose a political career. A career path for women in politics linking female membership, leadership, and nominations to public office, established in the cross-national study is not borne out in Lebanon.

The section "Concluding Remarks" of the book highlights that (1) parties of lower religiosity are superior for women's leadership than parties of higher religiosity; (2) female membership does not matter for leadership or parliamentary nominations; and (3) municipalities constitute a breakthrough for women's leadership to a political career. The theory of party religiosity and women's leadership explains the conundrum of the mismatch between women's high socioeconomic and low political profiles motivating this research. It is robust, predictive, explanatory, and generalizable.

CHAPTER ONE

Toward a Theory of Party Religiosity and Women's Leadership

This introductory chapter lays the global challenge motivating this research that relative gains realized by women in leadership are lower in the public than in private sector. Here a theory of party religiosity and women's leadership is advanced and its contours developed. As party religiosity rises, women's leadership in political parties and nominations for public office falls. These are two additional indicators for women's political participation besides the most commonly invoked parliamentary representation.

The chapter proceeds in four sections. The first section provides empirical evidence substantiating the mystery of women's political leadership. The second section covers previous scholarly country-level and society-level explanations for the gender gap in parliamentary representation, offering alternative institutional and party-level explanations for women's leadership. The third section highlights the critical role of political parties laying the conceptual framework of the theory of party religiosity and women's leadership that this book proposes. The final section provides the hypotheses that make the theory along with the measurement and operationalization of variables for cross-national and single case studies testing the theory.

The Conundrum of Women's Political Leadership

Between 1995 and 2010, the share of women among heads of states and governments (excluding ruling monarchs and queens) grew by 2 percentage points, while their share as chief executive officers (CEOs)

grew by five times as much. During the same period, female ministerial positions increased by 3.4 percentage points, while in board seats it more than doubled. Furthermore, female parliamentary representation, the most commonly invoked indicator for measuring women's political participation, grew by 7.5 percentage points, less than half the increase recorded for corporate managers. This suggests that, while gains have indeed been realized in women's leadership in the public sector, these gains are far below those attained in the private sector. Moreover, the global average for women in parliament (lower house)

Table 1.1 World and Regional Averages: Women in Public versus Private Sector Leadership, 1995–2010 (%)

A. Public versus Private Sector: World Averages

Public Sector Leadership				*Private Sector Leadership*			
	1995	*2010*	*1995–2010 Change*		*1995*	*2010*	*1995–2010 Change*
Heads of State and Governments (excluding queens and ruling monarchs	5.8	7.7	1.9	Directors and CEOs	3.3	13.2	9.9
Cabinet Ministers	6.1	9.5	3.4	Board seats	6.2	14.7	8.5
Parliament (lower house)	11.6	19.1	7.5	Corporate officers and general managers	12.5	27.0	14.5

B. Women in Parliaments: World and Regional Averages

Region	*1995*	*2010*
Nordic Countries (NC)	36.4	42.1
Europe OSCE Countries	13.2	24.9
Americas	12.7	22.2
Europe OSCE Excluding NC	12.3	21.9
Asia	13.2	18.7
Sub-Saharan Africa	9.8	18.4
Pacific	6.3	13.2
Arab states	4.3	10.1
World	11.6	19.1

Sources: Computations by the author based on www.ipu.org, November 30, 2010; World Wide Guide to Women Leadership: www.guide2womenleaders.com, May 10, 2010; www.cia.gov; www.CNNMoney.com 2000–2009; UN 2010: 22–24; http// laborsat.ilo.org; Ernst and Young sponsored Census of Women in Fortune 500 Corporate Officer and Board Positions (www.ey.com); www.fortune500.com; www.infoplease.com

stands well below parity at 19.1 percent in 2010, up from 11.6 percent in 1995, with wide variations across regions. The Arab region has the lowest female representation, despite improving from 4.3 percent in 1995 to 10.1 in 2010 while the Nordic countries continue to boast the highest average share at 42.1 percent (table 1.1).

This empirical evidence does not only reflect an enduring mismatch between women's economic and political participation, but also wide disparities and lingering inequalities in female parliamentary representation worldwide. Nonetheless, significant improvements are witnessed across regions and in developing countries between 1995 and 2010. This may be attributed to (1) efforts of international organizations to push a gender equality agenda that enhanced gender awareness pursuant to the four world conferences on women from New Mexico 1975 to Beijing 1995; (2) increasing employment of affirmative action measures (constitutional and legislative quotas) by democratizing countries boosting female representation; (3) adopting women-friendlier national laws and legislation by developing countries, demonstrating to the international community commitment to gender equality; (4) ratifying and implementing international legal instruments including the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Beijing Platform for Action, and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); and (5) promoting women as a *symbol of the modern* to showcase to the international community. Given this, what factors explain the disparity in women's public versus private sector gains, lingering gender inequalities, and wide variations in female representation across countries?

Explaining Female Parliamentary Representation

The analysis of factors influencing women's political leadership, broadly defined, necessitates engaging with the scholarship that seeks to explain persistent gender inequalities in female representation. Five main socio-political explanations have been advanced, notably, country-level development, political regimes, and electoral systems and society-level political culture and religion.

Country-Level Explanations

Development and modernization theories point to Gross Domestic Product per Capita (GDP/capita) as indicator of a country's development level. Comparative studies have established that as GDP/capita rises, the

overall status of women including female representation improves as a result of higher educational attainment and improved economic participation.[1] While this argument is generally valid, it cannot be denied that there are overachievers (Rwanda), underachievers (Luxembourg and Kuwait), and super underachievers (Qatar, Oman, and Saudi Arabia). Therefore, wide variations, especially in middle-income countries, are not fully explained by arguments based on countries' income levels. R. Anker (2005) also finds that GDP/capita alone is not a dispositive factor in explaining variations in female representation.

Some scholars observe that women's status and parliamentary representation is higher in democratic than in autocratic and authoritarian regimes. Steven Fish ties women's overall station directly to regime type, arguing that more democratic regimes provide the basis for higher status (2002: 29–37). Basu argues that different political regimes offer different opportunities for women in the political arena, be it in political participation or representation in public office (2005: 34). This scholarship maintains that democracies are more conducive to female representation, because they are premised on principles of freedom of expression, contestation, transparency, competition, free and fair elections, and equality among citizens.[2] In contrast, countries with democratic deficit tend to discriminate against women, withhold their rights to compete for leadership.[3] This is manifested in political institutions, including political parties, and is behind the substandard position of women and their low representation in public office. Indeed, average female representation in democracies is higher than it is in autocracies and theocracies, which accords general support for a political regime's argument. However, one also observes overachievers among autocratic regimes (United Arab Emirates [UAE], Afghanistan, Tunisia before 2011); and underachievers among democracies (Japan) or democratizing countries (Comoros, Lebanon).

A third line of argument attributes variations in female representation to electoral systems, list types, and gender quotas.[4] Empirical evidence shows that proportional systems, notably party list proportional representation (List-PR), are superior since they maintain higher levels of female representation. Under List-PR, each party presents a list of candidates for a multimember electoral district, where voters vote for a party and parties receive seats in proportion to their overall share of the vote. This provides incentives for parties to nominate women since they do not risk losing seats because of gender bias. Mixed Membership and Proportional (MMP) and Single Transferrable Vote (STV) or majoritarian systems have embedded elements such as open

lists or small districts, which are inherently not "women-friendly." Following Norris, I refer to women-friendly electoral systems as those that improve female representation in public office. A key feature of electoral systems affecting women's representation is the use of open or closed electoral lists. Closed lists have specified placement, top rank-ordered or zipper quotas, in which the winning candidates are taken from the lists in the order of their position on these electoral lists. If the lists are "open" or "free" the voters can influence the order of the candidates by marking individual preferences. In such voting systems, prejudice or gender bias among voters may cause them to favor male over female candidates. Thus, ballot systems that do not allow substitution according to candidate attributes such as gender are more favorable to women's advancement. Closed electoral lists with rank-ordered or zipped lists as articulated in the electoral law offer women greater chances of electability than open electoral lists because they eliminate gender bias and the possibility that women are knocked off the lists by voters or replaced by male candidates.[5] In contrast, in Bloc Vote (BV) systems, as in Lebanon, voters vote for candidates and do not offer parties incentives to nominate women.

However, as Norris cogently argues, "By itself the electoral system is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to guarantee women's representation. Nevertheless, the electoral system functions as a facilitating mechanism, which expedites implementation of measures within parties, like affirmative action for female candidates" (1999: 2). Experts suggest that the most effective formula for boosting female representation is combining a List-PR system with large electoral districts, closed, rank-ordered lists (top-ranking, zipper quotas), and percentage quotas for women.[6] Affirmative action measures merit special consideration. The 1995 Beijing Platform for Action specifies a minimum of 30 percent quota for women in all decision-making levels as a temporary measure. Hence, temporary quotas for women, legislated and constitutional quotas (percentage shares or reserved seats for candidates), and/or voluntary internal and electoral party quotas are effective in boosting female representation to a level that will eventually make a difference in decisio making: the critical mass theory (Pitre 2006). While it is true that the majority of developed, democratic countries employs women-friendly electoral systems and use or have used gender quotas, some developing countries with autocratic regimes are also employing a List-PR system and quotas with less rewarding results in female representation. Thus, this is not a magic formula, since one still observes wide variations in female representation that

remain unexplained by an electoral systems argument or a preferred electoral combination. This signals the presence of other, possibly more compelling explanations.

In order to elucidate deviations from the general pattern, the joint influence of country-level GDP/capita, political regimes, and electoral systems on female representation is examined quantitatively. This is tested on a nonrandom sample of 80 countries (42.6 percent of the universe): 33 developed countries of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and all 47 developing Muslim-majority (Arab and non-Arab) countries (Sbaity Kassem 2011; Annex 2 in this volume). Higher-income democracies employing List-PR systems generally produce higher shares of female parliamentarians than all other groups of countries. However, one still finds underachievers (Japan) and superachievers, notably, the Nordic countries. This group outshines other higher-income democracies also employing List-PR, closed lists, and voluntary party quotas, but boasting the highest female representation worldwide. Thus, income level differences and disparities in political regimes or electoral systems do not, singularly or combined, explain variations in female representation from the general pattern. These factors are necessary but not sufficient to explain fully variations from the general pattern and cannot explain super and underachievers in female representation. This signals the presence of other—as of yet untheorized—explanatory variables for women's leadership.

Two related questions emerge: How have the Nordic countries succeeded in almost reaching gender parity in parliamentary representation, while others failed? And, what special characteristics distinguish them from other consolidated democracies also employing women-friendly electoral systems? One observation is that most of the five Nordic overachievers have social democratic parties and these parties have high shares of female legislators. These parties are nonreligious, nominate women for public office, and are instrumental in politically empowering them. This simple observation prompts in-depth examination of party types for plausible explanation of variations in female representation. I argue that it is the superiority of these countries' party systems and nonreligious party politics offering women more opportunities in leadership than others. I assume that political parties provide the missing link. But, why are some parties superior to others in enhancing women's leadership? Do we find more compelling explanations at institutional-level party religiosity or at society-level political culture and religion?

Society-Level Explanations

Some scholars seek additional explanations for female representation at society-level political culture and/or dominant religion.[7] Following Norris, I refer to political culture as "[t]he dominant values and attitudes toward the role of women in society and in political life. Where traditional values prevail, it might be expected that women would be hesitant to pursue a political career, selectors would be hesitant to choose them as candidates, and parties would be unwilling to introduce effective gender equality policies" (Lovenduski and Norris 1993: 312). A political culture argument focuses on cultural barriers (traditions, customs, norms, and values) and entrenched patriarchy in the society. I extend the analysis from a society's patriarchal culture to institutional party-level political culture, which is not a constant even among parties within the same culture and dominant religion. Arguments relating to political culture and religion cannot be easily quantified or measured and have often relied on qualitative, in-depth case studies, as I do. Information culled from 150 interviews with Lebanese party leaders, male elites, and female activists reveals that political culture across parties is indeed a variable.

Political culture is reflected in the attitudes of party elites. If the prevailing political culture in the party is not women-friendly, then male elites especially in religious and conservative parties tend to block women's access to leadership positions. They invoke illiberal discourses that "women's leadership violates the Shari'a"; or "women's place is at home," and "politics-is-a-man's business," as also Dahlerup (2006) finds. Indeed, some party leaders resort to antifeminist discourse in order to justify the low share of women in leadership bodies. For instance, in a telephone interview with the leader of a Lebanese Salafist (Sunni) party, the cleric asserts that "God created women as mothers, wives, daughters, and sisters. But, women are not interested in politics, not experienced in policy or decision-making, or fit for political leadership. Politics is for men. Women's place is at home." Thus, a political culture argument might explain low female representation and leadership in political institutions within the same country or across countries with traditional and conservative value systems. However, it fails to account for variations in female leadership across different parties and institutions that exist within the same country and share the same traditions. I find that a political culture explanation is weak on its own unless combined with arguments grounded in politics. Other scholars also argue that political explanations are superior to cultural

ones (see Przeworski et al. 1989; Donno and Russett 2004; Stepan and Robertson 2003).

Closely related to a political culture explanation is the argument built on salience of religion. The discourse on religion and religiosity brings me closer to the main thrust in this book and the theory advanced, linking religiosity in party politics to women's leadership.

Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophers, notably, Voltaire and Nietzsche predicted that "[r]eligion's influence on public life would decline in modern times." They suggested that the dominance of religion would wane as societies became modernized and less traditional, at which time secularism or "laïcité" would take over.[8] However, historical developments have belied these expectations and secularism has not proven inevitable or irreversible. In this vein, Corstange affirms that "contrary to the early expectations of secularization theory, religion appears to be increasing, rather than decreasing, in importance in the contemporary public sphere" (2012: 1). Similarly, Norris and Inglehart note that "[i]t is obvious that religion has not disappeared from the world, nor does it seem likely to do so." They conclude that especially "[i]n developing societies, we would predict that religion would continue to play an important role in politics. [And that] . . . [t]he expanding gap between the sacred and the secular societies around the globe will have important consequences for world politics, making the role of religion increasingly salient on the global agenda" (2004: 4, 22, 241). These conclusions carve out a role for religion in today's politics, particularly party politics.

Witness the rise of Islamist parties and their sweeping landslide electoral victories in the wake of the 2011 Arab uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. Threats heightened that women will lose some of their hard-acquired rights as Islamists took over the revolts. This is associated with a dramatic drop in women's leadership in the public sphere or any visible sharing in rebuilding and democratizing their new countries. As Adeed Dawisha cogently argues, "There is perhaps, no better barometer of the democratic orientations of political groups than their attitudes and policies toward women" (2013: 3). However, I ponder whether similar hostile attitudes toward women's leadership are observed in different religions or religious cultures. Scholars have often argued that world religions (Catholicism, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Judaism) are at least in some ways particularly hostile toward women.[9] Also, Jimmy Carter, former U.S. president, highlights that "women are prevented from playing a full and equal role in many faiths, creating an environment in which violations against women are

justified."[10] Thus, differentiation by religious family suggests, and my in-depth research in Lebanon confirms, that different religions have different consequences for female empowerment and leadership and that even the influence of the same religion on women is not uniform or a constant. Therefore, party denomination might matter for women's leadership.

Indeed, feminists and social scientists alike have broadly explored and found a tenuous relation between religions or religious cultures and the status of women. Anke Schuster recognizes the existing tension between religion and democracy and the influence of both on the station of women. She points out that "[r]eligion is frequently the reason for discrimination, injustice and exclusion, a marker for social marginalization, which is a central concern of multiculturalism" (2007: 2). More specifically, she finds that one of the reasons religion is thought to be inimical to liberal-democratic policies is that "conservative and fundamentalist religious groups frequently hold and proclaim opinions that are illiberal. One of the most contentious issues in this respect is the attitude of religious groups toward the role of women" (3). Schuster indicates that these religious groups often have affiliated parties that carry their conservative values into politics, adversely influencing women's prospects for leadership and public office. These views are corroborated by qualitative evidence culled from statements of religious party leaders and elites interviewed in Lebanon. In fact, when clerics double as party leaders and elites, women's chances in leadership are severely thwarted or blocked. This is clearly reflected in the response of a cleric, leader of a Lebanese Salafist party: "Women cannot and should not lead men. This would be in stark violation of the Shari'a and the holy Qur'an. The society will not accept women in politics or as leaders. This is not in our religious culture and traditions!" This leader wanted a telephone not face-to-face interview and did not refer female party members, since their functions are limited to religious guidance and counseling and not party politics.

Notwithstanding this, parties will support women's leadership when it is in their interest to do so, in which case even religious and Islamist parties tend to relax their conservative stance or overlook the Shari'a. This somewhat contradicts Mervat Hatem's argument that "while Islamists are not at all committed to the liberal process, secularists are only committed to it if liberalization does not dislodge them from their position of power" (1994: 676). But, in such instances, one is hard-pressed to stress that it is common for parties to employ "strategic maneuverings," in this case supporting women's leadership, if it is in

their interests to do so (Clark and Schwedler 2003). Therefore, women aspiring to leadership must identify where parties' interests lie and strategize accordingly, a behavior that may lead to favorable outcomes and breakthroughs. In this respect, religions function not unlike other ideologies in that they provide a unified, structured way of seeing the world, affecting the lives and thoughts of adherents, including women (see also Corstange 2012).

Moreover, religious tenets are often conflated with traditions and norms, especially in conservative societies, stunting women's advancement. Tyra Bouhamdan argues that "[s]ocial and religious history often drives legal traditions to evolve . . . [g]ender issues are often primarily dictated by culture (i.e. traditions, customs, norms, social identifications, etc.)" (2009: 20). However, Corstange maintains that "[r]eligion is therefore not necessarily inimical to pluralism and democracy" (2012: 42). He does not consider that Islam hinders democratization, particularly looking at its role in public debates. He suggests that the increasing visibility of religion in the public sphere does not necessarily threaten liberal democracy. Similarly, in his seminal work on public religion, Casanova argues that "deprivatization" of religion is instrumental to democratization and that public religion does not circumscribe liberalism and democracy. However, he explicitly excludes the Islamic world stressing that political Islam is public religion, which is still in the phase of secular-religious cleavages and is neither liberal nor democratic (1994: 221–232). In contrast, Samuel Huntington (1996) argues that Islam is inherently undemocratic, pointing to the more marginal status of women in some Muslim and Arab countries (see also Fox 2006). Similarly, Fish stresses that "[t]he station of women . . . links Islam and the democratic deficit" (2002: 29). Stepan and Robertson (2003 and 2004) question these contending arguments, stressing that it is not Islam but rather "Arab exceptionalism" that should be investigated (see also Donno and Russett 2004). They argue that Islam is not a bar to women's political leadership since in certain non-Arab Muslim-majority countries women are heads of state and government. In fact, the performance of some Arab and non-Arab Muslim-majority countries on a number of indicators of democracy and women's rights and public office representation has been a subject of interest to scholars who have sought explanations of these comparative outcomes. There are wide variations in female representation across Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries, with countries like Afghanistan or Tunisia boasting female representation (27 and 28 percent) way above 19.1 percent world average and closer to that in advanced countries [www.ipu.org]).

This suggests three conclusions. First, Islam by itself does not seem to be a bar to near-average female parliamentary representation in some Arab and non-Arab Muslim-majority countries. Second, the low female representation in Arab states must not be attributed solely to Islam but varying interpretations thereof, which are not women-friendly. Third, there remains a great deal of unexplained variation within Muslim-majority, conservative societies, particularly the lower levels in Arab countries, begging for an explanatory theory. The 2011 Arab uprisings have disproved the argument of "Arab exceptionalism," as the wall of fear broke down with women standing side by side with men in the freedom squares and as the enraged Arab peoples took to the streets downing their despotic rulers and demanding liberty, equality, democracy, dignity, and freedom.

These explanations do not necessarily rest on the notion that all religions are essentially un-egalitarian. However, since men continue to dominate the theological realm, they exercise a near monopoly over jurisprudence and interpretation of the doctrine. Qualitative evidence from my research in Lebanon shows that whenever clergymen double as party leaders, they tend to thwart women's leadership in the political realm. Simultaneously, they have the authority to influence party politics in a manner to execute women unfriendly policies at the party level. As Jimmy Carter cogently states, "The truth is that male religious leaders have had—and still have—an option to interpret holy teachings either to exalt or subjugate women. They have, for their own selfish ends, overwhelmingly chosen the latter" (Fairfax Media, January 25, 2013). Many religions have been formally structured by men to exclude women from key roles and to retain gendered power advantages over women (Duerst-Lahti 2006). Elin Bjarnergard (2008) concludes that women's advancement to leadership positions within formal religious structures is often blocked by the men who dominate those spaces. Indeed, leaders and elites of Lebanese Islamist parties often invoke doctrinal violation blocking women from leadership and nominations to public office. This is not sui generis to Lebanon, but is also prevalent in other Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries, and in the Netherlands, where women in a Calvinist party face a similar fate (Schuster 2007). Thus, in some countries women are subjected to the double jeopardy of gender bias in party politics and religion-related hostility, which thwarts their chances in leadership and public office. Other countries may be free from gender bias as Richard Matland and Gunes Tezcur (2011) find in Turkey or partly free as the Arab Barometer data (2012) show for Lebanon. Such, religion-related hostilities embedded in party

politics provide additional explanation for variation in women's leadership, besides political culture.

In sum, previous scholarship analyzing country-level attributes and society-level political culture and hostilities of some world religions—particularly Islam—to women do not fully explain observed variations in female leadership across countries. These arguments do not explore the underlying influence of party variation in religiosity on women's leadership in parties' inner structures. Religions can be and are continuously being reinterpreted. There is also profound variation in female representation across different types of parties in Arab and non-Arab Muslim-majority countries, which prior arguments fail to explain fully. Therefore, how we understand and measure the influence of religion and party religiosity on women's political leadership and representation becomes a valid and timely question. One broad argument posits that female representation is largely influenced by parties' formal commitment to gender equality, notably employment of affirmative action measures (gender quotas), and explicit, gender-specific and transparent rules that allow for accountability. This is too obvious, self-evident, and somewhat tautological; however, this body of work also examines political culture, electoral systems, and/or political regimes as barriers to female representation.[11] Another broad argument suggests that party institutionalization and placement along the political spectrum (left, right, or center) account for female representation (Kittilson 1997; Sacchet 2005). A third line of argument maintains that female representation is influenced by the behavior of parties toward women as opposed to social and women's movements (Basu 2005).[12]

Prior arguments do not fully account for observed variations in women's participation. This begs for additional explanation, one that examines political parties as main vehicles for women's leadership and identifies factors influencing such prospects. Further, while some of the extant scholarship analyzes party-level characteristics to understand female representation, it fails to explore the influence of party variation in religiosity on women's leadership in inner echelons and as nominees for public office. Therefore, an alternative theory is needed, one that generates compelling evidence explaining variations in women's leadership across political parties. This is the theory advanced in this book: as party religiosity rises, women's leadership falls. Prior scholarship does not directly address the relationship between party variation in religiosity and women's leadership. Granted, there are studies on women at large in nonreligious and religious, including Islamist, political parties, but not on women in leadership bodies and

not with parties as unit of analysis, as this theory does. These studies cover countries in the West, South Asia, and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and identify some party-level characteristics that explain female representation. These studies do not study in depth women's chances in assuming leadership across parties of varying religiosities. None of these studies focuses on Lebanon, a multireligious country with a profusion of diverse parties, to examine women's leadership and nominations to public office. None of the studies, that I am aware of, compiled a unique, original dataset on women in 330 parties across 26 countries, as this pioneering work does. This is a modest contribution to comparative political science, Middle East studies, and women in politics.

Debates Motivating a Theory of Party Religiosity and Women's Leadership

The theory proposed explores the interlinkages between party politics, party variation in religiosity, and women's leadership. It posits that the intensity of party religiosity in political platforms is a core explanatory variable for women's leadership. Embracing Stepan's (2001) multivocal understanding of religion implies that there are many voices and interpretations within the same religion producing socially constructed multiple secularisms and religiosities. However, these are neither constant nor uniform among individuals or across parties. Indeed, within any particular religious group, different voices and intensities are modulated, from the Islamist Taliban and radical Al-Qaeda schools of thought, to the Christian Calvinists and the Jewish SHAS, to the less traditional and more tolerant positions of some parties in Indonesia (PAN or PKB) and in Senegal (MDRS or RP). It follows that the intensity of religiosity (degree of secularism) embodied in party platforms varies along a continuum rather than a dichotomy. I expect women's chances in leadership to be inversely related to the intensity of party religiosity. In this section, I address key conceptual issues and debates motivating the theory of party religiosity and women's leadership.

Why Political Parties?

Political parties are main vehicles for women's political advancement. As gatekeepers, they recruit, select, and nominate candidates for public

office.[13] Parties also provide resources, opportunities, and create a pool of eligible women for leadership, as per the critical mass theory (Pitre 2006). The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA 2010) recognizes that

> There is a growing realization of the critical role played by political parties in democracy building and in the sustainability of democratic institutions. A country's democratic sustainability is often linked to the state of its political parties and its political actors. The quality and capacity of political parties has a direct impact on parliamentary performance and organization affecting among other things the legislative capacity of members elected, the promotion of equal participation and representation of women in politics and the representatives with political positions in the parliamentary structures.

Accordingly, these institutions play a central role in enhancing or impeding women's path to a political career. In order to validate this basic assumption, I gauge the views of Lebanese party leaders and female activists. A five-time-elected female member of parliament (MP) and a minister maintains that while there is no magic formula for women's leadership: "Only political parties offer women leadership opportunities. Running as independents is not a formula for success. Women should build alliances with men and lobby for affirmative action policies. Political expertise is not a college degree, but acquired overtime. Eventually, women will be recognized when they impose their presence as leaders." This echoes Phillips's (1995) argument that "[t]he only way that (*political*) institutions will change is through the politics of their (*women's*) presence" (in Duerst-Lahti 2006: 10). Similarly, the ILO reports that "[t]here is no evidence to show that once women attain upper levels of management and leadership, attitudes toward them are not much different to those toward men" (2004: 2). Practitioners recognize that women's chances in winning are slim if they run as independents, as another female MP stresses:

> Given patriarchy, parties are women's only avenue to a career in politics. Men may accept to compete with women in business and employment but they will not cede their seats to them willingly in parliament. Therefore, if women run as independents their chances in winning are nil. Strong parties are best placed to nominate women for parliament.

Indeed, findings from in-depth research in Lebanon confirm that all female candidates who could not secure their party's nomination or were not party members ran as independents and lost. This provides support that parties are critical for women's leadership.

In the first instance, a twice-failed female parliamentary candidate stresses that "Parties are not committed to gender equality and do not take measures to ensure it. Otherwise, we should have seen more women on electoral lists." She expresses disappointment that she failed because she couldn't secure the party's support. Similar sentiments are expressed by other failed female candidates. Few argue that the civil society may be an alternative route for women's leadership. Other candidates raise tokenism in parliamentary representation in that "Female MPs are only seat-warmers. Parties fail to prepare them to legislate and they remain ill-equipped for this task. Civil society works more for women's leadership than parties. In Jordan and Kuwait, female activists were appointed ministers. Parties should partner with women's non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to empower women." This echoes Basu's (2005) argument that women's movements may be an alternative to political parties for women's leadership, provided they build alliances with parties and have leverage as pressure groups. A former female minister suggests other avenues:

> Parties are not the only vehicles for female leadership. State intervention is also a viable route, when legislating affirmative action and gender quotas. These may be combined with parties' support for women. Municipalities work for women, because family networks and tribal affiliations are more essential than parties' support. Civil society is women's forte, they are active, visible, and experienced. This has worked for women in Europe and America as well as in Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Kuwait. So, why not in Lebanon?

A female activist while conceding that "parties are the only avenue for women's leadership" suggests that women should establish all-female parties emulating the few in America, the Netherlands, Ukraine, Jordan, and Syria, among others. She also highlights the importance of establishing networks to exchange good practices in this domain. However, the experience of all-female parties is not altogether encouraging, since they marginalize women instead of mainstreaming their issues, a process that feminists would undoubtedly argue against. Indeed, women need to work with the flow and not oppose it.

In the second instance, a female municipal candidate remarks that "being a political activist from the South, I am exposed to the ideologies of Hizbullah, Amal, Ba'ath, and Qawmi-Suri parties. However, I was appalled by their disregard for women, despite their rhetoric, and decided not to join any party." Despite this declared aversion, she accepts to be nominated by the party for municipal elections, which lends further support to parties' veritable role in advancing women. Notwithstanding this, there are few dissenting voices. A female MP states that oftentimes, "parties dismiss women's potentials and fail to accord them equal opportunities to compete for leadership or nominate them for public office." These reservations are legitimate given that different parties offer women different opportunities and some may not be particularly conducive to women's leadership (Basu 2005). This view is shared by a Lebanese party leader noting that

> It is not a question of whether or not political parties offer women chances in leadership, but whether women impose their presence in politics. Unfortunately, most women do not. In Asian Muslim countries or the West, women prove themselves as politicians. In the Arab countries, neither women nor men have a great opportunity in politics. This is basic human rights and not a gender issue.

Thus, except for a few dissenting voices, most respondents concur that parties are the main vehicles for women's leadership and representation in public office.

Analysis of determinants of women's leadership, broadly defined, ought to begin at the entry level into politics: political parties. Political, electoral, and party systems comprise the setting within which women's prospects for political leadership are conceived and drawn. Since different parties offer women different opportunities, variations in outcomes are explored by focusing on party religiosity as a core explanatory variable for women's leadership across parties.

Why Party Religiosity?

Research findings on women in politics point to secular parties as more hospitable to women's leadership demands and tolerant to diversity than religious parties.[14] Hatem (1994) argues, however, that liberalists (secularists) and Islamists do not differ in their views with respect to women and their political empowerment. Corstange (2012) concludes that religion (Islam) is not inimical to pluralism, liberalism,

and democracy. A multivocal perspective articulates multiple secularisms and religiosities that are socially constructed (Stepan 2009 and 2001: 234–236). Deeb also describes the multivocality of religion as the "[e]mergent public faces of religiosities around the globe" (2006: 26). I examine these contending arguments by exploring party variation in religiosity to identify which parties are superior for women's leadership. Party religiosity refers to the extent to which religion penetrates parties' political agendas.

Some parties declare adherence to religious positions as an almost reflexive and, in a sense, self-protective measure, while others openly claim secularity or separation between religion and politics. Parties resort to such different tactics in order to appeal to voters and be accepted by their communities. In some Arab and non-Arab Muslim-majority countries, parties have adopted a level of secularism that fits the society without risking antagonizing religious authorities. Safinaz Kazim finds that "in most of the Arab countries, particularly those which proclaim Islam as the religion of the state or the leadership, everyone who is secular finds a way around using this term" (in Hatem 1994: 674).[15] Extending these arguments to parties, one finds that in Indonesia no party would want to be labeled "secular," as that might cost it the votes of religious individuals. The same applies in Senegal, where *laïcit*é is used instead of *secularism,* or in Albania where secularism is linked to atheism. In certain countries there is a negative connotation to religiosity, such as the hostile secularism in Turkey, while in others religiosity is more popularly accepted or at least not socially rejected. Basu notes that in Pakistan "[t]he steady growth of political Islam has made many feminists rethink the value of a wholly secular approach that would separate them from the large majority of women, for whom religion is central in their daily lives" (2005: 15). Kazim also holds that secularists in Muslim countries tend to use religious emblems to fend-off charges of being a-religious and secular, because society is more accepting of religious-oriented politics (in Hatem 1994: 674). I found the opposite to be true in Lebanon, where some confessional parties distance themselves away from religious or sectarian labels for electioneering purposes and outreach. For instance, the leader of a Christian-dominated party self-identified the party as "[s]ecular with civil and national goals, although the majority of our members belong to one denomination. We do start our meetings with prayers and the party logo carries the cross. But, this does not make us a religious party." In this connection, Corstange studying the sectarian nature of Lebanese politics concludes that "[e]cumenical religion is the foil to sectarian

religion in multifaith societies" (2012: 42). This reality confers value on the study of party variation in religiosity as it examines their political platforms, distinguishing public rhetoric from concrete political commitments, actions, and behavior.

At the individual level, religiosity refers to the extent to which people adhere to the doctrine and are committed to practicing rituals. Melani Cammett and Sukriti Issar suggest that, in contrast to sectarianism, religiosity "[r]efers to piety and the observance of religious principles and practices" (2010: 391, footnote 30). Fadlallah, the late enlightened Shiite Lebanese scholar, explains that "[r]eligiosity means seeking out the vital elements in one's religion, which inevitably coincide with the vital elements of another's religion in which the values espoused by different faiths are largely shared values" (in Corstange 2012: 6). In a strong argument on the role of religion in women's lives, Mary Robinson, former president of Ireland and UN high commissioner for human rights asserts that "We all recognized that if there's one overarching issue for women it's the way that religion can be manipulated to subjugate women. There is of course plenty of fodder, in both the Qur'an and the Bible, for those who seek a theology of discrimination. ("Women and Religion," *New York Times*, January 10, 2010). Basu (2005) also sees that religiosity, broadly defined, is a plausible explanation for variations in female parliamentary representation in South Asia. Kittilson (1997) considers that religious ideology is of paramount influence on female representation in Great Britain. Though these arguments do not speak directly to party-level religiosity, they mirror closely the argument this book makes for women's leadership within parties.

Religious precepts at the institutional, party-level, can influence attitudes and behavioral patterns of party leaders and party members and, therefore, impact women's leadership. However, I posit that it is not religion or religiosity of individuals per se that influences women's leadership, but the intensity of religiosity in party platforms, or the extent to which religious goals and components penetrate political agendas. I argue that internal party politics, especially party religiosity (ideology), is a critical determinant of women's chances in leadership. In 1993, Norris suggested that future research should look deeply into the role of party ideology, including their religious ideology, in advancing women to the public sphere. This scholarship lends credence to the identification of party religiosity as a core explanatory variable for women's leadership in inner party structures. This is essentially because religious interpretations, particularly when clergymen double as party leaders, are then brought to bear on issues pertaining to

women's leadership chances (see Carter 2013). This analysis yields the following hypothesis:

> ***H1. The share of women in leadership bodies and on electoral lists is likely to be higher in parties whose platforms reflect less religiosity (more secularism) than in those containing high religiosity (low secularism).***

Since I am not a proponent of monocausal explanations and in order not to be accused of overexaggerating the role of religiosity, I explore other aspects of party institutionalization of potential import to women's leadership in the following section.

Party Institutionalization

Institutionalization of political parties is seen by many students of political parties as one of the basic determinants for their effectiveness in the political arena. In Huntington's words, "institutionalization is a process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability. [It is] stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior" (in Janda 1980: 19). Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully look at party institutionalization as a prerequisite for democratic consolidation and "[a] process by which a practice or organization becomes well-established and widely known, if not universally accepted" (1995: 1). Similarly, Janda describes an institutionalized party as "[o]ne that is reified in the public mind so that 'the party' exists as a social organization apart from its momentary leaders, and this organization demonstrates recurring patterns of behaviour valued by those who identify with it" (1980: 19).[16]

Institutionalization is unpacked in order to select aspects that may influence women's leadership. Janda (1980) identifies six criteria to measure institutionalization of political institutions, namely, year of origin, name changes, organizational discontinuity, leadership competition, legislative instability, and electoral instability, which covers party strength measured by the share of parliamentary seats occupied by a party (Lane and Ersson 1987). Mainwaring and Scully list four basic rules. First, stability in rules and patterns or nature of interparty competition that manifest themselves regularly. This is measured using Pedersen's index of electoral volatility that is derived "by adding the net change in percentage of seats (or votes) gained or lost by each party from one election to the next, then dividing by two" (1995: 6). Second,

roots and linkages between parties, citizens, and organized interests of the constituency, which measure how deeply parties penetrate society. Third, legitimacy to electoral processes, which is indicated via parties and elections as the means of determining who governs. Fourth, level of party organization, which is high when the interests of the party are not subordinated to interests of ambitious or charismatic leaders and when the party acquires an independent status and value on its own (1–6). These are relevant to parties in developing and Arab countries, including Lebanon.

Field research proves that some aspects of party institutionalization are potentially more relevant than others for women's leadership. These include party age (as distinct from longevity), centralization/decentralization in decision making, composition of membership by sect (pluralism) and gender (female membership), democratic practices in operating procedures, party strength, and employment of gender quotas and explicit, replicable, and transparent rules for accountability. Party denomination is viewed by interviewees to influence women's leadership. These variables will be examined separately in the following paragraphs.

Democratic practices in operating procedures: These include competitive periodically held elections for leadership transitions and decision-making processes within parties. In considering this variable, I extend the argument that democracies are more egalitarian than authoritarian regimes to parties. Democratic practices offer women equal opportunities to compete for leadership posts and involve women in decision making. I take my cue from Norris and Lovenduski (1995) who establish that operating procedures, as in pragmatic decision making, are integral aspects of institutionalization, and from Janda (1980) who focuses on leadership transitions.

Pluralism in membership: This refers to tolerance to diversity and openness without formal restrictions or discrimination on the basis of sex, sexual orientation, sect, class, ethnic groups, or race. A party is plural when membership composition is inclusive or open to other sects and denominations. When membership is exclusive or closed to other sects it is plural deficient. The presence of women and men and different religious denominations and sects signals tolerance to diversity and openness to dialogue. Parties with plural membership tend to attract more women to join and to offer women more leadership opportunities than exclusive, single-sect, monosectarian parties.[17] For example,

women complained to the Dutch government that the Calvinist party (SGP) is not open to them. Subsequently, the state withheld financial subsidies to SGP, until it realized that it is losing about 800,000 euros per year. In June 2006, the party convention decided to admit women to the ranks but not to run for leadership positions (Schuster 2007: 21). Other examples include exclusionary membership of specific religious sects and/or affiliations like the Taliban in Afghanistan, Hamas in Palestine, or Hizbullah in Lebanon.

Party democracy and pluralism may partially overlap with religious ideology. Religious parties tend to be less plural and democratic than nonreligious ones, in which case they are measuring the same underlying concept. The risk of overdetermination will be borne in mind in assessing the influence, particularly of pluralism, on women's leadership.

Female membership: The debate whether female membership matters for leadership is complex. This is linked to parties' democratic practices and pluralism assumed to attract women to join parties and enhance female membership and leadership. Some scholars maintain that the presence of huge female membership is instrumental to lobby for more top-level positions, which creates a critical mass for leadership. Kittilson (1997) highlights the potency of women as actors and party activists in improving female representation, arguing that a huge female membership would, by necessity, raise their share on parties' electoral lists. However, she cautions that the huge presence of women at the rank-and-file may not be matched by corresponding levels in leadership bodies. Indeed, in Lebanon, Islamist and religious parties are not plural and may not be democratic by involving women in decision making. These parties employ religious mobilization to attract women, boast huge female membership, but have very few women in leadership posts. Basu finds that "[i]ndeed in all South Asian countries, right-wing groups, often ethnic and religious in character, have enormous capacity to mobilize women's movements while undermining women's advancement" (2005: 35). This phenomenon has been observed by other scholars studying Islamist and other religious parties.[18]

Many of these religious parties are popular social movements with broad-based, grassroots constituencies, draw large numbers of youth (women and men), and coordinate with parallel, like-minded women's groups. Faith and religious convictions drive women to join religious parties in large numbers, especially when they are poor and in conflict-stricken areas. Under these settings, women tend to become more

religious than men, which might explain their huge presence in most religious parties. Empirical evidence from Lebanon shows that women join religious parties in large numbers. Many parties have special women's wings to mobilize women, which marginalize or "ghettoize" them by diverting them away from decision making and leadership. Female officials in nonreligious parties lobby to dismantle these units (Sbaity Kassem 2012).

Women join parties voluntarily, while their ascendance to leadership remains in the hands of party elites. Given this, I do not expect party religiosity—as distinct from individual religiosity and piety—to influence women's membership as it does their leadership chances. Nonetheless, the interaction of female membership with party religiosity will be examined quantitatively to gauge its influence, if any, on female leadership.

The analysis for pluralism, democratic practices, and female membership yields the following hypotheses:

> ***H2. The share of women in party membership and leadership bodies and on electoral lists is likely to be higher in parties employing democratic practices in leadership transitions and decision making than democratically deficit parties.***
>
> ***H3. The share of women in party membership and leadership bodies and on electoral lists is higher in plural, inclusive parties open to all regardless of religion or gender, than in plural deficient parties of closed single-sect membership.***

This research also explores whether female membership is a prerequisite for and matters for women's leadership, as many scholars argue. As such, female membership is an endogenous variable for women's leadership, but may also be an intervening variable, which will be examined using quantitative tools of analysis. This yields the following hypothesis:

> ***H4. The share of women in party leadership bodies is likely to increase as their share in membership expands.***

Party age: Janda (1980) argues that one of the basic criteria for party institutionalization is party age. He looks at older parties as more organized, which indicates more stability and political clout. This argument is used by other scholars as a party-level characteristic that is more conducive to female representation (Kittilson 1997; Sacchet 2005).

However, I look at party age not as longevity or a causal variable but as a useful proxy for capturing changes and shifts in party-level characteristics over time. Party age is a proxy in relation to some historical or political watershed, like a civil war or major conflict, which may have restructured the party system into preconflict and postconflict parties. In this sense, party age correlates often with conflict and party religiosity.

Conflict often revives intrinsic identity politics, by which individuals combine and mobilize around ascriptive identities like confessional affiliations. This can reanimate religion as an organizing principle for political behavior, especially of political parties, which entrenches conservative values and favors patriarchy in a manner that is inimical to women's advancement. Research on conflict and the salience of religious and ethnic cleavages is well-developed in political science. Lane and Ersson (1987) maintain that in situations of social distress and tension, wars and conflict exacerbate existing social cleavages, including those that are religious-based, and create additional ones. Further, conflicts tend to intensify religious cleavages, as Norris and Inglehart argue: "[r]eligiosity persists most strongly among vulnerable populations, especially those living in poorer nations, facing personal survival-threatening risks . . . [and] the religious gap will lead to greater ethno-religious conflict and violence" (2004: 5 and 241). This tendency may exert a negative influence on women's leadership within parties whose religiosity intensified in the aftermath of civil conflict. To gauge this, Donno and Russett call for more research on the impact of conflict on women's empowerment noting that "in addition to culture, the effects of other variables—international and civil conflict—on both democracy and women's rights need to be probed more deeply" (2004: 602). Heeding this advice, I study the impact of the Lebanese civil war on the party system and on parties' political culture vis-à-vis women's leadership (in chapter three).

Indeed, wars and conflict tend to have a differential impact on women.[19] In this conflictual setting, while some parties support the status quo or the status quo ante, new parties arise or mutate to reflect emerging interests, including postconflict-heightened religiosities. This translates, inter alia, into variations in political culture across prewar and postwar parties and employment of different mobilization strategies during the crucible of war than in its aftermath. Theoretically, one would expect that widening religious gaps or social divisions and heightened religiosity in parties' platforms should limit women's chances in leadership altogether. However, as research in Lebanon

shows, postwar parties tend to use state-of-the-art, modern, women-friendly, and more effective mobilization strategies than prewar parties. This militates against or undercuts and limits the adverse influence of widening religious cleavages and heightened religiosity observed during and postconflict.

Given this, party age conveniently serves as a proxy, or analytic framework, to distinguish between prewar, war, and postwar party-level characteristics, especially their attitude vis-à-vis women's leadership. In this sense, party age does not count as an aspect of party institutionalization. Therefore, by looking at parties that formed along the civil war timeline in Lebanon and around intensified social and especially religious cleavages, I can examine their influence on women's membership and leadership. This yields the following hypothesis:

> ***H5. The share of women in party membership, leadership bodies, and on electoral lists is likely to be higher in postwar parties than in prewar parties.***

Party strength: This is measured by a party's share in parliamentary seats (Lane and Ersson 1987). Weaker parties are cautious in nominating women to parliament because they risk losing precious seats, given the possibility of gender bias and inability to indulge in vote-buying. A Lebanese female MP maintains that "If parties are strong they can afford to nominate women for public office and are more willing to promote them to leadership positions." Thus, strong parties have less to lose than weaker parties by nominating women to parliament. In effect, "Women stand a much better chance of winning in elections if they are nominated by a stronger than weaker party." This aspect of party institutionalization is linked to electoral stability, given that party strength is not a constant over time. It is anticipated to influence women's nominations to public office, though not their leadership chances within parties' inner echelons. This yields the following hypothesis:

> ***H6. The share of female nominees in parties' electoral lists is likely to increase as party strength (share of parliamentary seats) rises.***

Party denomination: Membership may be multidenominational or dominated by a single sect or religious denomination. This is looking at pluralism through the lens of party denomination to see whether it makes any difference for women's leadership and nominations to public office. I have argued earlier that different religions offer women

different opportunities. Also, qualitative evidence from Lebanon points to predominantly Christian parties as more women-friendly than Muslim-dominated parties, offering women more leadership chances and nominations to public office. This is also tested cross-nationally on predominantly Christian or Jewish parties. This yields the following hypothesis:

> ***H7. The share of women in party leadership bodies and on their electoral lists is likely to be influenced by party denomination whether Christian, Jewish, Muslim (Shiites, Sunnis, or Druze), or nondenominational.***

Methods and Measurement

Stathis Kalyvas argues that "using multiple cases provides variation on the dependent variable while controlling for independent variables." However, he concurs with Laitin, and I heed his advice, that researchers should use both, a comparative and a focused approach. Therefore, in order to test the theory of party religiosity and women's leadership, I combine a comparative, multiple cases, cross-national research method with a focused, single case study approach.

> The identification of plausible connections between independent and dependent variables only suggests association, but not cause. The empirical relationships become powerful if they are part of a deductively driven "story" which provides rationale . . . The stronger the theory (its assumptions are reasonable; the number of independent variables is few; its applications to other cases wide; its account of the cases at hand are plausible), the more confident one is that the empirical associations has causal properties. (1996: 14)

Indeed, a cross-national statistical examination of women's leadership is undertaken to test whether the theory travels. The comparative review required the compilation of an original dataset covering women's leadership in 330 parties across 26 countries. This statistical exercise focuses on party religiosity as an explanatory variable for variations in women's leadership across 330 parties in 13 Arab and 7 non-Arab Muslim-majority countries, 5 European countries with Christian democratic parties, and Israel. It may seem absurd to compare women across

three different regions in Asia, Africa, and Europe, of multifaiths and multicultures, especially because women should not be essentialized. But, one may apply the explanations for experiences in one country or society to another, as Brand cogently argues: "[I] remain unpersuaded that an explanation that works in one society cannot also work elsewhere . . . [and, that] comparability of experiences across regions is an empirical question" (1998: 21). The theory of party religiosity travels and party religiosity is borne out in the cross-national comparative study. The statistical findings support anticipations that women are likelier to assume leadership positions in parties of lower religiosity. The positive association between female membership, leadership, and nominations for parliament draws a linear career path for women in politics. This tripartite relationship, which will also be examined in Lebanon, indicates that the "upstream" focus in this theory can determine "downstream" electoral outcomes. Future research should study the linear career path of women linking it to electoral outcomes in female parliamentary and municipal representation. These are not within the purview of parties, and hence fall beyond the scope of this study.

A case study approach has the comparative advantage of more in-depth investigation of the core questions posed and finding explanations that may be generalizable to similar situations. Hence, the robust findings in the cross-national statistical exercise pave the way for in-depth, focused single case study, linking the large (N = 330) to the small (n = 18) in Lebanon and shedding further light on interesting associations discovered in the cross-national analysis. A focused case study is carried out in Lebanon, marked by a profusion of diverse parties within a single controlled setting. The advantage of a single case study lies in having the same political regime and electoral system for all parties within the same country. This isolates the influence of party religiosity and other variables, while holding constant such "macro" features as the political and electoral systems.

Research to collect data and information on women in parties was conducted between 2006 and 2010 for all 26 countries in the cross-national dataset. This is compiled from party officials and administrators who provided literature and documentation on parties, filled questionnaires and provided information to national researchers (Annex 1). For Lebanon, qualitative and quantitative analyses are based on 150 interviews with party leaders, male and female elites, and administrators.[20] These mixed research methods test expectations specified in the hypotheses and estimate regression models for women's leadership and nominations to public office (see chapters two, seven, and eight).

Why Lebanon?

To judge by their educational attainment and economic achievements, Lebanese women are among the most qualified in the Arab region (table 3.1). Most significantly, women's gains in public office representation are much lower than in education and private sector economic participation and leadership. In 2010, women constituted 33 percent of the labor force. Of this share, about 30 percent were administrators, 40 percent specialists and professionals, and 10 percent CEOs and corporate managers in the private sector. In contrast, they represented only 3 percent in parliament, about 5 percent in municipalities, and less than 7 percent in the 2009 government (the 2012 cabinet is all-male). This dismal performance prompted Bouhamdan to remark thus:

> Even in Lebanon, the so-called "Switzerland of the Middle East," where women have more opportunities than men do in the workforce, where modernity is the constant social trend, the country is yet to usher in a female political leader, . . . a woman's political career remains gravely limited by social, cultural and religious norms. (2009: 39)

Lebanon offers a particularly useful case for exploring party variation in religiosity and its influence on women's leadership because of its multireligious society and its multiparty system. It is an Arab, Muslim-majority, conflict-stricken country marked by a 15-year civil war fought along religious lines and marked by multiple cross-cutting social cleavages, which heightened existing religious cleavages. The mosaic fabric of Lebanese society, comprising 18 different sects, offers a unique laboratory for studying the influence of party variation in religiosity on women's leadership. Religious communities with larger constituencies (Maronites, Shiites, and Sunnis) form their own parties and compete fiercely, vying for control and power over the polity. Smaller communities struggle for better political representation by allying themselves with stronger political blocs. This confessional multifaith society is also characterized by wide income disparities and the presence of minorities (Armenians and Palestinians), which have created class and ethnic cleavages in addition to religious ones. The 15-year civil war (1975–1990) is a watershed that destabilized the complex fabric of society, deepened existing social cleavages, and created new ones. Despite periods of intermittent peace, conflict continues to erupt frequently. This exacerbates and reinforces social cleavages,

especially religious-based ones. These cleavages shaped and structured the Lebanese party system into multiple and diverse parties. This wide range and diversity of competing political parties with varying religiosities offers great within-country variation, which is useful for comparing many parties within a single country. The Lebanese multiparty system is characterized by more than 80 registered and active parties, though only 18 are "relevant" (those occupying 1 percent or at least 1 seat in 2009 parliament). This small number of parties (n = 18) constitutes a caveat for quantitative analysis.

Finally, Lebanon continues to be one of the very few Arab countries with a strong, albeit much interrupted, tradition of competitive elections among political parties and blocs. It ranked second only to Comoros among the 22 Arab countries on the democracy and political freedoms scale of Polity IV and Freedom House, and close to Senegal, one of the top-ranking democratizing non-Arab Muslim-majority countries, on the Bertelsmann BTI 2010.[21]

Measurement and Operationalization of Variables

This research takes political parties as the unit of analysis. In chapters two, seven, and eight, quantitative tools of analysis are employed and multivariate regression models are estimated to test the theory of party religiosity and women's leadership. Toward this end, the dependent and independent variables are measured and operationalized (coded) in the following paragraphs.

Dependent Variables: Women in Leadership Bodies and as Nominees for Public Office

Dependent variables are measured by the percentage shares of women in parties' (1) leadership bodies: These may carry different names in different parties but discharge the same executive and legislative function. The simple average share (mean) of women is computed by summing female members in top-level bodies and dividing this by the total number of members in these leadership bodies; and (2) electoral lists for parliament and municipalities. This study deliberately excludes elected female MPs and municipal members, because their election to public office depends, inter alia, on the electoral system, voter preferences, and voter turnout. Focusing strictly on party nominations and internal leadership bodies offers a more direct test of party behavior and attitudes—qua political culture—toward women's leadership.

Independent Variables: Party Religiosity, Democratic Practices, Pluralism, Female Membership, Denomination, and Strength

(1) *Party religiosity* (conceptualized as a continuum). A religiosity scale honors and acknowledges the full realm of intensity of religiosities in parties' platforms and their influence on women's leadership within parties' echelons and on electoral lists. Parties are situated along a continuum measured by the extent that religious goals penetrate their platforms; and their explicit goals rather than whether or not they nominally refer to themselves or are viewed as religious or secular parties. Classifying, labeling, and coding parties was done after undertaking a thorough content analysis of party platforms and extensive consultations with party administrators, politicians, scholars, and national experts on political parties for the 26 countries including Lebanon. This was instrumental for developing an ordinal measure of religiosity to code parties. Parties are classified by religiosity into three generic categories: (1) *religious* with varying intensities of religiosity depending upon the religious components in their political platforms, and are labeled extremist, conservative, or tolerant;[22] (2) *confessional* with civil and national goals and varying degrees of secularisms;[23] and (3) *secular* with a-religious platforms (leftist, Communist, Marxist, socialist). Parties are coded along a 5-point religiosity continuum starting with 1 for highest religiosity or those marked by extensive religious components on their agendas, to 5 for lowest religiosity or those with fewer or minimal religious contents.

(2) *Democratic practices* (compiled for the Lebanese case study only). Values for leadership transitions are based on data gathered from official sources, bylaws, and party administrators. Data cover the leaders' term in office, periodicity of elections, eligibility, nominations to office, competitiveness, and contestation, transparency, and smoothness of the process. Values for decision making or women's involvement thereof are gathered from statements of interviewees. This compound variable is operationalized by combining both indicators (leadership transitions and decision making) and coding on a 3-point scale: Parties pursuing democratic practices in both leadership transitions and decision making are assigned 2; those that are democratic in one of the two indicators are assigned 1; and those with democratic deficits on both counts are assigned 0.

(3) *Pluralism in membership* (compiled for the Lebanese case study only). Values are based on data compiled from party administrators and membership rolls. Older parties do not maintain computerized databases on composition of membership by sex and sect, and consider this

confidential. Pluralism is dichotomized: parties with plural, inclusive, and open membership are assigned 1 and single-sect, monosectarian, and exclusive parties are assigned 0.

(4) *Female membership* (measured by the percentage share of women in total party membership). This statistic posed a major problem in data compilation, especially in non-Arab Muslim-majority countries and Israel, where it is missing for several parties. In Lebanon, female membership data were compiled from party administrators simultaneously with the parties' plural composition. It is largely based on membership rolls and registers, where available. Difficulties were encountered in older noncomputerized parties, due to unisex names and overlapping Christian and Muslim surnames.

(5) *Party denomination*: This is operationalized for the cross-national exercise by assigning 1 to parties of Muslim denomination; 2 Christian; 3 Jewish; and 0 for nondenominational. For the Lebanese case study: Shiites 1; Sunnis (including Druze) 2; Christian 3; and nondenominational parties 0.

(6) *Party strength*. This is measured by the percentage share of seats a party occupies in parliament.

(7) *Party age* (proxy variable specified for the Lebanese case study only). It is operationalized by splitting parties along the civil war timeline, before and after 1975. Since there are only five parties with religious platforms, war-origin parties and postwar parties are collapsed into one group. Party age is dichotomized: Prewar parties are assigned 0 and postwar parties 1.

Pluralism, democratic practices, and party age are not included in the cross-national exercise. This requires in-depth research covering 25 countries across 312 parties (excluding the 18 relevant Lebanese parties), which has time and cost considerations. Legislated and voluntary party internal and electoral quotas for women are specified in the cross-national statistical exercise but not in the Lebanese case study, where quotas are not employed. The study benefited from cross-fertilization between the cross-national and single case studies: (1) using qualitative evidence from the Lebanese case study to (a) label and code the 330 parties by religiosity in consultation with national researchers and experts; and (b) identify additional explanatory variables, notably party strength and denomination, in the cross-national models; and (2) linking the large "N" of the cross-national to the small "n" of Lebanon by shedding light on interesting associations of a linear career path for women in politics established in the cross-national study between female membership, leadership, and nominations.

Conclusions

This chapter lays out the observed phenomena motivating this research, notably, the lingering gender gaps in political leadership and representation. This is demonstrated by the conundrum of the global mismatch between women's much lower gains in leadership in the public than in the private sector. Previous scholarship largely ignored political parties as the main vehicle driving gains and losses in female leadership. They sought explanations in country-level development, political regimes, and electoral systems, or society-level political culture and dominant religions. This chapter advances an institutional-level theory focusing on political parties, as women's entry level into politics. Which parties are superior for advancing women to leadership is the main research question. The conceptual framework and contours of the theory of party religiosity and women's leadership and nominations for public office are laid out: As party religiosity rises, women's leadership falls. Party religiosity is identified as a core explanatory variable. Party institutionalization is unpacked to identify other plausible variables besides party religiosity, notably, democratic practices, pluralism, female membership, strength, and denomination.

CHAPTER TWO

A Traveling Theory of Party Religiosity and Women's Leadership

Moving from country-level and society-level explanations for female representation to an institutional party level, chapter one lays out the conceptual framework and develops the contours of a theory of party religiosity and women's leadership. It establishes that political parties are the entry level and first intervention point for women's leadership, broadly defined to include their representation in public office, posing the main research question: Which parties are superior for women's leadership? I argue that parties whose platforms contain less religious goals are superior to those with expansive religious goals; and that party variation in religiosity can largely explain variations in women's leadership. Party religiosity is the programmatic orientations or the extent to which religious goals penetrate political platforms. The rationale for highlighting the role of party religiosity in women's leadership is central to the theory advanced. This concept is grounded in existing scholarship and it is neither intuitive nor noncontroversial. Its plausibility and contingency are fully explicated and justified in this body of work. Women's leadership in inner structures is endogenous to party-level characteristics, specifically party religiosity.

First, this is an institutional party-level theory rather than country-level development, political regimes, and electoral systems or society-level political culture and religion to explain variations in women's leadership. Second, rather than conceptualizing a relationship between religions, such as Islam, Christianity, or Judaism, and female leadership, I develop an ordinal measure of religiosity based on the salience of religious components in party platforms. This measure for party

religiosity is transparent, sensitive, and useful for capturing variations across parties. It is unprecedented and a step forward in comparative politics. Third, I suggest other indicators for female political participation besides parliamentary representation, the most commonly invoked indicator, namely, the share of women in parties' leadership bodies and as nominees on their electoral lists for public office. These additional indicators may eventually determine the outcome and explain variations in female parliamentary representation.

In testing the theory of party religiosity on a cross-national nonrandom sample of 330 parties across 26 countries of majority Muslim, Christian, and Jewish populations (Sbaity Kassem 2011), I find that the theory travels. The encouraging statistical results of this additional, but necessary, exercise pave the ground for conducting an in-depth, focused case study of Lebanon, linking it to the large N in order to shed further light into associations depicted in the cross-national exercise. The career path for women in politics is one such association that assumes upward mobility from party cadres to leadership in public office, emanating from the tripartite relationship between female membership, leadership, and nominations to parliament. This chapter presents a summary of the statistical findings in the cross-national study. In the first section, the process of selecting countries from Arab, non-Arab Muslim-majority, and European countries plus Israel for the cross-national dataset is described, including problems encountered. The second section recapitulates the contours of the theory of party religiosity and women's leadership, modifying the testable hypotheses for the comparative study. In the third section, multivariate regression models are estimated for women's leadership and parliamentary nominations.

The comparative study constitutes the nucleus for a global database on women in political parties. It is complementary and analogous to databases built by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) on female representation and the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) on gender quotas. Building such a database requires high investment and continuous maintenance and updating.[1]

The Cross-National Dataset

The theory of party religiosity and women's leadership is tested on 330 relevant parties of varying religiosities in a nonrandom sample of 26 electorally competitive developing and developed countries (14 percent of the universe) of dominant Muslim, Christian, and Jewish

populations. These include 13 Arab, 7 non-Arab Muslim-majority, 5 European countries, and Israel. Relevant parties are those occupying at least 1 percent of seats in the current parliament at the time of data collection. The threshold of 3 percent specified by Sartori is lowered to obtain more observations for statistical manipulations (1976: 121–123). Criteria for selecting countries and the process of compiling data and information for the cross-national dataset are described in the following paragraphs.

Selecting Countries for the Cross-National Dataset

The growing global interest in Islam and Islamist parties' influence on the station of women in Muslim-majority countries motivated selecting these countries in comparative perspective to Christian and Jewish ones. Scholars studying the Arab region argue that it is religion (Islam), authoritarian regimes, women-unfriendly electoral systems, or political culture that most strongly produce the gender gap in female leadership and representation. By controlling for the influence of Islam on female representation, we are able to show that even in countries with Muslim-majority populations, one sees variations and wide disparities in female leadership. It would be interesting to explore how Islamist parties would behave toward women in Christian-majority countries, which calls for further in-depth studies. The whole set of 49 Arab and non-Arab Muslim-majority countries (over 50 percent) are considered.[2] These countries have diverse civil, national, secular, and theocratic Islamist parties, which is useful for testing the theory of party variation and women's leadership. Following the democracy scores published by Ted Gurr's Polity IV, Freedom House Index (FHI), and Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2010 BTI, countries are selected that (1) allow political parties to form, function, and compete and (2) hold regular elections.

This produces two subsets of (1) 7of the whole set of 27 non-Arab Muslim-majority countries meeting both criteria (Afghanistan, Albania, Indonesia, Senegal, Turkey, Bangladesh, and Bosnia-Herzegovina); and (2) 13 of the 22 League of Arab States (LAS) yielding the whole set of Arab countries meeting these criteria (Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen, and Palestine).[3] I adopt the Kalyvas (1996) set of five European countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands) that have Christian democratic and/or social parties and add Israel that has Jewish parties for the third subset (table 2.1)

Table 2.1 Cross-National: Women in Parliament and Country-Level Indicators on Development, Political Regimes, and Electoral Systems

Country	*Female MPs (%)*	*Electoral systems*	*Closed or open lists*	*Legislated quotas for women*	*Electoral voluntary party quotas*	*Polity IV 2006–2009 Democracy scores*	*GDP/ Capita US$*
Arab Countries That Allow Parties to Form and Hold Elections							
Tunisia	27.6	Parallel	Closed	No	Yes	–4	4160
Mauritania	22.1	TRS	Closed	%	No	–2	1096
Djibouti	13.8	PBV	Closed	Seats	No	+2	1382
Palestine	13.0	Parallel	Closed	%	No	n.a.	n.a
Jordan	10.8	SNTV	Open	Seats	No	–3	4435
Morocco	10.5	List-PR	Open	Seats	Yes	–6	2868
Kuwait	7.7	BV	Open	No	No	–7	32530
Algeria	7.7	List-PR	Closed	No	Yes	+2	4477
Lebanon	3.1	BV	Open	No	No	+7	10019
Comoros	3.0	TRS	Open	No	No	+9	819
Bahrain	2.5	FPTP	Open	No	No	–7	19641
Egypt	1.8	TRS	Open	Seats	No	–3	2771
Yemen	0.3	FPTP	Open	No	Yes	–2	1230
For Comparison: Arab Countries That Do Not Allow Parties to Form and Hold Elections (Except Iraq)							
Iraq	25.2	**List-PR**	Closed	%	No	–66	2625
UAE	22.5	N	Open	No	No	–8	47406
Sudan	25.6	FPTP	Closed	Seats	No	–4	1642
Syria	12.4	BV	Open	No	No	–7	2892
Libya	7.7	N	Open	No	No	–7	12062
Somalia	6.8	N	Open	Seats	No	–77	600
Oman	0.0	FPTP	n.a	No	No	–8	18040
Qatar	0.0	N	n.a	No	No	–10	74422
Saudi Arabia	0.0	N	n.a	No	No	–10	16641
Non-Arab Muslim-Majority Countries (50% +) That Allow Parties to Form and Hold Elections							
Senegal	22.7	Parallel	Closed	%	Yes	+7	964
Indonesia	18.0	**List-PR**	Closed	%	No	+8	2963
Albania	16.4	MMP	Closed	%	Yes	+9	3661
Turkey	9.1	**List-PR**	Closed	No	Yes	+7	10206
Other Non-Arab Muslim-Majority Countries (Unstable Polities) That Allow Parties and Hold Elections							
Bangladesh	18.6	FPTP	Open	Seats	No	+5	640
Afghanistan	27.7	SNTV	Closed	Seats	No	–66	560
Bosnia-Herzegovina	16.7	**List-PR**	Open	%	Yes	–66	4157

Continued

Table 2.1 Continued

Country	*Female MPs (%)*	*Electoral systems*	*Closed or open lists*	*Legislated quotas for women*	*Electoral voluntary party quotas*	*Polity IV 2006–2009 Democracy scores*	*GDP/ Capita US$*
European Countries and Israel							
Netherlands	40.7	**List-PR**	Closed/ ordered	No	Yes	+10	46418
Belgium	39.3	**List-PR**	Closed	%	Yes	+10	42596
Germany	32.8	MMP	Closed	No	Yes	+10	40512
Austria	27.9	**List-PR**	Closed	No	Yes	+10	43723
Italy	21.3	**List-PR**	Closed/ blocked	No	Yes	+10	33828
Israel	19.2	**List-PR**	Closed	No	Yes	+10	27085

Sources: www.ipu.org, November 2010; www.quotaproject.org, November 2009; www.worldban.org; www.imf.org, December 15, 2010; www.idea.int;

Notes: Polity IV 2006–2009 combined democracy score captures the regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from –10 (least democratic) to +10 (most democratic). Autocracies are assigned scores from (–10 to –6), democracies (+6 to +10), and all regimes in between (–5 to +5). The combined Polity score is computed by subtracting "autocratic" score from "democratic" score: +10 (strongly democratic) to –10 (strongly autocratic).

Electoral systems acronyms: Party List Proportional Representation (List-PR); FPTP (First Past the Post); BV (Bloc Vote); MMP (Mixed Membership Proportional); Parallel systems; PBV (Party Bloc Vote); STV (Single Transferable Vote); SNTV (Single Non-Transferrable Vote); TRS (Two-Round Systems); N (no electoral system in place).

This cross-national comparative study engages with the scholarship that different religions (Islam, Christianity, and Judaism) exhibit different attitudes toward women.[4] These differences may reflect themselves in parties' political culture and party religiosity, which is central for the theory under scrutiny. The Christian democratic parties in Europe have been traditionally religious parties, but shed their religiosity and transformed overtime, at a time when party religiosity in some Arab and non-Arab Muslim-majority countries was on the rise. Religion remains an identity and is retained in the parties' titles, but their platforms do not have religious components and their political goals do not involve changing the system of governance toward a theocratic state. The European countries and Israel subset offer valuable comparison with the Arab and non-Arab Muslim subsets.[5] Countries in this subset are consolidated democracies, peaceful, and employ "women-friendly" electoral systems and various types of gender quotas. Parties in these countries employ voluntary internal and electoral quotas for women, demonstrating commitment to gender equality. Therefore, including the European countries and Israel enriches the analysis in more ways

than one. First, it makes the case that selection of countries should not be based solely upon those with strong religious parties. There are weak and strong religious parties worldwide. Second, religious parties do not necessarily equate with high religiosity. For instance, the European Christian parties are low on the religiosity scale and high in female representation at both the party and country levels. This offers leverage from a comparative perspective. Third, this permits assessing if high religiosity, where it is pervasive, translates into low female leadership. This should not imply that parties in other countries do not employ women-friendly electoral systems or there are no low religiosity parties outside Europe, as, for instance, in some Muslim-majority countries like Turkey, Albania, or Lebanon. Unfortunately, this comparison is incomplete because there are also prominent Christian religious parties in other Christian-majority countries in Europe, Latin America (Chile and Argentina), and Australia. These and other countries could not be covered due to time and cost constraints.

I am fully aware that countries in the dataset are at different levels of development, have different political regimes, employ different electoral systems, belong to different cultures, and have different religious denominations. This may raise criticism in as far as comparability is concerned. However, while I control these variables, I am nonetheless guided by Brand (1994) and Barry (2000) who see that such comparisons across societies and cultures are permissible. Moreover, international research outfits, including the UN, also conduct global comparisons across different development, political, and electoral systems. I follow suit.

Collecting Data on Women in Relevant Parties: Process, Problems, and Caveats

Between 2006 and 2010, data on women in the 18 relevant parties in Lebanon was compiled by the author. For the 312 relevant parties across 25 countries in the dataset, national experts and researchers did it. Having served in the United Nations for over 35 years, I am lucky to have a wide network of connections. This facilitated my task of identifying local researchers, university professors, gender experts, or political scientists and selecting those of relevant experience. For each country, a national researcher was engaged to compile data on women in "relevant" parties. They were provided with a letter of introduction addressed to parties to facilitate the collection process and conduct structured interviews with party administrators and official sources, including party websites. To ensure consistency, comparability, and

reliability of data gathered, the process was based on a questionnaire and a list of data and information on women's leadership in political parties (Annex 1). Information and data compiled includes programmatic goals for religiosity/secularism, voluntary internal and electoral gender quotas, denomination, strength (average share of seats occupied by a party in current parliament), and percentage share of female party membership, leadership, and nominations to parliament. Party leadership bodies, as identified by party administrators, may have different names in different parties but discharge similar decision-making functions. Simple average shares of women in parties' leadership bodies are computed by dividing the combined total number of women in top-level decision-making bodies by the sum total of members in these committees.

Published data on women in political parties, worldwide, are scarce and, if available, oftentimes obsolete. For example, data on female membership in major parties in 18 Western democracies and Japan date back to 1992 (Ware 1996: 82).[6] Shawkat Shtay finds that women comprise 10 percent of parties' membership in Egypt, 2 percent in Yemen, and 8 percent in Lebanon, compared to an average of 10 percent worldwide (2004: 144). The share of female members is computed from party rolls: number of women divided by total members. The process of data collection was hampered by the paucity of sex-disaggregated data, nonavailability of membership rolls in older parties, and the claim by some officials, particularly in religious extremist parties, that membership is classified information. Thus, data on female membership are missing for some parties in Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Indonesia, Senegal, Turkey, and Israel. This caveat in the dataset reduced the number of data points on female membership from 330 to 185 parties when estimating leadership and nominations models. Another revealing statistic in the dataset is that there are 111 parties, largely extremist and conservative including 11 all-male parties that do not nominate women for parliament and do not employ voluntary gender quotas. This reduced data points from 330 to 179 parties for estimating the female parliamentary nomination model. Despite these caveats, interesting associations and positive results are produced supporting the theory of party religiosity and women's leadership.

Which Parties Are Superior for Women's Leadership: Nonreligious or Religious?

Different parties offer women different opportunities, but some are superior to others in advancing women to leadership. I argue that secular

a-religious parties of lower religiosity are superior offering women more leadership chances than parties of higher religiosity. Parties are differentiated by the intensity of religiosity on their political platforms. The core hypothesis of the theory of party religiosity and women's leadership is that, as party religiosity rises, women's share in leadership bodies and on electoral lists falls. Other party-level explanatory variables, besides party religiosity, include female membership, strength, denomination, and gender quotas. The comparative statistical exercise takes political parties as the unit of analysis and party religiosity to explain variations in women's share in leadership bodies and as parliamentary nominees. I do not study outcomes, as in female parliamentary representation, because their election depends on the electoral system, voters' preferences, and voter turnout, which is not within the purview of political parties.

Party Religiosity and Secularism

As discussed earlier, some world religions like Islam, Catholicism, Hinduism, or Judaism are hostile to women. I argue that it is not religions per se but the intensity of religiosity in party platforms that affects women's leadership. Religiosity is not a constant since there are multiple religiosities and secularisms within the Islamic world and elsewhere, where other religions are dominant. The multivocal understanding of religions adopted in this body of work is extended from individual to institutional religiosity, that of political parties. This implies a continuum of varying religiosities and secularisms. I posit that a better predictor of female leadership—rather than religions broadly conceived—is the intensity of religiosity enshrined in party platforms or the extent to which religious goals penetrate political platforms. The degree of penetration is gauged by carrying out content analysis of party platforms and is informed by qualitative evidence from the Lebanese case study (chapter one). Party religiosity scores are assigned in close consultation with party officials, local researchers, and international and national experts on political parties in order to ensure transparency and comparability. Religiosity is used interchangeably with secularism to reflect placement along a 5-point religiosity-secularism continuum in order of magnitude of "secularism" from lowest 1 to highest 5, or "religiosity" from highest 1 to lowest 5. This scale honors and acknowledges the full realm of possible religiosities and may be more sensitive to capturing varying intensities in party platforms and their influence on women's leadership within parties' inner structures and on their parliamentary lists.

Party religiosity is the main explanatory variable for variations in women's leadership. As party religiosity falls, women's share in leadership bodies and on parliamentary lists increases (H1). A party-level argument affects country-level explanations in that when the share of women in leadership bodies and as parliamentary nominees increases, female representation improves.

Female Party Membership

Female party membership may influence leadership but is not a match or a prerequisite for it. Parties may have huge female membership without corresponding levels of female leadership, as per Robert Putnam's law (2000) of increasing disproportions. This phenomenon is observed by scholars studying Islamist and other religious parties. Most religious parties are essentially social movements with broad-based, grassroots constituencies, drawing in youth—women and men—into their membership, but very few women rise to leadership. Some parties recruit women for electioneering purposes and ghettoize them in special women's wings, which limits their leadership prospects since they become outsiders to party politics. In other parties, as female membership expands, women's activism is given a boost and they lobby for more women in leadership posts. Female activists are rewarded for their dedication, loyalty, and contributions to the party by being promoted to leadership. Once this critical mass or pool of women in leadership is created, they become more vocal in demanding inclusion on parties' electoral lists, and their electability chances increase. Thus, a key variable in feminist analysis of women's leadership is female party membership and the level of activism at the grassroots, as they slowly but surely become agents of change. Indeed, parties constitute the entry level or first intervention point for women's leadership, if they choose a political career. This marks the first step in women's upward mobility within party cadres and into public office. I dub this tripartite relationship between female membership, leadership, and nominations for public office as the *linear career path* for women in politics.[7] This extends hypothesis (H4) on female membership and leadership to nominations for public office, the *linear career path* hypothesis:

> ***H8. The share of female nominees on parties' electoral lists is likely to increase as their shares in party membership and leadership expand.***

Affirmative Action Measures: Quotas for Women

Parties may introduce voluntarily internal quotas for women in order to boost women's share in leadership bodies and/or electoral quotas to raise their share on electoral lists. Alternatively, legislative quotas as percentage shares or reserved seats for women in parliament may be imposed by the government on all parties. The results are too obvious. Empirical evidence shows that affirmative action measures (legislated and/or voluntary party internal and electoral gender quotas), wherever employed uniformly and without internal resistance at the party level, have invariably increased women's leadership and representation at all levels.[8] For instance, wherever employed, the 30 percent quota for women specified in the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action, female representation increased (Krook 2005; Sbaity Kassem 1998). Quotas for women boost female leadership, especially when combined with women-friendly electoral systems. Thus, List-PR systems in large electoral districts, closed lists with top-rank order rules, and zipper quotas, are proven formula for improving women's representation.[9] Many consolidated democracies, including the Nordic countries boasting highest female representation worldwide, have—at one time or another—employed quotas for women as an interim measure to boost female representation in parliament. Quota advocates stress that such measures do not only increase female representation but also create a "critical mass" or a pool of women for leadership. This yields the following additional hypotheses:

> ***H9. The share of women in leadership bodies is more likely to increase in parties that employ voluntary internal quotas for women than in parties that do not.***
>
> ***H10. The share of female nominees on electoral lists is more likely to increase in parties that employ voluntary electoral quotas for women than in parties that do not.***

Voluntary party (internal and electoral) quotas for women are specified in the model for women's leadership, while legislated gender quotas are not. Voluntary quotas are within the purview of parties and may produce variation in women's shares in leadership bodies or on electoral lists. Legislated quotas are imposed on all parties; hence, they do not cause party variation but produce variation in the magnitude of women's shares on parties' electoral lists. Although their positive impact is too obvious and evident, legislated quotas are nevertheless specified in the model for female parliamentary nominations.

Models for Women's Leadership and Nominations to Parliament

Regression models for women's leadership and parliamentary nominations are estimated and presented in table 2.2. The models for both dependent variables are run with and without country fixed effects, in order to check how the slope coefficients on the other explanatory variables would behave. This is especially important since the 26 countries have not only different levels of development, political regimes, and electoral systems, but also different religious denominations and cultures, which fixed effects take care of. Both ordinary least squares (OLS) models are also specified without fixed effects incorporating the three country-level variables. The following regression equations show how these models are specified:

Female Leadership = a +b_0 (secularism) + b_1 (internal quotas) + b_2 (female membership) + b_3 (denomination) + b_4 (strength) + b_5 (GDP/Capita) + b_6 (democracy) + b_7 (List-PR)

Female Nominations = a +b_0 (secularism) + b_1 (electoral quotas) + b_2 (female membership) + b_3 (female leadership) + b_4 (denomination) + b_5 (strength) + b_6 (democracy) + b_7 (List-PR) + b_8 (GDP/capita) + b_9 (legislated quotas) + b_{10} (closed/open lists)

The model for women's leadership in parties' bodies provides strong support to the theory of party religiosity, whether it is run with or without fixed effects. The results on the religiosity/secularism variable remain unaltered neither in direction nor in statistical significance, whatever specifications are introduced in the model. Party religiosity has powerful explanatory and predictive powers in the cross-national dataset. Both models for women's leadership show high statistical significance for party religiosity and female membership. In the fixed effects model, voluntary internal quotas are also statistically significant. As hypothesized, these findings establish that as party religiosity rises, female membership expands; and, as parties start employing internal gender quotas, the share of women in leadership increases. These results especially for party religiosity and female membership on women's leadership are robust and generalizable. However, party strength and denomination are not statistically significant for women's leadership, with negative and small magnitude coefficients. In the simple OLS model, GDP/capita, democratic regimes, and electoral systems

Table 2.2 Cross-National: Models for Women's Party Leadership and Parliamentary Nominations

Independent Variables	*Women's Leadership*		*Parliamentary Nominees*	
	Simple OLS	*Fixed Effects & Robust Clustered Std. errors*	*Simple OLS*	*Fixed Effects & Robust Clustered Std. errors*
Party-Level				
Secularism	3.2858★★★	2.7272★★	−.8652	.4515
	(1.2014)	(1.3097)	(1.0210)	(1.3473)
Female membership	.5175★★★	.5054★★★	.1164★★	.0870★
	(.0566)	(.0977)	(.0565)	(.0645)
Female leadership			.4313★★★	.2702★★★
			(.0658)	(.0922)
Internal quotas	2.6054	5.7318★★★		
	(2.2535)	(2.2795)		
Electoral quotas			1.2740	5.8223★
			(2.3757)	(3.1034)
Strength	−.0101	−.0637	.0629	.0760
	(.0588)	(.0634)	(.0508)	(.0656)
Denomination	−.4461	−.6553	−.6502	.8691
	(2.5763)	(2.7574)	(2.1059)	(2.9253)
Country-Level				
Democracy	−3.7106★		10.4881★★★	
	(2.7064)		(2.2222)	
GDP/Capita	.0003★★★		.0005★★★	
	(.0001)		(.0001)	
Electoral System (List-PR)	.01528		−6.8556★★	
	(3.2249)		(3.2287)	
Closed/Open lists			6.0136★★★	
			(1.8141)	
Legislated quotas			16.6378★★★	44.1977★★★
			(2.1885)	(7.2481)
Constant (base)	−12.4205★★	−8.9904	−17.4702★★★	−50.5581★★★
	(5.5052)	(5.0538)	(5.0487)	(9.3973)
N	185	185	179	179
Degrees freedom	176	161	167	154
R^2	0.5217	0.6776	0.7517	0.8318
Adjusted R^2	0.5000	0.6315	0.7353	0.8055
F	24.00 >1.94	14.71	45.96 >1.94	31.72

Source: Processed by the author based on cross-national dataset on women in 330 parties across 26 countries deposited in www.icpsr. umich.edu./cgi-bin/bob/dd?depno=23365; and archived with www.theARDA.com.

Notes: Clustered standard errors are reported. ★★★=P.01; ★★=P.05; ★=P.10.

Party-level variables: *Religiosity* is on a 5-point scale from 1 highest to 5 lowest. *Female membership* is percentage share in total membership. *Female leadership* is a simple average share of the number of women in executive plus legislative bodies divided by the sum of total members in these bodies. *Strength* is the share in parliamentary seats occupied by a party. *Female parliamentary nominations* is the share of women in parties' electoral lists. *Denomination*: parties predominantly Muslim assigned 1; Christian 2; Jewish 3; and nondenominational parties 0. *Voluntary internal and electoral quotas for women*: parties employing quotas are assigned 1; parties not employing quotas are assigned 0.

Country-level variables: *Development* is measured by GDP/capita (in US dollars). *Political regimes*: assigning 1 for democracies (between +6 and +10) on Polity IV, and 0 all others. *Electoral systems*: assigning 1 for countries employing List-PR and 0 all others. *Electoral lists*: assigning 1 for countries employing closed lists and 0 all others. *Legislated quotas*: assigning 1 for countries employing quotas and 0 for countries that are not.

are specified to control for their effects. Finally, the model with fixed effects is superior explaining 63 percent of the variance in female leadership, compared to 52 percent in the model without fixed effects.

In female parliamentary nominations models, with and without fixed effects, the coefficient on religiosity is not statistically significant, against expectations; however, in the fixed effects model it is in the right direction but small. Legislated and electoral quotas are statistically significant in both models, as expected and obvious. Out of the 330 parties in the dataset, there are 76 religious parties with varying religiosity scores (from 1 high, to 3 tolerant). One is apt to question whether religious parties are more or less likely to adopt gender quotas. Examining the data, we find that only 4 percent of these religious parties employ internal quotas and 6.7 percent employ electoral quotas. This demonstrates that religiosity and quotas for women are inversely correlated and that religious parties are less likely to be committed to gender equality or to advancing women to leadership positions. Many parties look at women as a *symbol of the modern*. They may not be seriously committed to gender equality, but do so for window-dressing and public consumption, and to enhance their image for elections. They also employ rhetoric and strategic maneuverings when it is in their interest to do so. However, parties' platforms transform over time, even those with religious platforms, and their religiosity levels may decline. This bodes well for women's leadership in these parties, signaling the presence of a light at the end of the tunnel.

In the model without fixed effects, all coefficients of country-level variables (GDP/capita, democratic regimes, and women-friendly electoral systems) are statistically significant indicating their strong influence on female parliamentary nominations. Also, electoral quotas are statistically significant for female nominations, as anticipated.

What stands out in both models, with and without fixed effects, is that female membership and leadership are both statistically significant in influencing female parliamentary nominations. This provides strong support to the linear career path for women in politics. An increase in women's party membership, as actors and party activists, creates a "critical mass" or pool of women for leadership. This is clearly depicted in both, women's leadership and parliamentary nominations models. In turn, women in leadership bodies become agents of change and a pressure group within parties as they lobby for a bigger share of women's nominations on parties' electoral lists to public office. Once a critical mass of women is created that imposes itself on parties' inner structures and lobbies for a bigger share in the political pie, a linear career

path for women is drawn. This augurs well for the future of women in politics. Women can break through the political glass ceiling and move swiftly into leadership positions in parties of lower religiosity that employ women-friendly electoral systems and exhibit a gender-sensitive political culture. This strong tripartite association between female party membership, leadership, and parliamentary nominations is worthwhile exploring in the Lebanese case study.

The quantitative examination of the influence of religiosity/secularism on women's leadership produces statistically significant results for the pooled sample of 26 countries, though not for parliamentary nominations. This may be largely due to the caveats of missing data on this variable, as explained earlier. Qualitative evidence from Lebanon may explain this. Results of the large N = 330 will be linked to the small n = 18 to shed further insight into interesting associations discovered in the cross-national study (see chapter seven).

Conclusions

This chapter summarizes work done separately to test the theory of party variation in religiosity on a cross-national sample of 330 parties in 26 countries (14 percent of the universe). Findings from the cross-national comparative exercise provide strong empirical support to the theory of party religiosity and its core hypothesis that as party religiosity rises, women's leadership falls. The cross-national study is made possible by compiling an original dataset of women in 330 political parties across 26 countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe. It constitutes a nucleus for a future research project to build a global database on women in political parties akin to those of the IPU on women in parliaments, or the IDEA on gender quotas. This is valuable to feminists, researchers, and comparativists. The encouraging statistical findings pave the ground for an in-depth case study of Lebanon and for exploring whether qualitative evidence from field research can shed further light into interesting associations, particularly the linear career path for women in politics, established in the comparative cross-national exercise. The theory of party religiosity and women's leadership is a traveling theory.

CHAPTER THREE

Why Lebanon? The Puzzle and Pool of Women in Party Politics

Political parties assume a major role as gatekeepers and main vehicles for women's political advancement. They are often blamed for the flagrant gender imbalances in female parliamentary representation and their dismal political profiles. By placing Lebanon in comparative perspective, for the remainder of this book, I address concerns voiced by Donno and Russett (2004) who called for more theory and research rooted in focused case studies. The advantages of a single case study in establishing causality and not mere association have been emphasized by researchers including Kalyvas, himself a staunch supporter of multiple cases (1996: 14). A focused case study has the advantages of investigating in depth a phenomenon within a controlled sociopolitical environment, while holding constant variables that might influence the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. More specifically, a single case study can isolate the influence of political parties, the independent variable, functioning within one society, on women's leadership, the dependent variable, while holding constant the country's development level, political regime, and electoral system. Hence, one important advantage is the feasibility of examining social dynamics within one country, which is not plausible in multicountry studies. This means that with a single case study, it is possible to conduct an analysis that controls for contextual variables to a significant degree as well as taking social variables into account that may be considered endogenous to the relationships examined.

This chapter is organized in three sections. In the first section, it is demonstrated how Lebanon exemplifies the global mismatch between

women's socioeconomic and political profiles. The second section describes the Lebanese multiparty system through the lens of religious cleavages and the impact of a 15-year civil war. This section highlights the advantages of taking Lebanon as a single case study: A country marked by multiple, cross-cutting social cleavages resulting in an extraordinary profusion of political parties with varying intensities of religiosities and secularisms. The third and final section lays out the process of data collection and problems encountered.

The Puzzle: Women's High Socioeconomic and Low Political Profiles

Lebanese women acquired suffrage rights in 1952, ahead of many Arab countries. A number of articles in the personal status and family legal codes were amended to ensure equality between women and men. Despite this, there is still a wide gap between the de jure laws and legislation and their de facto application, particularly gender discrimination in family, personal status, and nationality laws.

The Lebanese population is estimated at 3.8 millions, of which 51 percent are women. It is composed of 18 Christian and Muslim sects. The constitution allows agnostic citizens to register in a nineteenth nondenominational group. These communities have proportional representation in parliament via a confessional quota.[1] The last population census was conducted in 1932, before Lebanon gained its independence in 1943, which indicates the extreme sensitivity to rocking the demographic balance and status quo. Unofficial estimates denote that total population is composed of one-third each of Christians (all sects), Shiites, and Sunnis. Other estimates point to around 60 percent Muslims (Shiites, Sunnis, Druze, and Alawites), and 39 percent Christians (Maronites, Catholics including Armenians, Orthodox, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Copts, and Protestants), and 1 percent other religious sects including Jews. Estimates also point to around 4 million Lebanese in Diaspora, the majority of whom are Christians and Shiites. Pursuant to the 15-year civil war, the 1989 Ta'if Accord resolved the controversy over which denomination has majority population, by adding 30 seats to parliament and splitting 128 seats equally between Christians and Muslims.

In the educational domain, females recorded higher enrolment rates than males at all levels. Female to male tertiary level enrolment ratio stood at 1.2. Statistics show that 24 percent of women graduated in

medicine, pharmacy, engineering, and agricultural sciences, 20 percent in law, and 9 percent in business administration. About 31 percent of Lebanese women (15 + years) are economically active, comprising 33 percent of the labor force, of which, 30 percent are administrators, 39 percent are specialists and professionals, and 9 percent are executives and managers in the private sector (table 3.1). Women are recognized in professional associations where they are elected presidents and members of executive committees of pharmacists, engineers, and lawyers' orders.

However, in the public political arena, those highly accomplished women score less: only 3.1 percent got elected in 2009 parliament, 4.7 percent in 2010 municipalities, and 6.7 percent in 2009 cabinet, which dropped to 0 in 2011. Appointment to the government is done in consultation with major political blocs and parties. The all-male 2011 cabinet provides initial support to the theory of party religiosity, given that the majority in 2009 parliament belongs to religious parties, Hizbullah and Amal, and their allies of March 8 bloc. This does not bode well for women in political leadership.

The exception lies in the judiciary, where women represent 37 percent of the corps, one of the highest in the Arab region. Statistics show that 20 percent of women graduated in law, which buoys the supply side of the equation. Women join the Institute of Higher Judiciary Studies and sit for competitive, qualifying exams and pass in large numbers, which is largely attributed to the gender-blind exams, injecting meritocratic features into the judiciary system. Moreover, in mid-1980s, during the civil war, a large number of female judges replaced massive (forced) resignations of male judges because of large-scale corruption. However, because appointments to the supreme courts are subject to confessional quotas, women constitute only 18 percent of the Administrative Court (the Consultative or Shoura Council), and 17 percent of the State Supreme Court. The Constitutional Council is all-male. There is no civil family court in Lebanon. All family litigations go to confessional religious courts. Only the Protestant and Armenian Orthodox courts have women. The situation is similar in Israel, which is also characterized by religious pluralism. Civil marriage is not allowed and civil courts do not perform such functions. Couples head mostly to Cyprus to obtain a civil marriage certificate, which they can then register at home. One couple succeeded in obtaining a marriage license from civil courts in January 2013, after legally relinquishing their sectarian affiliation. After lengthy deliberations, their marriage license was signed by the minister of interior in May 2013

Table 3.1 Arab versus Lebanese Women's Socioeconomic and Political Profiles, 2007–2010 (%)

Country Groups	*I*	*II*	*III*		*IV*	*V*
League of Arab States (LAS)						
Higher Education, 2007	Qatar Kuwait	Lebanon Bahrain Oman Saudi	Jordan Libya Tunisia Palestine	Sudan Egypt Syria	Morocco Djibouti Comoros	Iraq Yemen Mauritania
Female/Male Ratio	2.72–2.20	1.20–1.05	0.97–0.80		0.78–0.72	0.52–0.20
Economic Participation, 2008	Comoros Mauritania Somalia	Morocco Lebanon Tunisia Egypt Sudan	Algeria Yemen Syria Jordan Kuwait		Libya Bahrain Iraq	Saudi Oman Qatar UAE
Share of Women in Labor Force (Total LAS 29%)	43.0	35.0–30.0	28.0–26.0		25.0–20.0	18.0–13.0
Political Representation, 2010 (Total LAS 10.1 %)	Tunisia Iraq UAE Sudan Mauritania	Djibouti Palestine Syria Jordan Morocco	Kuwait Libya Algeria Somalia		Lebanon Comoros Bahrain Egypt Yemen	Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia
Women in Parliament	27.6–22.1	13.8–10.5	7.7–6.8		3.1–0.3	0.0

Lebanon

Education, 2007	*Economic Participation, 2008 (Rates; % shares of total)*					*Political Participation, 2010 (% shares of total)*		
Higher Education (Female/male ratio)	Female economic activity rate (15 yrs +)	Share in Labor Force	Administrators	Specialists and professional	Executives andmanagers	Judges	MPs (4/128)	Ministers (2/30)
1.2	30.7	33.0	28.8	39.0	9.0	37.0	3.1	6.7

Sources: Computations by author based on www.escwa.org.lb; www.ipu.org, February 28, 2010; www.cas.gov.lb, April 2010; www.nclw.org.lb.

(AFP and Al-Jazeera, May 2, 2013). However, the law is still under debate by legislatures. In this vein, Deniz Kandiyoti points out: "In Lebanon, where the state incorporated the religious/ethnic heterogeneity of society in its formal structure, the government relinquished matters of family and personal status to religious authorities of the various communities" (1991: 12).

It is extremely puzzling that while Lebanese women are super-achievers in education and economic participation, they are severely underrepresented in the public sphere when compared to other Arab countries. At the tertiary level, female to male gross enrolment ratio (1:2) is among the highest compared to other Arab countries, except for Qatar and Kuwait.[2] Similarly, Lebanese women constitute 33 percent of the labor force, surpassing most Arab countries of comparable economies. In the agroeconomies (Comoros, Mauritania, Somalia, and Morocco), women's share in the labor force is higher than in Lebanon because the majority are traditionally engaged in the agricultural sector. However, using wage employment in the nonagricultural sector, Lebanese women rank at the top among the Arab countries.[3] Given this high socioeconomic profile, one expects a comparable representation in public office. Yet, female parliamentary representation in Lebanon is much below that of Sudan, Palestine, Djibouti, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, and Jordan, where women rank lower in education and economic participation. This is the puzzle that I seek to explain by examining party politics, especially religious ideology and its influence on the pool of female party activists.

Lebanon displays all the features and trappings of an enabling environment for women's political leadership. However, empirical evidence demonstrates quite the contrary. Indeed, female representation in Lebanon is unexpectedly and inexplicably lower than in most Arab countries of comparable educational and economic levels. A similar picture transpires when comparing women's socioeconomic and political status in Lebanon to other non-Arab Muslim-majority countries (www.womenwatch). The National Democratic Institute (NDI), serving as international observers in 2009 parliamentary elections, also raise this perplexing issue: "The level of women's representation in Lebanon's Parliament falls below international norms. Even within the Arab world, Lebanon has one of the lowest levels of women's political participation" (2009: 54).

In addition, one observes that women in the Lebanese legislature are mostly those "garbed in black" denoting that they are in a state of mourning for the accidental loss, natural death, imprisonment or

assassination of a husband, father or brother.[4] Bouhamdan remarks that "[T]he country is yet to usher in a female political leader or Member of Parliament, who is not a wife, the sister, the daughter or the mother of a prominent political martyr. Without blood ties to male political icons, a woman's political career remains gravely limited by social, cultural and religious norms" (2009: 39). Indeed, with the single exception of Ghinwa Jalloul in 2000 and 2005 parliaments, all other female MPs are widows, sisters, or daughters of martyred political leaders. Similarly, the International Foundation of Electoral Systems (IFES) comments that "Lebanese women parliamentarians have been branded as the women 'dressed in black.'" As such, some female MPs remain informal proxies and tokens in parliament, while others gain political maturity over time as legislators. They become role models, inspiring other women to pursue a political career. However, this is not sui generis to Lebanon. Denise Baer (2006) suggests seven types of political recruitment for women, namely, institutional, sponsored, lateral, widow, proxy, movement, and dynastic, which I use in my analysis.

Table 3.2 shows that 100 percent of women belonging to the widows/dynastic category and nominated by political parties won in elections. Between 1953 and 1972, or before the 1975 civil war erupted, the majority of female candidates (93 percent) belonged to the widows and dynastic combined category. When women run as widows, banking on their blood ties to politically powerful families, there is congruence between *widows* and *dynastic* recruitment categories, which serve as entry points into public office. The pattern shifted in postwar elections during 1992–2009, in which 74 percent of female candidates were nominated by political parties, including those garbed-in-black. This prompted the NDI to recommend that "[A]s other electoral reforms are pursued, consideration should be given to the best means to increase women's political representation as elected officials, in political party leadership, in the government, and as election administrators" (2009: 54). This recommendation is timely, although the NDI does not specify what the "best means" are. They do, however, point to the central role that political parties play in the process, which I fully share provided these parties are women-friendly.

Further, women who ran as independent or supported by the women's movement never made it to parliament to date. The inefficacy of independent avenues for women's leadership is equally observed in other countries.[5] This is not women-specific. The chances of male candidates are also slim if they run as independents without party support. However, female candidates suffer from triple jeopardy of the dire need

Table 3.2 Lebanon: Female Candidacy for Parliament and Municipalities

Nominees for Parliament by Baer's Categories, 1953–1972 and 1992–2009 (cumulative %)

Category	*1953–1972*	*1992–2009*		
	Candidates	*Candidates*	*Won*	*Lost*
Widows/ Dynastic	93.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Political Parties		1.6	2.2	0.0
Political Parties sponsoring women garbed-in-black	0.0	72.1	97.8	0.0
Independent	0.0	21.3	0.0	81.0 (100%)
Women's Movement	7.0	4.9	0.0	19.0 (100%)
Total	100.0 (n = 14)	100.0 (n = 61)	100.0 (n = 45)	100.0 (n = 16)

Nominees for Parliament versus Municipalities (%)

	Total Seats	*Candidates*		*Winners*	
		Number	*Percentage of Total Candidates*	*Number*	*Percentage of Total Winners*
Parliamentary elections 2005	128	14	3.5	6	4.7
Parliamentary elections 2009	128	12	2.0	4	3.1
Municipal elections 2004	8976	514	2.8	206	2.3
Municipal elections 2010	11424	1346	5.6	536	4.7

Sources: Calculations by the author by Baer's (2006) categories based on official data from Lebanese Parliament; International Foundation of Electoral Systems (IFES); www.moim.gov.lb; www.nclw.org.lb; Marguerite El-Helou 1999 and 2010; Wafa' Dika Hamza, "Where Are the Lebanese Women in National Decision-Making?" *An-Nahar,* March 9, 2009.

for patronage, limited financial means to run and campaign for public office, and potential voter gender bias. In this connection, the Arab Barometer data show that 82.6 percent of Lebanese people support women as prime ministers, but over 50 percent find that men make better political leaders than women (Arab Barometer 2007; Atallah 2012: 16). This gives a mixed message and does not rule out gender bias in Lebanon, or its negative impact on women's electability. I argue that it is not fear of voters' preferences and gender bias that prevents extremist religious parties from nominating women. Rather, it is party politics, informed by party religiosity, which is antithetical to women's

leadership and embedded gender bias at the institutional level. This is embodied in the attitude qua political culture of conservative and extremist religious parties toward women's leadership, as qualitative evidence will show. Given that parties select and nominate winners, which parties are superior for women's leadership: parties with expanse religious platforms or secular ones?

To sum up, measured by regional standards, progress achieved by Lebanese women in academic and professional achievements in the private sector surpasses their political representation in public office, except for the judiciary. This mismatch cum puzzle demonstrates why Lebanon offers a particularly useful, albeit puzzling, showcase of women's political leadership. The following section makes the case for Lebanon in comparative perspective.

Religious Cleavages, Party Politics, and the Pool of Women for Leadership

Lebanon is a small country with a multireligious plural society. It has the largest Christian population (estimated at one-third) among other predominantly Muslim Arab countries (minorities in Syria, Jordan, Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, and Sudan). This demographic characteristic has significant implications on conflict as a result of fierce competition over control and power among three major communities: Maronites, Shiites, and Sunnis. It is also marked by multiple cross-cutting cleavages, producing class disparities due to uneven income distribution, gender disequilibria, and wider conflict-bearing religious cleavages instigating political unrest. These cleavages drowned the country in a 15-year civil war. As a result, parties mushroomed, forming around these cleavages and attracting poor and deprived communities, especially in South and North Lebanon where religious extremism thrives, and the birth place of most religious parties. This phenomenon is not sui generis to Lebanon as Norris and Inglehart find:

> We believe that the importance of religiosity persists most strongly among vulnerable populations, especially those living in poorer nations, facing personal survival-threatening risks. We argue that feelings of vulnerability to physical, societal, and personal risks are a key factor driving religiosity . . . Societies where people's daily lives are shaped by the threat of poverty . . . [and], death, remain as religious today as centuries ago. (2004: 4–5, 216)[6]

Tessler also finds that "[r]eligion is a more salient independent variable among women than among men, apparently because women are more religious . . . [t]he higher level of religiosity among women helps to account for their greater conservatism relative to men" (4).[7] Indeed, this phenomenon is observed in conflict-stricken Lebanon where poor women are often more religious and pious than poor men. Findings of research point to wars, civil strife, and armed conflict as having a differential impact on women, which thwarts efforts to bridge the gender gap, including in the political arena.[8]

Conflict-Bearing Religious Cleavages

Cleavages may be segmental like racial, linguistic, and religious (Eckstein 1966). Eckstein considers sex, tribe, race, region, rural-urban, young-old, language, religion, differences in values, norms, and belief systems as social cleavages (in Lane and Ersson 1987: 41). Lane and Ersson find that cleavages may also be cultural (young-old, urban-rural, traditional-modern, authoritarian-libertarian), or socioeconomic as in class, status, role, and gender. They argue that when social cleavages are more pronounced, the political system becomes less stable (1987: 39–40, 93, and 315). Similarly, Norris and Inglehart (2004) argue that some cleavages can cause the fragmentation of society and thus threaten its well-being and stability, chief among these being conflict-bearing religious cleavages. However, other scholars argue that social cleavages are essential for democracy because they allow competition (Almond and Verba 1965; Dahl 1965 and 1982). I am ambivalent about this holding in Lebanon, which has been democratizing forever but is still conflict-stricken by cleavages.

There is a host of examples of social and religious cleavages that are at the root of conflict and political instability around the world. These cleavages demonstrate their relevance to the structure of political systems, party-formation, and to studying women's leadership. For instance, in Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Belgium, there are ethnolinguistic cleavages. In Denmark, France, and England, religious cleavages have emerged with the influx of Muslim immigrants. In Pakistan and India there are religious and ethnic cleavages. The cast system in India is especially unfavorable for Muslim women. Religious extremism and gender segregation in Afghanistan have created a schism in the society. In Ireland, South Africa, Rwanda, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, one finds conflict-bearing racial and ethnic cleavages, leading to "ethnic cleansing," apartheid, and other war atrocities. In

Arab countries, which enjoy a common language, religion, race, and cultural heritage, one perceives conflict-bearing ethnic, linguistic, and religious cleavages, especially between minorities (Kurds, Armenians, Berbers, Christians and Copts, Assyrians, Druze, Alawites) and Muslim-majorities in Algeria, Morocco, Western Sahara, Egypt, Iraq, Bahrain, Sudan, Somalia, and Lebanon. Religious cleavages also prevail in other Arab countries (Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, and Egypt) that have Christian minorities, but where Islam is the state religion. These are conflict-bearing, which became more pronounced in the wake of the 2011 Arab uprisings. Witness, for instance, the Copts in Egypt, Shiites and Sunnis in Iraq or Bahrain, Alawites and Sunnis in Syria, or the religious schism between Christian and Muslims that led to the splitting of Sudan.

Lebanon is a showcase of multireligious, plural society, and the plethora of parties forming around cross-cutting, conflict-bearing religious-based cleavages that led to a 15-year sectarian civil war. The armed presence on Lebanese soil of Palestinian refugees and Syrian troops have also contributed to prolonging civil conflict. These cleavages heightened extremism and intensified party religiosity, which may have thwarted women's advancement and stunted their leadership prospects. Conflicts tend to reinforce cleavages that mobilize religion, thereby reducing opportunities for women to break through the political glass ceiling. This is why conflict and cleavages are relevant to a study of party religiosity and women's leadership. Gender cleavages are not conflict-bearing, so far, but are relevant to a study of women's leadership in a Muslim- majority country, where more often than not political culture is conflated with the Shari'a to disadvantage women. Bouhamdan stresses that "[i]n religiously pluralist systems, like Lebanon, Palestine and to a lesser extent Israel, religious leaders often institutionalize traditional norms and values which are often contrary to gender equality" (2009: 18).

The Multiparty System

The multifaith mosaic fabric of Lebanese society is marked by a multiparty system formed around cross-cutting social cleavages. A party leader aptly describes Lebanon as a mix of fabrics, sects, convictions, contradictions, cleavages, and communities, in which parties are but a reflection of society. Scholars find that social cleavages shape and structure a party system and reflect the degree of society's cohesiveness and homogeneity (Almond and Verba 1965; Lipset and Rokkan

1967; Lane and Ersson 1987). Parties forming around these cleavages mark how closely they are linked to local communities and to society at large, and define how they function within these segmented societies. In Lebanon, these social cleavages are reflected in some 80 active and diverse types of parties, though with 18 "relevant" parties competing and vying for power and control. The diversity and profusion in the multiparty system has been recognized by politicians, clergymen, scholars, and political scientists studying the roots of political instability and perpetual conflict in the country.[9] For instance, Shtay, a Lebanese scholar, finds that the most prominent characteristic of the Lebanese multiparty system is the disparities and diversity in its salient features, particularly in inner workings, organizational structures, and ideologies. He highlights the multiplicity in numbers and complexity in classification (2004: 130).

The multiparty system features a handful of powerful parties and several minor ones that do not stand a chance in elections unless they join political blocs and coalitions. The impact of social cleavages is depicted by measuring the strength or fragmentation of a party system. Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera developed an index for the "effective" number of parties within a party system, which takes into account their relative size and measures their strength in terms of the proportion of seats they occupy in the legislature (1979: 8 and 24).[10] They suggest that "The number of effective parties is the number of hypothetical *equal-size* parties that would have the same total *effect* on fractionalization of the system as have equal parties of *unequal* size" (1979: 2). This is useful for comparative purposes, as the effective number of parties is a frequent operationalization for the fractionalization and segmentation of party systems. Accordingly, the Lebanese parliament is effectively a 4.9 party system (with a fractionalization index of 0.94), which is borderline high, since anything above 5.0 is high. This reflects wide disparities in relative sizes and strengths of parties because only a handful of the 18 relevant parties wield power. It also reveals a high degree of fragmentation permeating the Lebanese legislature, as a result of the multisocial and religious cleavages.

The diversity and variation in Lebanese political parties is useful for testing the theory of party religiosity within a controlled environment in which endogenous factors as the electoral and political systems or culture are at play. The majority of parties in Lebanon are confessional, single-sect dominated or monosectarian, with civil, national, and/or religious orientations. They rally around leaders from the same dominant sect and few have plural membership. Their labels

vary depending on self-definition (self-location), declared objectives, and programmatic orientations. These parties may not fully conform to the standards, classical features, common nuances, and norms of parties in their institutionalization, ideologies, and/or the mix of religious and secular components in their political platforms. The intensity of religiosity (degree of secularism) is denoted by examining (via content analysis) parties' platforms to determine the extent to which religious and secular components penetrate their agendas. One finds across the party system multiple religiosities and secularisms, as the testimony of a female activist demonstrates: "We established nondenominational kindergartens, as models for children in the South. These were approved by Hizbullah, which indicates that even in the most religious parties, one finds secularist tendencies." This statement also shows that efforts continue to be exerted to bridge religious cleavages and that, religions continue to be reinterpreted and to have multiple interpretations that eventually inform and influence custodians of religious parties.[11]

Some confessional parties maintain a religious denominational identity, but declare nonreligious objectives, while pushing for civil goals and national sovereignty. These generally lack a political ideology per se and their outreach ranges from limited territorial to less than wide national control. In this sense, parties in Lebanon may look after the interests of one of the 18 religious communities, but not after the whole population. This aggregation of confessional parties mark the Lebanese party system, as male elite from Ishtiraki party maintains,

> Lebanon is a confederation of 18 religious communities, each concerned with its own identity and survival within separate enclaves. It is a federation of minorities that govern by proportional confessional representation within a consociational political system. Unlike other Arab countries, Lebanon is a civil and secular, not a religious state. It boasts a tolerant constitution stipulating freedom of religious conviction, expression, and practice.

Similarly, the leader of the Maronite-dominated Ahrar party stresses that "Lebanon is the only Arab country which does not impose one religion on all its citizens. Its confessional quota reveals the importance of religion in society, which actually governs the social, political, and public life as well as its party system." This is substantively significant and is a testimony that, in Lebanon, religion and politics are intertwined.

Beyond the confessional identity that brings constituents together, the locomotive or driving force behind the formation of parties lies in the self-serving interests of political leaders for electoral power, patronage, and clientelism. Feudal or "rentier" type clientilistic behavior keeps the party in the political arena, as the leader uses his affluence for buying votes or offering financial and in-kind incentives to secure higher turnout. Capitalizing on a common confessional identity for electoral purposes is a classic case for parties, as Norris and Inglehart point out that: "One's religious identity provided a cue that oriented voters toward political parties, and helped define one's ideological position on the political spectrum" (2004: 228).

There are several Islamist parties that uphold the Shari'a and enshrine its tenets in their political platforms. These parties use politics to achieve religious and politicoreligious goals, but the intensity of religiosity in their political agendas may vary. The relationship between the state and religious leadership ebbs and flows, as a party leader explains: "The multireligious composition of society is not the major problem. It is the implicit understanding between strong religious leaders and a weak state to maintain the status quo because it is in their mutual interest to do so." The Fox Religion and State (RAS) index on religion-state regulation assigns a high score of 22 to Lebanon, equivalent to that of France and India (Kunkler 2009). This high level of cooperation between the state and religious authorities begs the question whether such cooperation is attained consciously through efforts of the willing, or the government is coerced into accepting the status quo in order to ensure stability and security. The political situation in Lebanon is in a continuous flux. There is a lot of muscle-flexing and "not-so-peaceful" political climate as the July 2006, June 2007, and May 2008 events demonstrate. A case in point is Hizbullah's maintenance of a fully armed militia within the boundaries of the state, reflecting a state-within-a-state situation akin to that of armed militias within Palestinian refugee camps before the civil war erupted in 1975. Therefore, such implicit cooperation-co-optation between religious leaders and the state may not work in favor of women's advancement or their leadership chances since religious leaders have the upper hand in deciding the station and lives of women.

Women's chances in leadership are limited overall, but I argue that they are infinitesimal in parties whose platforms contain more religious components. For instance, in 2009 parliament, the representation of the five religious parties, occupying around one-fifth of seats, is all-male. This is very telling since it does not only reflect a nonegalitarian

stance, but also the magnitude of women's lost opportunities in leadership. Twenty percent of parliamentary seats are closed to women unless these religious parties change their politics, become women-friendly, and nominate women to public office. This simple statistic provides compelling evidence of the influence of party religiosity on women's leadership.

The Lebanese Bloc Vote (BV) electoral system is not women-friendly. Voters vote for candidates and not parties and as such parties have no incentives to nominate women. Parties do not employ voluntary internal or electoral quotas for women. There are no legislated or constitutional quotas to boost female representation in public office. Furthermore, despite an assumption of homogeneity in language, history, and culture, there are slight nuances in the Lebanese multifaith society, which offer a fertile ground for studying party variation in political culture. In this context, a Lebanese sociologist remarks that "Lebanon has a very complex, diverse and global culture, influenced by Western culture, Arab satellite channels, the Koran, the Bible" (*The Media Line*, February 9, 2010). This makes Lebanon particularly useful for examining the impact of religious cleavages on the party system and exploring interlinkages with party religiosity and women's leadership.

Lebanon is the only Arab country with a long tradition of holding regularly competitive elections, despite interruptions during the 15-year civil war. In 1992, the first postwar parliamentary and municipal elections were held. Whether these are "free and fair" is intimately linked to the affluence, strength, and outreach of competing parties and the clout of political leaders. Until 1975, Lebanon was the only Arab country ever close to being ranked as a "democracy" by credible international standards.[12] Subsequently, due to reasons of "stateness," or not having monopoly over the legitimate use of force, and the presence of foreign armies on its soil, Lebanon's ranking on Polity IV democracy scale (21-point scale from +10 to 0 to –10) dropped from +5 in 1974 to –66 until 2004. Its politically unstable democracy was described as dysfunctional, given external threats from neighboring Syria for intervention in internal politics and Israel for assault. During the period 2005–2009, the index went up to +7, second only to Comoros among the Arab countries (table 2.1). Polity IV classified Lebanon as a "democracy" in its global report, albeit this is doubtful because it lacks several essential elements qualifying it as such. The June 2009 elections were labeled "free and fair" by international observers. According to "Freedom in the World 2010" report, Lebanon's rank improved on account of "noteworthy gains"

in civil liberties. The Austrian-based Global Democracy Ranking cited Lebanon as the second most improved democratizing developing country in the world after Nepal, and the most improved in the Middle East and the Arab countries (*Daily Star*, January 14, 2010). The BTI 2010 assigned Lebanon a 6.25 score on the 10-point democracy scale (from 1 lowest to 10 highest). Lebanon's democracy score is higher than most Arab countries and closer to the non-Arab Muslim-majority Senegal (6.30) and Indonesia (7.00), considered by comparativists along with India as the best democracies in the developing world. This lends support and adds credence to the choice of Lebanon as a case study for testing the theory of party religiosity and women's leadership.

In sum, Lebanese demographics, a 15-year civil war, multiple social and widening religious cleavages, a multiparty system of diverse and competing parties, and an encouraging rating on democracy and political freedoms make Lebanon a particularly useful case study to test the theory of party religiosity and women's leadership. Lebanon demonstrates how conflict-bearing religious cleavages, which widen sectarian schisms and heighten religious extremism, intensify party religiosity thereby reducing women's leadership chances. The diversity among competing parties provides the opportunity to examine multiple cases within a single case study, while simultaneously controlling for the influence of political and electoral systems. The prevalence of varying intensities of religiosity and secularism on party platforms offers good grounds for exploring the hypothesis that higher religiosity parties are less likely than lower religiosity parties to enhance women's leadership.

The structural aspects, the very nature of the Lebanese political system reflected in political parties—as opposed to a mix of socioeconomic and cultural factors—might account to some degree for the constraints and barriers to better political performance and more leadership opportunities for women. By privileging confessionally identified actors and constituencies, some political institutions give religious and conservative cultural values a backdoor entry, erecting an indirect barrier to women's presence. This is exacerbated under conditions of conflict or in postconflict situations. It is not so much that religious values contrary to women's advancement infuse Lebanese society directly and account entirely for women's limited ascension to positions of power. Instead, those values are incorporated into the political skeleton of confessionally defined political parties and wield their influence from there.

Data Collection Process and Problems

Data and information are collected on party-level characteristics and women in leadership bodies in these parties. Global statistics on women in party membership, leadership, and as nominees for public office are rare and, if available, often obsolete. The paucity of research on women in parties and related sex-disaggregated data is highlighted in official and scholarly reports. Scholars criticize the failure of political scientists to engender their research and address the political participation of women (Shtay 2004: 143–144). In order to narrow this data gap, an original dataset on women in the 18 relevant parties was compiled, which is unique in coverage, scope, and quality (table 4.1).

The collection process was severely hampered by the prevailing political unrest, and by the paucity of sex-disaggregated data, and if available, their accuracy, reliability, and timeliness. Obtaining party membership disaggregated by sect and sex posed a major hurdle. Lovenduski and Norris also find that "in the past most parties have not counted their membership according to sex" (1993: 212). Some older prewar parties do not maintain computerized databases for membership applications and rolls. The problem is compounded in Lebanon since there are unisex and multidenominational names and overlapping Christian and Muslim surnames.[13] However, most party administrators were extremely cooperative and provided me with assistance to go through the membership rolls manually and to estimate party membership by sex, sect, and denomination.

Given the political instability and the high security alert after the July 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, it was extremely difficult to secure interviews with top-ranking party officials and politicians. There were frequent interruptions during 2007 and 2008 as violence and fighting erupted in refugee camps, streets, and/or closures of downtown Beirut by Hizbullah and allies. The situation somewhat stabilized following the election of President Michel Sleiman in October 2008, but remains volatile to date. Nonetheless, access to party elites and leaders does not generally involve going through official channels, but is secured via personal networks, referrals, and/or key brokers *wasta*. This condition prevailed throughout the research period, owing to the unstable security situation and attendant political concerns preoccupying politicians. Through personal and professional connections, appointments were secured with party leaders, senior advisers, administrators, male and female officials, and parliamentarians. Meetings with political leaders were held under very tight security measures in fortified

parliamentary offices, at party headquarters, private homes, remote locations, hotel rooms, and other safe havens. This was necessary as many high-profiled interviewees were always at risk of assassination.

Stringent requirements were set by extremist and conservative religious parties to grant interviews. I had to submit proforma applications specifying the name and/or position of party official to be interviewed, purpose of research, list of questions, along with personal data, and an official letter of introduction from my former affiliation (Columbia University). Subsequently, I was referred to male or female party elites to set up the interview. In one case of a Salafist religious party, the interview with the leader, a cleric, was conducted over the phone. He did not refer me to female members stressing that women are not politically involved or in leadership posts. The cleric's attitude provides ample insight on women's slim leadership chances in such religious parties.

The postwar era witnessed the birth of new powerful parties, with some parties surviving the civil war, while others becoming the offshoots of prewar parties and some defunct. Field research covered only the 18 relevant parties. In order to get more observations, Sartori's 3 percent threshold for relevant parties is lowered to one seat (almost 1 percent) in 2009 parliament (1976: 122–123). Combined, these 18 relevant parties account for over 70 percent of the 128 parliamentary seats. The small number of parties (n = 18) constitutes a caveat for modeling, which is compensated for by the rich qualitative findings.

The questionnaire was pretested in September 2006, following the July 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon (Annex 1). This was followed by three rounds of structured and semistructured interviews between 2007 and 2009, with updates until the end of 2010. I personally conducted all interviews with party leaders and their senior advisers, female party activists, parliamentarians, and scholars.[14] I interviewed the following: 14 party leaders including 4 clerics and senior male advisers; all 6 female members of parliament (MPs) in 2005 parliament; 3 of all 4 ever female ministers; 2 current and former female party leaders, 1 vice president, 2 secretaries-general, and the majority of women in leadership in parties' decision-making bodies; all current and former heads of women's wings in 13 (of 18) parties that maintain such wings; a 2.5 percent sample of all female candidates for municipalities included on lists of 10 of the 18 relevant parties that nominated women in 2010 elections; and 14 current chairs and/or members of municipal councils. This extensive list shows that female party activists in leadership positions are targeted. Female officials, especially from religious parties, were

selected by party elites to be interviewed. All female elites interviewed were highly educated, holding at least first-level university degrees. The majority are professionals (lawyers, physicians, architects, engineers, and businesswomen), school teachers, and university professors. They are politically mature and well-informed. Although those highly profiled women are not the whole universe of women in leadership positions, they are a representative sample nonetheless. Their qualifications and merit lend credence to the information supplied or analysis provided, which substantiates the positive findings of this research. The openness and understanding that interlocutors showed were critical for the success of this research.

Information gathered from structured and semistructured interviews is invaluable in its comprehensive coverage of women in parties, as party activists and potential agents of change. This information covers party-level institutional aspects including self-location of parties, year of birth, decision-making processes, mobilization strategies, membership composition, leadership transitions, relevant operating procedures, and insights on parties' political culture and behavior toward women. In this, I heed Pande and Cirone's advice that "Gathering empirical evidence on how individual attitudes, cultural norms about appropriate work for women, and political institutions affect participation is essential" (2009: 7). Such information is essential for developing a religiosity-sensitive classification, labeling, and coding parties in order to test the theory and related hypotheses. The rich information culled from 150 interviews provides insight on party variation in religiosity and political culture, the dominant set of values, norms, and attitudes of party elites vis-à-vis women's leadership.

Conclusions

Lebanon exemplifies the global mismatch between women's high socioeconomic profile and their low political representation in public office. This mismatch, or disconnect, is especially pronounced when comparing women's dismal representation in the public sector to that of women in other Arab countries of comparably high socioeconomic profiles. Its mosaic and multireligious, plural society of 18 religious communities is marked with multiple cross-cutting social and conflict-bearing religious cleavages that shape and structure its political and party system. The interaction between religious cleavages and the diversity of parties in Lebanon constitutes an interesting and compelling case for

in-depth examination to probe their influence on women's leadership. A single country case study shows variations in women's leadership, the dependent variable, while holding constant the potential influence of political regime and electoral system, to isolate the influence of party variation in religiosity, the independent variable.

Can party religiosity explain women's leadership? The following chapter looks at party variation in religiosity along the civil war timeline through the lens of political culture.

CHAPTER FOUR

Party Religiosity, Political Culture, and the Civil War

Little in-depth research on women's leadership in political parties has been undertaken to date, particularly on interlinkages with party religiosity informing party politics. Basu exclaims that "What becomes striking is the dearth of scholarship on these relations [between women and parties] on the one hand, and their political significance on the other" (2005: 33). Feminists and scholars have studied women, at large, in political parties in the West, South Asia, and MENA countries.[1] Also, Norris (1993) calls for future research to look deeply into the role of party ideology on female representation. In-depth research in Lebanon responds to these calls, aiming to contribute modestly to narrowing this scholarship gap.

This chapter is organized in three sections. In the first section, qualitative evidence supporting the conceptual framework that party religiosity is a plausible explanation for women in leadership is examined. Individual "religion" as influencing women's social life is differentiated from institutional "religiosity" as affecting their political life and leadership chances within party echelons. Also, in this section I engage with the debate over private and public religion, particularly public Islam, and its potential influence on women's leadership. The second section highlights the impact of a 15-year civil war on widening religious cleavages and restructuring the multiparty system. In the third section, an ordinal measure of party religiosity is developed that is sensitive to capturing variations thereof across parties. Parties are classified, labeled, and coded along a 5-point religiosity continuum of secularisms and religiosities.

This lays the ground work for the qualitative and quantitative analysis carried out in the following chapters.

Ware describes a political party as "[a]n institution that (a) seeks influence in a state, often by attempting to occupy positions in government, and (b) usually consists of more than one single interest in the society and so to some degree attempts to 'aggregate interests'" (1987: 5). Blondel describes parties as "[m]ultiform and . . . at the crossroads between the institutional and behavioural aspects of politics" (1969: 221). Whereas, Norris, one of the few scholars linking parties to women in politics, highlights that

> Political parties serve vital functions as one of the main linkages between citizens and government: structuring electoral choice, recruiting legislative candidates, providing a legislative agenda in government. Parties provide a range of opportunities for women to participate in political life from the political booth to local meetings, the conference platform, legislature and cabinet. (Lovenduski and Norris 1993: 308)[2]

Some Lebanese scholars argue that parties formed after the civil war diverge from the norm while others find that parties conform to the standard pattern.[3] Indeed, Lebanese parties fit the standard pattern, albeit with slight nuances. They are multiform, pursue specific goals, and perform similar functions, especially as gatekeepers in selecting and nominating women and men for public office. However, they form around specific communities and as such fail to aggregate interests nationwide. Thus, while Lebanese parties do not fully conform to the standard model of parties, they are not sui generis nonetheless. This allows for generalization of findings and predicting parties' behavior vis-à-vis women's leadership. Given the above, which party-level characteristics influence women's leadership?

Party Variation in Religiosity

Lebanon is a Muslim-majority country with a large Christian population in which religion and religious affiliations play an important role in politics. Religion is inextricably intertwined with politics in such a manner that "religion is politics" (see Corstange 2012). This phenomenon is perceived in many Arab and Muslim countries, as Iliya Harik argues, comparing the East to West:

> The majority of Muslim countries have a secular constitution, while retaining some manifestations of religiosity that do not violate secularism. There are diversity and degrees of secularisms even in more advanced Western democracies. It is not at all possible to separate fully religion from the state or the state from religion. Combining religion and politics is a matter of realization and perception and not a contextual matter. In my view, this is akin to realizing full democracy without state intervention, or laissez-faire without managing trade, or complete implementation of Marxism, socialism and communism. This has never been witnessed to date in any country. So, why do we expect that the case be different for religion and politics? (2001: 321)

Moreover, separating religion from politics does not imply separating religion from the society, as Fouad Khoury, the late Lebanese sociologist, remarks,

> [S]ecularism . . . eliminates elitism in religious decisions but does not eliminate its religiosity. Therefore, when religion matters to people, one tends to see a mutual reinforcement between society and the political system that affects public affairs. This is why contemporary Islamists face a dilemma between the principle of representation and the Shari'a law in government. (in Harik 2001: 255)

However, this dilemma is accentuated as the space collapses between religion and politics, or between private and public Islam, or, following Casanova (1994), between "deprivatization" and privatization of religion (see also Kadivar 2003). Religion means different things to different people, including scholars. For instance, Shuster refers to Amy Gutmann's definition that "[r]eligion is primarily a matter of individual conscience which is no variant than moral belief" (2007: 2).[4] Corstange sees that religion "[i]s a multidimensional phenomenon that encompasses aspects of group belonging, doctrinal beliefs, and ritual behavior" (2012: 3).

In Lebanon, religion is an identity or religious affiliation, and is used interchangeably with individual religiosity, reflecting piety and commitment to practicing rituals. Moreover, when people, particularly political leaders, are committed religiously and in decision-making positions, they tend to follow their faith and convictions also in legislative

decisions. This invariably affects women's station and their leadership chances, as Schuster argues:

> Conservative and fundamentalist religious groups take part in politics on the basis of their faith, sometimes even seeking to make the public order conform to the ordinances of faith . . . One of the most contentious issues . . . is the attitude of religious groups towards the role of women. (. . .) Religion is frequently the reason for discrimination, injustice and exclusion, a marker for social marginalization . . . ; religion is often believed to be inimical to liberal-democratic policies . . . , conservative and fundamentalist religious groups frequently hold and proclaim opinions that are illiberal. (2007: 2–3)

However, Jeff Spinner-Halev's conception is that "[r]eligion is a set of rules and practices with no difference to culture (in Schuster 2007: 3). In these instances, I would argue that it is not religion per se, but conflating individual with institutional religiosity that influences political leaders' attitude toward women and may have negative implications on women's leadership. More precisely, as the space collapses between private and public religion, women's leadership prospects fall. The fluidity between what is politics and what is institutional or individual religiosity of religious leaders is not very much appreciated by Lebanese citizens. Analyzing the Arab Barometer Data II for Lebanon, Atallah finds that "most of the Lebanese consider themselves religious but they strongly feel that the public and private practices of religion should be separated." The Lebanese disapprove of religious leaders playing a role in politics and influencing government voting decisions, as they have been doing to date. They also prefer that laws and legislation were based on people's wishes rather than on Islamic law. Atallah concludes that religion defines the parameters of women's role in Lebanese society (2012: 24). This, however, is not sui generis to Lebanon or to Islam, but applies to most religions worldwide.

But, what people and ordinary citizens want is one thing and what political leaders, wearing piety hats, do is another. It does not seem likely that "Public Islam" or "deprivatization" will usher liberal democracy as, to quote Casanova (1994), Catholicism and Protestantism did in the West. Indeed, he excludes Islam from his conclusions. On the contrary, qualitative evidence culled from 150 Lebanese interviewees point to privatization of religion favoring egalitarianism and women's leadership.[5]

In the first two rounds of interviews, practitioners' views are solicited on the role that religion plays in party politics, particularly to substantiate that religiosity in party platforms and not religion influences women's leadership. I wanted to see if the practitioners also make the same distinction that I do between religion and religiosity or between individual religiosity that affects women's social life and institutional/party religiosity that impacts their political life and leadership prospects.

Several religious party elites emphasize that, while their parties give prominence to religion, it is no bar to women's leadership. One gets the feeling that religious leaders cum politicians tend to couch their responses in diplomatic and strategic terms, which indicates awareness of what the interviewer expects to hear. These statements confirm that the station of women in Islamist parties is governed by Shari'a law, but often conflate with or are camouflaged by cultural discourses. Nonetheless, party officials differentiate between religion cum religious affiliation and religious extremism as a variant of party religiosity. For instance, a cleric, doubling as an Islamist party leader, stresses that "Religious extremism and not religion is the barrier to women's leadership, but also patriarchy, traditions, and customs. Women are not fit for politics or interested in it. Politics is for men and God wants women to stay at home." It is reassuring that he sees that religion is distinct from religious extremism, a more intense level of religious commitment than religion per se. However, he invokes God's ultimate authority to confine women home, as Schuster confirms:

> What is truly distinctive at least about Christianity, Islam and Judaism, though never theorized outside of religious science, is the reference of religious groups to the higher authority of God. Maybe, and certainly in the eye of the believer, this is what makes religion special: the reference to a higher, transcendental truth; what, if any, normative consequences this has needs to be explored. (2007: 21)

This religious party leader employs a patriarchal discourse of "politic-is-men's-business" (Dahlerup 2006). This leads one to infer that a party headed by a clergyman, exhibiting such conservative attitude, is unlikely to advance women to leadership. Responses of other religious leaders reveal similar views defending religion while simultaneously pointing to religious extremism. They invoke built-in doctrinal barriers to women's leadership blaming culture and patriarchy for women's poor lot, hiding behind external factors, not internal party politics. While

these statements exhibit hostile, antifeminist attitudes blocking women from leadership, they link party variation in religiosity (extremism) to women's advancement.

However, an Islamist party leader confesses that "Islamist extremist movements, like ours, do not approve of women's leadership; while moderate movements like the Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwan*) allow women to assume leadership and even nominate them to office." I wonder whether this still holds in the post-2011 Arab uprisings, especially as events continue unfolding in Egypt under Ikhwan. These events turn the "Moderation Theory" on its head that, once in power, religious parties will mellow as they seek to cultivate people's trust (see Tezcur 2010). On the contrary, there is a rollback in women's gains. They are sent back home and marginalized after being at the forefront in Tahrir Square. The situation of women in Egypt under Ikhwan highlights the adverse effects of Public Islam on women's leadership. Thus, *deprivatization* of religion or Public Islam may not lead to liberalism, democratization, and egalitarianism, as Christianity did in the West (see Casanova 1994).

Such qualitative evidence provides initial indication that religiosity in party platforms, not religion per se, impacts women's leadership. It differentiates between religion and religiosity and between public and private religion, substantiating the thrust of the conceptual framework upon which the theory of party religiosity and women's leadership is built. Information distinguishing parties by religiosity guides the process of classifying parties, as a female party official explains:

> In religious parties and in confessional but not religious parties, religion has no influence on women's leadership, since all members belong to the same sect. In secular and leftist parties, religion is a private matter. It is not religion and religious affiliation but religious extremism, traditions and patriarchy that block women's leadership. Religious affiliation not "religion" limits women's chances in public office only because of the confessional quota stipulated in the electoral law. Do not blame religion for women's dismal political representation.

Similar clarifications are made by a male party official that "Religious parties use politics to achieve their religious goals, aiming to change the political system and align it with the doctrine. Confessional parties have civil goals and keep religion in the private sphere." Such statements provide a useful generic classification of parties into secular,

leftist, religious, confessional, and civil parties, depending on parties' programmatic orientations and the place religion occupies, whether in the private or public sphere. Table 4.1 presents the 18 relevant parties classified, labeled, and coded by religiosity and other institutional aspects of import to women's leadership.

The statement by the only female in Hizbullah's political bureau provides insight on how, as a politician, she conceives of religion and religiosity, and whether religiosity influences party politics vis-à-vis women's leadership. She asserts that "Religion plays a very important role in Hizbullah's culture as far as values, norms, practices, and convictions are concerned. The doctrine informs our political agenda, since Islam guides our social and political life. Ours is a religious but not extremist party. We are open and tolerant to other religions. Islam is not a deterrent to women's leadership. I am the perfect example!" She concedes that religion plays a dominant role in party politics, yet it does not influence women's chances in leadership. However, the fact that there is only one woman in Hizbullah's otherwise all-male Politburo speaks volumes. How can this be explained? Are there no other female senior officials qualified for leadership? Granted, she is a university graduate and politically motivated. However, it cannot be denied that there are many highly educated women in leadership of women's wings in religious parties. Therefore, one cannot assume that political interest, maturity, or experience; education and skills; or other personal attributes impede women's leadership in religious parties. I argue that party religiosity, informing party politics, is behind the low representation of women in leadership bodies of religious parties.

The response of a female official in another religious party raises the critical issue of interpretation of the Shari'a: "Our religious convictions and values guide our activities. Religion matters but it has nothing to do with women's leadership. The dismal situation of women in Afghanistan is not because of religion but because of religious extremism of the Taliban. Islam is being misinterpreted and accused for women's poor lot. This should be set straight." A female activist also highlights that

> One of the misconceptions is that religion prevents women from assuming leadership positions. The truth is that it is not religion, but women-unfriendly interpretations of the doctrine by religious leaders translated as party policies that block women's leadership in religious parties. In contrast, women's leadership is enhanced in secular and pluralist parties like Tayyar, because religion is a private matter.

Table 4.1 Lebanon: Classifying, Labeling, and Coding 18 Relevant Parties

Party Name	*Denomination (Code)*	*Label and Religiosity (score)*	*Strength (%)*	*Women's membership %*	*Women's Leadership %*	*Pluralism*	*Democracy*	*Women Wings*
Pre-War Parties (1924–1974)								
Lebanese Communist	Nondenom. (0)	Secular (5)	1	16	11.2	1	2	1
Syrian Social Nationalist (*Qawmi-Suri*)	Nondenom. (0)	Secular (5)	1.6	20	13.1	1	2	1
Phalanges (*Kata'éb*)	Maronite (3)	Civil-Confessional 4)	6.2	10	4.2	0	1	1
National Bloc (*Kutlah*)	Maronite (3)	Civil-Confessional 4)	1	10	9.4	0	1	0
Arab Renaissance Socialist of Lebanon (*Ba'ath*)	Nondenom. (0)	Secular (5)	1	10	9.1	1	2	0
Progressive Socialist (*Ishtiraki*)	Druze (2)	Civil-Confessional 4)	4.7	25	7	1	1	1
National Liberals (*Ahrar*)	Maronite (3)	Civil-Confessional 4)	1	15	6.8	0	0	0
Islamic Group (*Jama'a Islamiah*)	Sunni (2)	Religious Extremist (1)	1	30	0	0	1	1
War-Origin and Postwar Parties (1975 to date)								
Hope Movement—Lebanese Resistance Regiments (*Amal*)	Shiite (1)	Religious Tolerant (3)	6.2	30	10.9	0	0	1
Unitarian Movement (*Tawhid*)	Sunni (2)	Religious Extremist (1)	1	30	5.3	0	0	1

Party of God (*Hizbullah*)	Shiite (1)	Religious conservative(2)	10.9	50	7.1	0	0	1
National Secular Democratic Promise (*Wa'ad)*	Maronite (3)	Civil-Confessional 4)	1	20	17.8	0	1	0
Democratic Revisionist Movement (*Tajaddod*)	Nondenom.(0)	Secular (5)	1	21	21.5	1	1	0
Free Patriotic Movement (*Tayyar*)	Maronite (3)	Civil-Confessional 4)	6.2	51	25	1	1	1
Lebanese Forces (*Quwwat)*	Christian Maronite (3)	Civil-Confessional 4)	4.7	35	15	0	1	1
Islamic Action Front (*Jabhat Al-'Amal*)	Muslim Sunni (2)	Religious Extremist (1)	1	30	0	0	1	1
Future Movement (*Mustaqbal*)	Muslim Sunni (2)	Civil-Confessional 4)	34	31	12.5	1	1	1
Giants (*Marada*)	Christian Maronite (3)	Civil-Confessional 4)	1	50	9.1	0	1	1

Source: Processed by the author based on Lebanon dataset on women in 18 parties: www.icpsr. umich.edu./cgi-bin/bob/dd?depno=23365.

Notes: Religiosity: 5-point scale from 1 highest to 5 lowest; *Denomination*: 0 nondenominational; 1 Shiite; 2 Sunni and Druze; 3 Maronite; *Strength* measured by percentage of seats in parliament; *Democracy*: 2 democratic in decision making and leadership transitions; 1 democratic in either indicator; 0 not democratic; *Pluralism:* 1 multireligious membership; 0 single sect; *Women's Wings*: 1 wings; 0 no wings.

Indeed, the field of jurisprudence is male-dominated and Shari'a interpretations vary widely across the Islamic world and between Sunnis and Shiites, which gives Islam a multivocal character. In this connection, the male elite in a religious party emphasizes that "The Qur'an is for all places and times. Islamic Shari'a is the only guide to governance, and it is open to *Ijtihad* in Shi'ism. One does not need anything else." This implies that the doctrine plays a dominant role not only in party platforms but also in governance. Sheikh Nai'm Qassem, the second top-ranking official in Hizbullah, invokes "Wilayat Al-Faqih" in interpreting the Shari'a, highlighting existing tension between religious extremism and moderation on the one hand, and modernization on the other, which he suggests to resolve by "[s]ettling for the centralism of the Jurist-Theologian, who lays down the general rules for the nation of Islam" (2005: 225). Since jurisprudence is male-dominated, a male jurist-theologian would be entrusted with interpreting the Shari'a, and the rules referred to, by necessity, would adversely impact the station of women (see also Carter 2013).

Therefore, who interprets the Shari'a and how is of great import to women's leadership, especially in parties with extensive religious goals, where leaders are clergymen and Ulama. Since religions are multivocal, clerical interpretations of the doctrine may vary across religious parties. Enlightened clerics, who are open to *Ijtihad*, offer women-friendly interpretations of the Shari'a, while conservative and extremist clergymen do not. This invariably affects women's leadership chances, as the self-explanatory response by a Salafist party leader reveals:

> No community or "Ummah" will succeed if led by a woman! Yes, religion is an obstacle to women's top-level leadership. Women cannot and should not lead men. This would be violating the Shari'a and the principle of "Al-Qiwama."[6] Men and women are physiologically different and their roles are not exchangeable. If women neglect their domestic duties, the family and society becomes dysfunctional.

Another religious party leader justifies that "Women are physically weaker and more emotional than men. This makes men wiser, more level-headed, and better leaders. Women are aware of the shortcomings they are born with. They are meant to serve men and stay at home to nurture their families. They do not tolerate the hard work of rough politics. This is a man's job." These conservative discourses are antifeminist, offering lame justifications for women's absence from

leadership bodies in religious parties. Obviously, these statements are not in defense of women's rights to leadership, but reflect the power that clerics wield in interpreting the Shari'a and deliberately conflating it with culture and patriarchy. Such qualitative evidence demonstrates how the clergymen resort to religious (violating Shari'a) and patriarchal ("politics-is-a-man's-business") discourses to block women from leadership. In this sense, the doctrine as enshrined in party platforms defines a religiosity that can create boundaries blocking women from assuming leadership.

Seeking further evidence that women's concerns for leadership are not a priority for religious parties, I search for excerpts on women in Qassem's (2005) book, *Hizbullah: The Story from Within*. I found only one reference to women in connection with civil and mixed religious marriages, which are prohibited in Islam. Qassem also refers to "women" in a footnote, criticizing the banning of headscarves in French public schools. Further, the Index to Qassem's book does not carry a single reference to women, while the book dedicates a whole section to "Recruiting Young Men with Imam Hussein (PBUH) as a Role Model" (2005: 43–47).[7] This is evidence that my expectations are in place, that women's concerns, let alone leadership, are not on the party's agenda, which encapsulates impressions gained from other religious parties. This qualitative evidence is testimony to the influence of political culture or party elites' attitude toward women, and does not augur well for women's leadership in religious parties.

Responses of elites from parties of secular, leftist, and civil platforms are also reassuring of the correctness of the conceptual framework that party religiosity, not religion per se or individual religiosity, influences women's leadership. Several party leaders and elites stress that religion is a private matter and that religious affiliation is simply an identity. It does not influence the party's goals or women's leadership, as a party leader explains: "Religion is central as a value system for society and for Tayyar. We do not have religious goals in our civil-secular platform and we do not aim to change the political system. We are pluralist, democratic, modern, tolerant to diversity, and encourage women's leadership irrespective of religious affiliation." Similarly, a senior adviser to the leader of another party remarks that

> I am a practicing but not "fanatic" Muslim.[8] Mustaqbal's goals are national sovereignty, civil, and secular. Our political agenda is religious-free. We distinguish between religion or religious affiliation and personal religious commitment or religiosity. Women

> and men compete for leadership positions according to transparent and replicable internal rules and bylaws; not by dogma, as in religious parties.

A party leader also stresses that "Religion is a private matter. We do not have religious goals, although our membership hails from one sect, which might lead some to think otherwise. When posts are available, women and men compete for leadership by seniority and competence." Further, a leftist party male official flags that "Religion plays a significant role in politics. Our party considers it cultural heritage. But, we strongly advocate separation of religion from politics. Promotions are based solely on merit and performance, not on religious affiliation."

Several interviewees point out that neither gender nor sect are specified on application forms and membership cards as evidence that the party does not discriminate against women or members' religious affiliation. For instance, a party leader asserts that "Religion is a private matter. We do not include the religious sect or gender on the application forms or on membership cards; although this poses a problem for estimating voter turnout in elections, given the confessional electoral system." In fact, this was a problem in collecting statistics on composition of membership, especially for older prewar parties. Lovenduski and Norris also raise the issue of gender-blind membership in studying Dutch parties (1993: 212). As further evidence of variation in attitudes toward women between nonreligious and religious parties, a female MP states that "Had I been member of a religious party, I would have had much more difficulties in assuming leadership posts in my party and in parliament." Another female official in a leftist party maintains that "Sectarianism in Lebanon interferes with the social and political life of citizens. I would not have made it to this high-level leadership position in a religious party." Indeed, she was elected first-ever female vice president of the Communist party in 2009.

Thus, there are variations across parties with respect to women and women's leadership. In leftist parties, religion is not relevant, especially for decisions pertaining to women's leadership, and religious goals are at a minimum. In predominantly single-sect parties with civil goals, religion is confined to the private sphere; religious affiliation is an "identity" and a mobilization tool, given the confessional electoral law. For party members, religion cum religious commitment is manifested in practicing rituals in everyday life but does not inform party politics.

In this context, two issues require clarification. First, the debate over public and private religion and whether privatization of religion

works more for women's leadership than *deprivatization,* to borrow from Casanova (1994). Qualitative evidence shows that *deprivatization*, in this case Public Islam, a phenomenon widely linked to religious parties, is inimical to women's leadership, while privatization or private religion is more likely to enhance women's leadership. Elites in parties with leftist, secular, and civil platforms consider religion a private matter, stressing that women's leadership is a party policy, in contrast to statements by elites in religious parties. Keeping religion in the private sphere implies that its inimical impact, if any, on women's leadership is minimized, since it is individual not institutional religiosity that matters. Private religion does not inform party platforms and party politics, and egalitarian, liberal, and democratic policies are not affected, offering women more chances in leadership.

In contrast, in Islamist parties with religious platforms, the private and public spheres collapse and the space between individual and communal religiosity shrinks (see Kadivar 2003). This is especially pronounced when the clergy double as party leaders. The "private" becomes "public" and communal or public religion overshadows and swallows individual or private religiosity. Clerics set party strategy, interpret the Shari'a, and decide on promotion policies in the light of their faith and religious convictions. Moreover, unlike parties with mostly nonreligious goals, parties with expanse religious platforms are, more often than not, hierarchical and authoritarian. This does not augur well for women's leadership since, as qualitative evidence shows, these parties are essentially not women-friendly. I am aware that this challenges the popular argument put forward by Casanova (1994) and adopted by other scholars that "public religion is not incompatible with liberal democracy." However, Casanova notes that he does not study Islam or Iran and other Muslim countries.

Second, contending arguments point to self-selection as a factor in women's leadership in religious parties, because they are less well-educated than in nonreligious parties. This is a valid concern. However, qualitative evidence culled from Lebanon dismisses the possibility of endogeneity in the causal argument of party religiosity that this book advances, placing the onus on party politics informed by intense party religiosity (chapter seven).

In sum, qualitative evidence substantiates that it is not religion per se but variations in party religiosity that influence women's leadership. Statements of practitioners in parties whose platforms contain expansive, religious components invoke doctrinal and patriarchal discourses impeding women's leadership. These parties exhibit hierarchical,

dictatorial, and authoritarian tendencies limiting women's leadership chances. In contrast, parties of secular, leftist, and civil platforms are more democratic, liberal, egalitarian, and women-friendly. Elites in these parties do not deny the importance of religion in their personal lives. However, they distinguish individual religiosities as faith, commitment, and piety, from institutional religiosity and the extent to which religion informs parties' agendas. They assert that neither their religious convictions nor religious affiliation steer women away from leadership. Responses of female and male officials are consistent in that religion is a private matter and individual religiosity does not influence women's chances in leadership. This offers qualitative evidence that privatization of religion is more likely to enhance women's leadership than deprivatization perceived in parties with expanse religious platforms. These responses are valuable in that they differentiate between individual and institutional religiosity or between religion in personal lives/private sphere and in party platforms/public sphere.

Thus, information gathered from party officials supports the claim that party religiosity is a plausible explanatory variable for women's leadership. It enriches our understanding of how 'religiosity' is perceived by parties of varying secularisms and religiosities, which is essential for labeling and coding parties. The following section addresses the impact of a 15-year civil war on widening religious cleavages and intensifying party religiosity thereby affecting women's leadership.

The Civil War: Religious Cleavages, Parties, and Political Culture

Between 1975 and 1990, Lebanon was prey to a debilitating, sectarian civil war.[9] Predominantly Christian and Muslim parties built militias and held arms against each other. Sheikh Qassem of Hizbullah clarifies that sectarianism "[r]epresents the association of individuals with particular sect due to birth as such and therefore being partial to that sect for the mere fact of belonging to it. This is akin to familial, tribal or regional fanaticism, the difference being in the title and the number of those involved" (2005: 209). The 1989 Tai'f Accord put an end to the armed conflict that rocked political and social stability. Despite cessation of hostilities in 1990, political instability lingered with continued presence of Syrian troops on Lebanese soil and threats from neighboring Israel.

The Civil War and Religious Cleavages

The civil war widened religious cleavages, intensified party religiosities, and restructured the party system. It exacerbated existing social cleavages (religious, class, ethnic, and gender), reproducing these same cleavages with wider magnitudes around which new postwar parties formed. Religious cleavages widened between Muslims and Christians, as well as between Sunnis and Shiites. Class cleavages deepened with an increasingly disappearing middle class, which widened the gap between the poor and deprived Shiites in the South and Sunnis in the North with other communities. Ethnic cleavages also emerged between the Palestinian Sunni refugees and Lebanese Christians, although with Armenians these cleavages remain docile. Gender inequalities, especially in the political realm, accentuated in the wake of armed conflict, since these have a differential impact on women. Confessional identities deepened in the postwar era relative to the pre-1975 era, when secular and leftist parties thrived, and national parties with nonsectarian orientations flourished (El-Khazen 2002: 44–45). A party elite reports that "The majority of parties are confessional, but may not be religious. Their membership is dominated by one sect, or one of the two dominant religions. These parties do not have religious goals and claim to be secular (laique), separating religion from political goals. There are also progressive and leftist parties who are fully secular". The impact of widening religious cleavages on party platforms is not uniform. This is more visible in parties with religious platforms, while some nonreligious but confessional parties are more concerned with maintaining a denominational identity than a religious platform.

The Civil War and Political Parties

Polarization of religious cleavages restructured the party system and manifested in the mushrooming of parties, many with single-sect confessional dominations, and others with religious platforms. Several prewar parties and war-origin (militias) transformed, became irrelevant, obsolete, or defunct.[10] Prewar Muslim-dominated militias and parties disbanded in the postwar period. Three militias cum resistance movements formed, notably two Shiite-dominated (Amal and Hizbullah) and one Sunni-dominated (Jabhat Al-'Amal Al-Islami). These became full-fledged parties after the war and joined the electoral process along with the newly formed Sunni Islamist Tawhid party, an offshoot of Jama'a Islamiah.[11] The number of active parties reached around 80 by

2010, as opposed to 15 in the prewar period, and around 26 political groups and parties by 1979, after the civil war broke.[12] However, only 18 of these parties are relevant and their political agendas vary in intensity of religiosity. Further, the number of religious and Islamist parties grew fivefold during and after the war; and other new parties emerged, some with liberal and modern outlook toward women than older, more conservative, and traditional parties.

Cessation of hostilities in 1990 saw the leftist, socialist, and progressive parties (Communist, Ba'ath, Qawmi-Suri, and Ishtiraki) lose clout, outreach to their traditional constituencies, and electoral strength, with plural membership shifting mostly to Hizbullah and Amal. This coincided with the end of the Cold War when Communism and leftist ideologies lost ground worldwide due to rapid systemic and global changes. A similar fate hit the prewar Christian-dominated parties (Kata'éb, Kutlah, and Ahrar), as membership shifted to Tayyar and Quwwat. Militias transformed in the postwar era into full-fledged parties along with newly emerging popular movements, mainly Mustaqbal. Simultaneously, new parties like Quwwat emerged as offshoots of Kata'éb, or formed around socioreligious cleavages like the democratic Wa'ad and Marada.

The golden age of nonsectarian, leftist, secular, plural, democratic, and progressive Lebanese parties, which marked the prewar era disappeared after the war. A senior adviser to the leader of Ishtiraki party succinctly describes this multiparty system:

> In the post-1943 independence era, political parties were formed along ideological lines, nurtured by the Arab-Israeli conflict, and influenced by regional and international trends like Arab nationalism, socialism, Communism, and Marxism. During the 15-year civil war, parties became militarized along confessional lines: Maronites, Sunnis, and Shiites. The end of civil war coincided with the breakdown of USSR and end of Cold War, with Marxist and leftist parties, barely surviving, losing power and plural membership. After the 1989 Ta'if Accord, warring militias shed their arms and transformed into fully fledged parties, while new powerful parties formed. Some took the religious road while others combined civil goals with a confessional identity.

Similar testimonies by other interlocutors encapsulate the impact of widening religious cleavages on the party system, shedding light on

intrinsic disparities in religiosity across parties. A female activist in a leftist party recapitulates:

> Before the war, our party was more pluralist and much less sectarian than it is now. After the war, the tendency for those most affected by the civil war, including the poor and women, was to step behind their religious sects for protection. The war turned people into extremists and into sectarian communities, and enclaves within which they sought refuge and security, that the government failed to provide.

These sectarian cleavages are observed not only across parties and individuals but also among children, as a female activist exclaims: "I saw my neighbor's ten-year old son wearing a huge cross. I asked him why and was appalled by his response that 'it is better than being mistaken for a Muslim Shiite.' It is unfortunate how sectarian and extremists even our children have become after the war." Thus, while the civil war revived religious cleavages and nurtured sectarian tendencies, it influenced attitudes of individuals and parties impacting their attitude toward women in politics. Indeed, Atallah finds that "Although religion in Lebanon is often considered to be most salient in explaining the divisions in the country, the Survey (*Arab Barometer Data II*) shows that its importance is confined to women's role in society, which is also attributed to gender discrimination" (2012: 24).

Thus, the watershed of the civil war restructured the party system and redefined party-level characteristics, including their religiosity and political culture. The postwar era saw parties emerge with a whole new approach to mobilizing women distinct from prewar parties. Therefore, not only did this upheaval shift party membership but it also transformed the attitude of party elites toward women's political involvement across parties. It is inevitable, however, that individual cum personal religiosity of party elites, especially when they are also clergymen, would not map on party political culture.[13] Scholars also find that party-level characteristics shape the behavior and overall performance of parties. This exemplifies the collapse of space between public and private religion and how this is assumed to influence elites' attitudes toward women's leadership. In this case, the "private" refers to individual religiosity and the "public" to party religiosity, which in Islamist parties is communal religion guided and interpreted by the religious party leader, often a cleric.

The Civil War and Political Culture

While political culture cannot be measured, it can be gauged from qualitative evidence on variations in parties' behavior toward women's leadership. A lot of ink has been spilt to date to blame women's stuttering political advancement on cultural factors and gender bias. The Arab Barometer survey data clearly indicate that 83 percent of Lebanese people think that women can become presidents or prime ministers in Muslim nations, which dismisses gender bias (Atallah 2012: 16). A similar conclusion is reached by Matland and Tezcur (2011) that there is no gender bias in Turkey. However, the polls also show that 52 percent of the Lebanese think that men give better political leadership than women (Arab Barometer Lebanon Report 2007: 6). This gives a mixed message regarding gender bias and voter preferences (see also Tessler 2011). There are two dimensions to gender bias: the first is internal to parties reflected in male elites' attitude toward women; and the second is external linked to voter preferences and turnout. My concerns are in the former dimension of internal party political culture. In this context, Tessler states that "Islam plays a critical role in shaping political culture . . . Islam has become increasingly influential in Arab culture and political life during the last quarter-century" (2002: 2). He also maintains that Islam and politics are the most important issues for governance in the Arab world (Tessler 2011: 1). This situation manifested itself in Lebanon and elsewhere in Arab and Muslim societies, as Islamist parties mushroomed. In the following paragraphs, I search for qualitative evidence that political culture of nonreligious parties is more women-friendly than that of religious and Islamist parties.

In order to capture attitudinal shifts, parties are split along the 1975 civil war timeline into prewar, and war-origin plus postwar parties (thereafter, postwar). Splitting these parties by party-age should not be construed as a causal variable but only as a rough proxy for capturing unobserved changes in parties' attitudes vis-à-vis women's political involvement. In an effort to evaluate how attitudinal shifts in political culture are correlated with the war experience and might have affected women's leadership across parties, I seek the views of practitioners. In general, prewar parties are viewed as more traditional and less receptive toward women's leadership than postwar parties. In the following paragraphs, I examine statements of party officials, reflecting their attitude toward women's leadership across prewar and postwar parties of varying religiosity.

Parties with Leftist, Secular, and Civil Platforms

Prewar Parties

Single-sect dominated parties that survived the civil war are often led by patrons (*Zai'm*) surrounded by older generation elites who tend to be traditional and conservative, setting rules and policies that are stringent, women-unfriendly, and gender-blind. These party leaders and male elites, while nominally gender-insensitive and unsupportive of women's leadership, are also inflexible and unwilling to adapt to the fast pace of change. This is reflected in their political agendas in which policies and measures to promote women are absent and in their priorities to strengthen the party and protect interests of their confessional communities. This may partially explain the less receptive attitude toward women's leadership in prewar confessionally dominated parties than in leftist, egalitarian ones. Several respondents point to the limited openings for women due to shrinking party membership after the civil war. The leader of a prewar party declares that "We are fighting for our existence and working under very strenuous circumstances. These are not normal times for the party system as a whole. This is an era of survival in the face of fierce competition from new parties. Women's leadership concerns are not a priority on our agenda!" Also, the leader of another prewar party frankly states that "We are not flexible and willing to change our policies to suit women's demands. Why should we, when women's priorities and interests do not lie in politics?" Similar sentiments, rather resentments, are expressed by other leaders and male elites: "Our charter does not include policies encouraging women to join or policies and measures to promote them to leadership. However, if women were as qualified and politically mature as they claim, nothing prevents them from running for leadership posts. But, women are women's own enemies. They are the problem not the Party!" To put it mildly, such statements reflect a hostile political culture. Some male elites are defensive: "There is no discrimination against women in the party. We have a meritocratic system, where competition for leadership posts is open to all. Unfortunately, women are not interested or committed to party politics. They fail to attend party meetings."

These statements encapsulate the views of male elites in prewar, single-sect parties, reflecting a "gender-neutral," even "gender-blind," "hands-off" stance, or, for lack of a better description, "laissez-faire" attitude toward women's leadership. A common alibi employed by these elites is that "Only few women are eligible, interested, or qualified for leadership positions!" The absence of a "critical mass" or a pool of qualified women for leadership is a discourse that many parties

resort to, even elsewhere, for not promoting women to leadership (see also Matland and Tezcur 2011). I have shown earlier that this is not true, at least in Lebanon, and this is the paradox! There is definitely no shortage of a qualified pool of women for leadership, which makes this a moot argument. Indeed, such noncommittal statements indicate a traditional, sexist, and patriarchal political culture. Such "women-are-to-blame-not-party-politics" arguments wrongly assume that all men in politics are 100 percent qualified, possess the requisite skills, merit, and competence for leadership while women do not though they are required to (see Dahlerup 2006). The older male generation in these parties is conservative, traditional, and socialized to disqualify women or look disdainfully upon them as politicians. A female activist highlights the adverse influence of this patriarchal "social stigma," which is being reproduced by party elites. She adds that "The society does not look favorably upon women in male-dominated parties, even if [they] are qualified." To demonstrate this, a female activist cites that "Women in leftist and Communist parties, particularly those coming from conservative and religious communities, prefer to remain anonymous. Their affiliation with these agnostic parties jeopardizes their personal lives and careers."

Similar voices are heard when responses of female party activists in prewar parties are pitted against those of male colleagues. This congruence, reflecting a traditional stance toward women among older male and female elites, comes as no surprise. Older female activists echo the same conservative discourse of women-are-to-blame-not-party-politics or laissez-faire attitude. This is especially pronounced when women counterintuitively fend off charges of deliberate party discrimination against them, as this female party official states:

> Our party does not discriminate against women and is committed to gender equality and promoting women to leadership. However, the civil war threw us back 20 years and left women in political coma. During the war, women were more interested in family safety and survival than in politics, and were definitely less politically motivated than men. Let's face it: women lack the requisite skills for decision making or leadership. This patriarchal society doesn't accept women as political leaders.

The prevailing traditional and conservative attitudes of older generation elites running most single-sect prewar parties were accentuated in the postwar era. In leftist parties, elites are generally more liberal and

supportive of women's leadership, as a female activist stresses: "Women are given equal opportunities as men in leadership posts, provided they have merit and competence." However, after the war, some of these leftist parties lost their modern-ness because they are also being led by older, conservative male elites (old guard) who are less receptive to women's leadership, as this female activist testifies: "The traditionalism of older members surfaced after the war as they directed their attention to sectarian and confessional issues engulfing the country. It is a pity that our enlightened Christian and Muslim members failed to rebuild liberal institutions that are modern, egalitarian, and secular." Another female activist states that

> The party lost some of its openness and tolerance after the civil war. Its overall performance slipped into traditional conservatism with leadership personalized and decision making centralized in the hands of a few. This caused overall membership to dwindle, including the share of women in membership and leadership bodies. In this postwar era, the party's main concerns are existential and survival; women's advancement did not emerge as a priority.

Similarly, a female activist and scholar analyzes this transformation as follows:

> The party's motto is "Our women are men and our men are strong men." In the prewar era, the party had mixed male-female membership at a time when segregation was the norm. It provided a rare chance for liberating women in a conservative and traditional society. In the postwar era, the party was taken over by traditional men and its liberal and modern stance was lost, especially vis-à-vis women's leadership. Patriarchy and traditionalism transformed the egalitarian qualities of this leftist party.

While this statement is antifeminist, essentializing "women as men," it clearly describes the shift, rather regression, from modern-ness into traditionalism. This instigated many women to withdraw from party membership, as a female activist explains: "We believed in this secular, leftist, socialist party, because it is premised on separation between religion and politics. Before the war, the party was more open, pluralist, egalitarian, and liberal. In the postwar era, it veered off-track into traditionalism and conservatism; and plunged into sectarian politics, relinquishing its egalitarian ideology."

This rich qualitative evidence by female activists reflects perceptible attitudinal shifts toward women in the postwar era. Shrinking membership in prewar parties leaves older generation party elites in charge, which may explain the traditional and conservative stance toward women's leadership. This regression marred leftist parties' egalitarian stance, diminished women's share, and negatively affected the plural composition of membership in terms of gender and religious denomination. It is revealing that, while most female elites from leftist parties observe this attitudinal shift in political culture, most male elites do not, which indicates party culpability.

Postwar Parties

In contrast to prewar parties, postwar parties with secular, national, and civil platforms appear to be more flexible, accommodating, and supportive of women's leadership. A party leader boasts that "We are modern, liberal, and committed to gender equality. This is explicit in our charter and not mere rhetoric. Our actions speak for themselves, as evidenced by the significant share of women in leadership bodies as full decision-making partners." In the group of postwar single-sect-dominated but nonreligious parties, leaders and elites shy away from being labeled religious parties. They self-locate as "Definitely, secular with no religious goals: we target all citizens without discrimination on the basis of region, sect, or gender. In fact, we introduced special measures to promote women to leadership, which attracts more women to join." Another leader stresses that "Our mission statement explicitly mentions that the party offers women equal opportunities as men to compete for leadership and specifies special measures toward that end." A case in point is cited by another party leader that "If there is a tie in vote between equally qualified women and men, priority is given to women. This empowers them and creates a critical mass for leadership." Similar testimonies by elites in other parties exhibit women-friendly attitude toward women. They also point to concrete policies and measures in charters and mission statements as evidence of commitment to gender equality, as this statement shows: "The charter and bylaws attest to the party's commitment to women's empowerment and encourage women's leadership. We are indeed modern and tolerant to diversity." As these testimonies reveal, this hospitable attitude toward women's leadership is not mere rhetoric since it is accompanied by concrete measures, which sets these parties apart from their prewar counterparts. In this context, several scholars argue that, incentives of party elites in the more modern and less traditional parties—in this case postwar secular

and civil parties—also affect the rules set up to encourage women and enhance their leadership prospects.[14]

Thus, prewar parties with single-sect confessional membership tend to employ laissez-faire or "hands-off" approach to women's leadership such that market forces will correct (gender) anomalies and produce the requisite equilibrium (gender balance). In this scenario, these parties expect that meritocracy will eventually place women in leadership positions without taking special measures or intervening. In contrast, postwar parties are willing to intervene by managing the trade-off between supply and demand for women's leadership, in order to create more opportunities for women's leadership. Interviewees' responses provide initial support to the conception that postwar parties, especially with secular and civil goals, are more receptive to women's leadership than prewar parties. In the latter, the more traditional and conservative stance toward women's leadership may be attributed to shrinking membership that leaves older generation party elites in charge. These male machos are socialized in traditional values and norms, which consider women second to men.

Parties with Religious Platforms

Several civil war Christian and Muslim militias transformed into full-fledged parties after the civil war. These compete in elections, gaining parliamentary seats, and are among the 18 relevant parties. None of the predominantly Christian parties and their offshoots maintains extensive religious platforms while all Muslim-dominated parties and their offshoots, except for Mustaqbal, have religious platforms. The focus here is on Islamist and religious parties, which increased fivefold after the war (from one to five parties) with widening religious cleavages (table 4.1). The attitude of religious parties' elites toward women's leadership is much more complex than in nonreligious parties. They tend to camouflage their views on women and couch them beneath a cultural-doctrinal umbrella in which traditions and religious convictions are conflated. The 15-year civil war and prevailing political instability intensified authoritarian, dictatorial, and hierarchical tendencies among Islamist parties, especially those that wield power and use it to their advantage. These religious parties are well-organized, hierarchical, strongly integrated, popular, and have huge female membership. Studying Christian democratic parties in the 1980s, Lane and Ersson remark that except for the OVP in Austria and the ARP in the Netherlands, "Most religious parties are weakly integrated: the organization and the position of the party leadership is weak and there is not

always a homogeneous behaviour within the party" (1987: 121). Two decades later, Kalyvas argues that

> Christian Democracy has always had strong integrative capacities by virtue of its (religiously inspired) political ideology. Precisely because Christian Democracy relied on religion as the foundations of their political message . . . religion is the foundational element of confessional parties, the core element of their identity; . . . their religious appeal turned these parties into highly heterogeneous coalitions of interest groups united only by their initial adherence to religion. (2009: 4, 10)

Information gathered from religious party officials reveals more pronounced attitudinal differences vis-à-vis-women between Sunni and Shiite parties, than between prewar and postwar religious parties, except probably Amal. Islamist Sunni parties are least hospitable to women's leadership. This is linked to authoritarianism that permeates theocratic parties but also since *Ijtihad* or interpretation of Shari'a, is closed for Sunnis. How the Shari'a is interpreted by party elites affects their attitude toward women and may pose a real threat to political leadership.[15] For example, an official in a Sunni Islamist party boasts that "Women are our mothers, wives, daughters, and sisters. They must be cherished at all times. Their functions in the party are restricted to the women's department, providing social services to families of fighters and the *Ummah*, Islamic community." This patronizing attitude toward women demonstrates an antifeminist discourse, limiting women's role to the nurturing traditional, domestic, and female-labeled tasks of welfare services.

Similar views, albeit less flagrant, are encapsulated in responses of male elites in the Shiite Hizbullah party, contending with token women in top echelons as a *symbol of the modern*. A male MP empathizes that "Women are the weaker sex. They are already juggling multiple tasks on top of caring for their families. It is not fair to overload them beyond their physical and psychological capabilities. Their place is not in politics but at home." In contrast, male elites in the Shiite Amal exhibit a more tolerant attitude toward women's leadership than all other religious parties. Amal is the only religious party that is not led by a clergyman, which translates into a relatively more enlightened political culture. A female official in Amal describes the party's transformation: "After the war, our party seems to be more tolerant and receptive to new ideas. A decade ago, I wouldn't dare demand leadership posts

for women. But now I feel confident and comfortable in lobbying and demanding recognition. This indicates fast-track transformation in the party, a continuous process of change." She capitalizes on the party's transformation by demanding and lobbying for women's leadership, an effort that eventually bears fruit. The leader appointed six women to leadership positions in 2009. At a minimum, this denotes variation in political culture across parties with religious platforms, and is a *litmus test* for variations in party religiosity. Such information guides the process of classifying, labeling, and coding parties by religiosity. In general, all religious parties do not have policies or rules to promote women or encourage them to compete for leadership. Because of segregation between the sexes, women are confined, rather ghettoized, to women's wings, and their functions are limited to providing social services and support in electioneering campaigns (chapter six).

To sum up, this section describes how the 15-year civil war exacerbated religious cleavages, which restructured and reshaped the party system. This is reflected in the mushrooming of parties of varying religiosities and in attitudinal shifts toward women across prewar and postwar parties. Party age offers a sensitive framework for studying these attitudinal shifts in political culture across the civil war timeline. The civil war did not only widen religious cleavages but created a new set of postwar parties of women-friendlier political culture, distinguishing them from prewar traditional parties. Party variation in political culture reflects the political dynamics and ramifications of the civil war on the Lebanese multiparty system. Thus, women's chances in leadership are more likely to be adversely affected in prewar than postwar parties, with variations within each category. There is also diversity and difference in parties' attitudes toward women's leadership within each group. Before the civil war, prewar leftist parties were more modern and liberal. In the post-war period, they underwent an attitudinal shift as they regressed into a traditional and conservative mode similar to that observed in other pre-war parties of confessional membership and secular or civil platforms. These parties' postwar counterparts reveal a receptive and women-friendlier stance toward women's leadership. In contrast, parties with religious platforms exhibit conservative and hostile attitudes toward women's leadership, which is more pronounced in Sunni-dominated than in Shiite-dominated parties. Who heads the religious party and who interprets the Shari'a matter for women's leadership, particularly when clerics double as party leaders.

Polarization of religious cleavages may lead one to expect that women's chances in leadership in the post-ar period should diminish.

Qualitative evidence denotes the contrary. Postwar parties emerged with women-friendlier political culture than prewar parties, particularly those that are single-sect dominated, run by older generation elites. They are resistant to change and set in their own ways like "old wine in new bottles." This rich information guides the complex task of classifying, labeling, and coding parties by religiosity in the following section.

Classifying, Labeling, and Coding Parties by Religiosity

Several interviewees stress that the 15-year civil war did not only widen religious cleavages and restructure the party system, but also shifted party memberships and transformed attitudes toward women. Widening religious cleavages created separate enclaves across various communities, emphasizing religious affiliation as an identity and marking most postwar parties with confessional and single-sect domination. Some of those parties incorporate the doctrine into their platforms transporting religion to the public sphere while others with civil and secular agendas treat religion as a private matter.

The process of classifying, labeling, and coding parties is largely based on content analysis of mission statements, charters, and political platforms. This revealed a wide-ranging host of secular, leftist, national, civil, existential, and religious goals. The literature on parties and classifications was reviewed, giving special attention to Lebanese parties. Party leaders—male and female elites—were sought to self-locate their parties in terms of religiosity/secularism. Subsequently, a preliminary classification of parties was proposed to practitioners seeking their views. This initial classification and labeling of parties was modified to reflect adjustments introduced by politicians and national experts. Consultations and follow-ups with practitioners to adjust, refine, and fine-tune party labels were maintained until consensus was reached. An ordinal measure of religiosity was developed and scores assigned to parties along a 5-point continuum (from 1 highest to 5 lowest religiosity) in order to operationalize religiosity, while ensuring transparency and maintaining accuracy.

Classifying Parties into Secular, Civil-Confessional, and Religious

Examining responses of party officials reveals the complexity of developing a classification that captures the intensity of religiosity in party

platforms. Views offered by interlocutors and national scholars dismiss a left-right or religious-secular divide. They highlight the complex process of classifying Lebanese parties, given the entanglement of religions (Christianity and Islam) and politics with interests of various communities. Noting this, the senior adviser to the leader of Ishtiraki progressive party remarks:

> Classifying Lebanese parties is complex, since there are no left or right parties. There are confessional parties with civil, national, or religious orientations, which confuse secular with religious parties. However, by looking at their agendas, you can separate them. Religious parties are sectarian and antisecular in which religion acts supreme and do not separate their religious from political goals. Secular parties do not have religious objectives. Some are pluralist, but few are democratic. I believe in separating religion from politics, but I am skeptical that such a divide is not realistic for Lebanon.

Studying parties in the West, Kittilson finds that "[t]he traditional unidimensional Left/Right ideological continuum may be too simple to describe how ideology affects women's representation" (1979: 4). She recognizes that the blurred line separating religiosity from secularism is unrealistic. Similarly, Lane and Ersson conclude that "The standard approach to the programmatic orientation of political parties is to employ the right-left continuum. Although it is true . . . the simple right-left model is too crude to capture crucial distinctions between party ideologies and party practices" (1987: 131). Party elites, male and female, also dismiss a left-right dichotomy while highlighting that party platforms carry varying religiosities. For parties with religious platforms, "party ideology" is indeed "religious ideology." I expect this ideology to determine party politics and set the tone for parties' overall performance and behavior, particularly its political culture vis-à-vis women's leadership. Programmatic orientations and goals indicate the intensity of party religiosity, which is critical for labeling and coding parties.

Even the most committed secularists in Lebanon do not give up their confessional identity. The intertwining of religion and politics is a fact that all interviewees and scholars studying Lebanon recognize (Tessler 2011). It is imperative for the sustainability of multiple secularisms to remain within the realm of religious and confessional politics (*As.Safir*, September 10, 2008). Secularism and religiosity coexist in varying

proportions on parties' platforms. This is why a continuum of multiple religiosities and secularisms is adopted to capture party variation in religiosity. The realization that there are varying religiosities guides the process of classifying parties away from right/left or religious/secular dichotomies to a continuum of religiosities and secularisms. A female official alludes to the duality between confessionalism and secularism, stating that "This is a secular party with a civil intonation and confessional domination. These are important nuances: A secular party calls for separation between religion and politics, while a civil party may have religious goals. Also, while religion is a private matter, it also serves to organize the party along secular interests." These distinctions are worthwhile noting in examining how parties with religious platforms self-identify.

In his book on Hizbullah, Qassem self-locates the party as an "ideological and not a sectarian party," where members join because of their allegiance to the doctrine and not to their religious sect. He explains that "There is quite a difference between a sectarian, confessional confederacy and a systematic, doctrinal one. The first draws its disciples based on the influence of birth and belonging irrespective of substance, while the second is founded on conviction and commitment, and harbours a set of guidelines as to moral and practical execution (2005: 33). However, irrespective of semantics and motivations for joining the party, membership in Hizbullah is exclusive to Shiites or those who convert to Shi'ism. In defending the party's ultimate goal of an Islamic state, Qassem clarifies that

> Such a project is the natural expression of allegiance for any committed Muslim holding on to Islamic conviction and persuaded by its code. It represents the ultimate justice to which man aspires. However, we seek here to detail the difference between the intellectual vision and its practical manifestation, where in the first we summon the creation of an Islamic state and encourage others to adopt it as the supreme representation of human happiness; while on the second, practical level, we recognize that such development requires a proper foundation that accommodates the creation of the state. (2005: 30)

In 1982, the secretary-general of Hizbullah declared in a public speech that the objective of Hizbullah is to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon. A similar argument is advanced by Rashed El-Ghannoushi, the Tunisian Islamist leader, as Stepan reports: "[t] he ideal form of

government would be an Islamic government . . . He acknowledged that in the modern pluralist world it is extremely difficult to achieve this ideal" (2001: 235). Similarly, Qassem stresses that since there is no compulsion in Islam, it is left to the Lebanese to decide whether or not to establish an Islamic state:

> We confirm our conviction in Islam as a tenet and system, both intellectual and legislative, calling on all to learn of it and abide by its code. And we summon the people to adopt it and commit to its instructions, at the individual, political and social levels. Where the freedom of choosing a governing system is attributed to our people in Lebanon, they will not find a better alternative to Islam. Hence, we call for the implementation of the Islamic system based on direct and free choice of the people, and not through forceful imposition as may be assumed by some. (2005: 31)

This demonstrates, in no uncertain terms, that Hizbullah's ultimate goal is to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon when the people choose.[16] However, after 1982 and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Hizbullah's aim for a theocratic state has been put on the back burner. Its political agenda and religiosity are transforming overtime. Kalyvas (1996) finds that this is common in the lifetime of political parties, as in the case of the Christian democratic parties in Europe. This is pointed out by a female activist in a prewar leftist party, reflecting on her personal experience with Hizbullah:

> I was teaching sciences and math to prepare girls and boys for the high school governmental exam in a segregated school of Hizbullah. One tool of instruction required girls and boys to mix. The students were apprehensive and sought approval from Hizbullah. To my surprise, this was given and justified as a learning process. Based on this example, I believe that eventually Hizbullah will advance women.

Furthermore, when Hizbullah published its 2009 electoral platform, analysts remarked that "The document calls for the abolition of sectarian politics and enactment of a new election law . . . in order to emphasize the group's priorities . . . to attract optimal representation and perhaps even a majority in parliament . . . This will advance Hizbullah toward its fundamental goal: the establishment of an Islamic state that provides expression to the Shiite majority" (*Jerusalem Post*, June 7, 2009). Indeed,

as Lebanon prepares for June 2013 elections, Hizbullah is advocating the abolition of sectarian politics and replacing the Bloc Vote (BV) by proportional representation electoral system. Political observers argue that this is in Hizbullah's interest, since Shiites outnumber other communities, and this will ensure a larger share of the electoral pie. (*An-Nahar,* July 25 and 30, 2009)

Identifying parties' religious and political goals is essential to gauge and capture the intensity of party religiosity. These goals include, inter alia, targeting the system of governance, protecting interests of specific communities, defending equality, freedoms, and human rights, and/ or safeguarding national sovereignty. This information distinguishes parties by goals and memberships: some have platforms with religious components, while others have civil and secular platforms. In the latter, religion is confined to the private sphere, and confessional affiliation is an identity. These parties self-identify on the basis of programmatic orientations as civil, secular, or nationalist. Recognizing the sectarian/ confessional nature of Lebanese politics, Corstange (2012) describes the plural deficit parties as "monosectarian." This applies only to religious parties, whose membership hails from a single sect, not to those confessionally dominated but open to other sects. These parties market themselves away from sectarianism by claiming secularity and distancing themselves from being labeled religious parties. In postwar Lebanon, it is a stigma for civil and confessional parties to be labeled religious based only on confessionally dominated membership, especially with the negative connotation attached to "extremists" in the aftermath of the civil war.

Confessional parties maintain strong links with their constituencies. Religious affiliation is not only an identity, but also a ticket to amass voters from the same sect or religious denomination. Voting behavior is a case in point, as Norris and Inglehart suggest that "[o]ne's religious identity provided a cue that oriented voters toward political parties, and helped define one's ideological position on the political spectrum" (2004: 228). It is considered an act of treason to the sect if someone votes outside her/his religious sect, or declares support to a party of another sect. This denotes that these parties are protective of their constituencies, controlling their allegiances, and less tolerant. Several Lebanese scholars address this contentious issue in the wake of the July 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon.[17]

Some party officials point to a preference for separating religion from political agendas, but recognize the difficulties involved, as a male MP remarks, "The party functions within a confessional society, but has

civil goals. It pursues a bottom-up approach to instill secularism at the grassroots level. But, this is a difficult task. Secularism is like democracy, cannot be imported or imposed from the top. Both should be woven into the fabric of society early on." What is a certainty, however, is that religion will always be an integral component of the Lebanese political and party systems. In a society marred by wide conflict-bearing religious cleavages, individuals are born, raised, and registered in one of the 18 sects. In this society, secularism and religiosity carry different connotations. Religious affiliation and identities matter more to constituencies as an organizing principle and in "aggregating interests" of religious communities than left-right, economic, political, or other ideologies, as a party leader stresses,

> Parties form around one religious sect, rally around a leader or founder from that sect, and their membership is dominated by that same single sect. Since parties form along confessional lines instead of socioeconomic or political ideologies, any classification into left, right, or center of the political spectrum or religious-secular divide becomes meaningless in a country like Lebanon.

Therefore, an objective of complete secularization starting at the grassroots is utopian, at best, in Lebanon, where secularism must be socially constructed but cannot be imposed. Nevertheless, efforts continue to separate religion from politics and to keep religion in the private rather than the public sphere. Indeed, a civil society movement composed of male and female scholars and political activists was established in May 2010 calling for secularization and freeing the state from religious domination. Even Hizbullah, as shown earlier, is advocating abolition of political confessionalism for secularization.

The leader of a postwar party concludes his statement by proposing a classification of parties in terms of their birth regions, political agendas, and membership composition. In the South, Hizbullah and Amal are dominated by Shiites and have extensive religious goals. In the North and Mount Lebanon, Marada and Tayyar are predominantly Maronites but have secular and civil goals. In Shouf, Ishtiraki party is Druze-dominated with progressive and existential goals while in Beirut, Mustaqbal is Sunni-dominated with civil and secular goals. Tajaddod is a secular party, with plural membership and national goals. Kutlah lost its clout and plural membership when the founder went into exile during the civil war. This enumeration lays down a framework for classifying and labeling these parties (table 4.1).

In order to capture party religiosity, parties are better placed along a continuum of multiple secularisms and religiosities in terms of goals in their platforms. Such a spectrum produces party variation in religiosity and offers a working basis for classifying, labeling, and coding parties that captures variation in women's leadership. The statements of party officials so far guided the process of grouping parties into three generic categories, notably, secular (a-religious), civil-confessional (secularism), and religious parties. By proposing this preliminary classification, I implicitly extend the multivocality of religions from individual to institutional party-level religiosity. Religiosity of individuals, especially when in leadership positions, by necessity, colors their attitude toward women's leadership. Therefore, an element of subjectivity in interviewees' responses is inevitable but is factored into the findings. In the following section, the process of labeling and coding of parties is described.

Labeling and Coding Parties

Several interviewees from leftist parties (Communist, Ba'ath, and Qawmi-Suri) and from the secular Tajaddod party stress that their agendas do not contain religious goals. This was verified via content analysis of their platforms. A female activist corroborates this in an interesting declaration: "I do not practice any religious rituals. I cannot carry two faiths and have double allegiance. My faith lies in the ideology of the party that I belong to and I am at peace with myself. I have no choice in being born Christian. This is the main problem in Lebanon: the interference of religion and confessionalism with our social and political lives. But, I chose to be Communist." Accordingly, these four secular and leftist parties are assigned the lowest religiosity score (5) among the 18 relevant parties. However, the fact that their platforms do not have religious goals and that they keep religion in the private sphere did not prevent them from building alliances with strong religious parties for strategic and electoral considerations.

The second generic category includes nine single-sect-dominated civil-confessional parties whose platforms contain a mix of secular, civil, national sovereignty, and existential goals for specific confessional communities. Membership in these parties is dominated by, but not limited to, Christian or Muslim denominations. Most of the Christian-dominated parties arguably have existential (survival) goals to protect their communities' interests. These parties do not aim to change the political system to match these concerns. In contrast, the predominantly

Sunni Mustaqbal party does not have such qualms, functioning in a Muslim-majority country. This existential/survival concern is valid and worth exploring in future research whether Christian parties may not act similarly in Christian-majority as they do in Muslim-majority countries, or Muslim parties in Christian-dominated countries. Comparing parties across systems in terms of scope and coverage of goals and agendas, a female party activist remarks that "The Kata'éb, Marada, or Quwwat tend to have more religious components in their platforms than Tayyar or Wa'ad. Also, Mustaqbal has less religiosity than the extremist Jama'a Islamiah, where there are no women in leadership. These Sunni Islamist parties are extremely conservative and closer to Saudi Arabia's 'Wahabi' followers."

Taking this comparison in stride, one tends to split the nine civil-confessional parties by religiosity, as she suggests. However, reverting to content analysis of platforms, consulting with party elites and experts, and noting that there is a small number of parties (n = 18) for quantitative manipulations, it seemed unwise to split these nine parties further. A female activist describes these civil-confessional parties as follows: "Confessional parties are premised on religious value system but have a civil agenda. They are pluralist, tolerant, democratic, and gender-sensitive. Secular parties are not religious at all, but lapsed into traditionalism after the war. Religious parties are conservative and take the doctrine as a political and social contract." These ascriptions may not fit all nine civil-confessional parties and must be employed with caution and skepticism, as qualitative evidence shows. A case in point is the testimony of a female official:

> I am committed to Christianity before politics. The party's priority is survival and protecting Christians in Lebanon and the Middle East. This takes precedence over other political goals. Our logo, the Cross, attests to this and so does our mission statement which is premised on Christian values. We pledge to defend our religion upon joining and start our meetings with prayers. Maintaining our Christian identity is our concern. (See also Corstange 2012)

Indeed, content analysis of this party's platform shows that there are no religious goals pertaining to state politics, except protecting the communities' interests and preserving their identity as Christians. The leader self-identified his party as a secular party with civil and national goals but Maronite domination. Essentially, these parties do not aim to change the political system, but they definitely have a few religious-related

goals. Therefore, this category is labeled civil-confessional parties and assigned a coding (4) on the religiosity scale, which is higher in religiosity than secular parties, because of community existential concerns.

The third generic category contains five parties with religious platforms of varying religiosities. Four of these monosectarian parties are led by clergymen: three Sunnis and one Shiite. These parties incorporate religious goals in their platforms and are guided by the doctrine in their social and political lives. Their ultimate goal is to change the political system into a theocracy governed by the Shari'a, which they consider all one needs for good governance. For these parties, Islam is the solution and the only correct, righteous path to the afterlife. By self-location, the three Sunni-dominated parties are Salafist, ultraconservative, not open to *Ijtihad* or to an enlightened, modern interpretation of the Shari'a. They are orthodox in sticking to the letter of the Qur'an. These are labeled religious extremists and assigned the highest religiosity code (1).

The second subcategory of religious parties comprises only one party, the Shiite-dominated Hizbullah. This party is headed by a clergy who is charismatic and well-versed in jurisprudence. The doctrine is enshrined in its platform with distant claims for an Islamic state, having undergone several transformations over time. This change cannot be imposed on the Lebanese people, they contend, but will come by choice when the time is ripe. This also implies that while the party is guided by the doctrine, it is also open to interpretations allowing the party to compete and enter politics, and tolerate diversity by allying with Communist (agnostic), leftist, and Christian-dominated parties. Based on their own self-location and placement among the religious parties, Hizbullah is labeled conservative but not extremist, and assigned score (2), lower religiosity than the Sunni Salafist extremist parties.

The third and final subcategory of religious parties contains the Shiite-dominated Lebanese Resistance Regiments Movement (Amal). Amal is the only religious party that is not led by a clergyman but by a politician who is the speaker of the house. This exemplifies how individual religiosity rubs on party religiosity and tints its political culture vis-à-vis women's leadership. In this party, the space between private and public religion is wider than in the four Islamist parties. Hence, I expect to find relatively more women in leadership posts in Amal. In this vein, a female activist asserts that "Parties with strong bonds to religion and where the cleric and politician are collapsed into one, religious tenets affect politics and take precedence over democratic and egalitarian values." The political platform of Amal is explicit in seeking guidance by the Islamic value system and the doctrine. Conforming

to the righteous path is a main goal in its charter. However, it also contains civil and national goals for good governance, particularly its concern for the dispossessed and deprived Shiites in the South, as the founder, Imam Mousa El Sadr, mandated in the party's mission statement. Accordingly, Amal is labeled a religious but tolerant party and assigned a medium-level religiosity code (3), which is higher than the nine civil-confessional parties but lower than Hizbullah.

For comparative purposes in labeling these parties, I refer to Schuster who distinguishes between religious, fundamentalist, and denominational-mass parties adopting party typologies suggested by Gunther and Diamond:

> The fundamentalist parties seek to reorganize state and society around strict reading of religious doctrinal principles, while denominational-mass parties are pluralist and incremental in their agenda. For fundamentalist parties, there is little or no room for conflicting interpretations of the religious norms and scriptures that serve as the basis of the party's program and of the laws that it seeks to impose on all the society... In this theocratic party model, there is no separation between the religion and the state, and religious norms are imposed on all citizens within the polity irrespective of their own personal religious beliefs. (2007: 20–21)

Shuster explains why denominational-mass parties, like the Dutch CDA or the German CDU, are not a problem for democracy unlike religious fundamentalist parties, like the Dutch SGP, which potentially are. Denominational-mass parties are equivalent to those labeled "civil-confessional." Religious fundamentalist parties are parallel to those labeled religious extremists in that they aim to impose their religious beliefs on all citizens. This distinguishes them from "religious conservative, but not extremist" in that the latter try to convert others by convincing them and not by coercion since there is no compulsion in Islam (see Qassem 2005). In addition, they are open to reinterpretation of the doctrine and at times are willing to overlook the Shari'a if it is in their political interest to do so, and for strategic maneuverings.

Summary and Conclusions

In a society marred by wide conflict-bearing religious cleavages, individuals are born, raised, and registered into one of the 18 sects.

Secularism and religiosity carry different connotations. Confessional affiliation matters more to constituencies as an identity or organizing principle, and in "aggregating interests" than left/right, economic, political, or other ideologies. An objective of full secularization starting at the grassroots is, at a minimum, utopian in Lebanon where secularisms and religiosities are socially constructed but not imposed. Like democracy it has to be homegrown.

Qualitative evidence gathered from interviewees supports the conceptual framework of the theory of party religiosity and women's leadership. Institutional party-level religiosity and not individual religiosity, or religion per se, influences women's leadership. The 15-year civil war widened religious cleavages and restructured the party system into profusion of diverse parties of varying religiosities and secularisms. This caused membership and attitudinal shifts in political culture across prewar and postwar parties. Prewar parties are conservative and traditional, while postwar parties are modern, liberal, and women-friendly. In secular parties with leftist orientations, pluralism shrank but was not lost. This did not dilute their egalitarian attitude toward women. Moreover, the civil war intensified religiosity and Islamic extremism, which negatively affected political culture and women's leadership, especially in Islamist parties headed by clergymen. In conservative Hizbullah, strict adherence to the Shari'a is observed and women's leadership is not accorded priority. Party leaders and male elites employ patriarchal and doctrinal discourses, notably, "politics-is-men's-business," "women's-place-is-home," and women cannot lead men as stipulated in "Al-Qiwama." A more tolerant attitude transpires toward women's leadership in Amal, the only religious party not headed by a cleric. Qualitative evidence shows that privatization of religion works more for women's leadership than Public Islam and "deprivatization," which Casanova argues ushers liberal democracy.

This chapter concludes by classifying and labeling parties by the intensity of religiosity into secular, civil-confessional, tolerant, conservative, and extremist. Developing an ordinal measure to assign religiosity scores to parties was a heuristic exercise, at best, in which I deferred to practitioners and national experts for consultation, modification, and as a spring board. Secular parties do not have perceptible religious components in their platforms and are thus assigned a score of 5 (highest degree of secularism and lowest intensity of religiosity). Civil-confessional parties maintain a religious identify, albeit not in the title, and declare that religion is private and personal. These parties are

assigned a religiosity score of 4, in-between secular and religious parties. Islamist extremist parties are assigned a score of 1 (highest religiosity), the conservative Hizbullah party is assigned a score of 2, and the tolerant Amal party is assigned a score of 3 on the religiosity scale. In as much as possible, this process was transparent, realistic, and sensitive to capturing variations in party religiosity, which is critical for statistically testing the theory of party religiosity and women's leadership in the cross-national study summarized in chapter two and for Lebanon in chapter seven.

CHAPTER FIVE

Unpacking Party Institutionalization

Qualitative evidence supporting the conceptual framework established that party religiosity is a plausible explanation for women's leadership. Many party officials point to the chilling effects of religious extremism, though not religion per se, on women's leadership. The 15-year civil war widened religious cleavages, which reshaped and restructured the party system into a profusion of confessional and single-sect (monosectarian) parties of varying religiosities, memberships, and levels of institutionalization. As parties mushroomed, memberships shifted from prewar to postwar parties, which was associated with attitudinal and political culture variations across these parties. Information from practitioners was instrumental in classifying and labeling parties by religiosity into extremist, conservative, tolerant, civil-confessional, and secular. Parties are coded along a 5-point religiosity continuum from 1 highest to 5 lowest religiosity.

In order to avoid being accused of overexaggerating the role of party religiosity, or offering a monocausal explanation, party institutionalization is unpacked in this chapter. Party age, composition of membership by sect (pluralism) and gender (female membership), democratic practices in operating procedures, strength, and denomination are identified as additional factors that may influence women's leadership and membership. At a first glance, party pluralism, democratic practices, and party religiosity may overlap since these appear to explain the same underlying concept. It is obvious that Sunni or Shiite religious parties (there are no relevant Christian parties), are monosectarian and as such are not plural. As discussed earlier, Islamist parties are generally hierarchical and authoritarian, which does not tally with democracy.

Nonetheless, such explanations are worth exploring to gauge their potential influence, if any, on women's membership and leadership.

This chapter proceeds in three sections. In the first section, democratic practices in leadership transitions and decision-making processes are explored. The second section addresses pluralism by sect in membership composition. In the third section, qualitative evidence from interviewees is produced linking democracy and pluralism to women's membership and leadership. Female membership will be examined separately in chapter six.

Democratic Practices in Operating Procedures

Scholars call for more in-depth research on party institutionalization and how different operating procedures impact female representation.[1] Basu specifically maintains that "In general, the stronger democratic institutions and practices are, the greater the opportunities this affords to women to achieve representation through the party system" (2005: 34). This process generally starts in female party membership and leadership.

National experts observe that most Lebanese parties remain as tools in the hands of their leaders, which may be a cause for alarm regarding the democratic process in operating procedures. Democratic deficits are prevalent in leadership transfers, especially when the founder or current leader of the party passes away or is assassinated, or when the leaders' term in office expires. In such instances, the party's bylaws are magically amended to extend or renew the leader's term in office, often a warlord and/or a religious leader. In other instances, the leader may be ceremoniously reelected or wins by acclamation, since no one dares to run against him. Or, leadership becomes a legacy (heirloom) as it is passed on to a family member, often a male. Democratic practices are also compromised when hierarchical and obsolete mechanisms lead to concentration of decision making in the hands of a few male party elites. Party religiosity and party democracy may overlap and seem to measure the same underlying concept, especially in religious extremist parties. These are often authoritarian and hierarchical in which the space between public and private religion collapses and *deprivatization* does not usher liberal democracy and egalitarianism. Women's leadership in religious parties is often blocked on doctrinal and patriarchal grounds. In contrast, in secular, leftist parties, where religion is confined to the private sphere, imported egalitarian and democratic

ideologies inform mission statements and political agendas. These parties enjoy plural membership, hold competitive elections periodically to transfer leadership, and have decentralized decision making. The fact that many Lebanese religious and confessional parties suffer from autocratic leadership and democratic deficits in leadership transitions and decision making does not augur well for women's leadership, as per qualitative evidence.

Democratic practices imply granting equal opportunities, irrespective of gender and sect, to compete for any position and at any level, and share in decision making. I expect female leadership to expand in parties employing democratic practices more than in parties that do not (H2). In order to assess whether this finds support among practitioners, I analyze responses to the question "Can democratic practices enhance female membership and leadership?"

A female secretary-general of the civil-confessional Kutlah party lists the criteria that influence women's leadership:

> (1) Secularism is paramount since once religion (Christianity or Islam) enters into the formula it is automatically associated with patriarchy, which is the major barrier to women's leadership. (2) Party institutionalization and the presence of explicit, clear, transparent, and replicable rules allowing accountability are essential. (3) Democratic practices including competitive elections, consultative decision-making, and a meritocratic promotion system, free of gender-bias or nepotism.

A former chairwoman of the supreme council of Qawmi-Suri party remarks that "Parties marked by democratic deficits and where the consultative process in decision-making is weak or absent, do not work well for women's leadership. This is mainly because women are not given equal opportunities in recruitment, selection, promotion, and nomination to office." Similarly, a female parliamentary candidate, president of an Islamic university for women and former member of Jama'a Islamiah, asserts:

> Men block women from leadership positions, especially in religious parties. If democracy is practiced instead of being proclaimed, women would have had a greater chance in assuming leadership. In effect, the democratic deficit in Islamist parties is the reason why women are marginalized, particularly in decision-making, and are not present in leadership bodies.

In effect, interviews with officials in religious parties, especially with women, had to be cleared beforehand by party leadership. This reflects hierarchy, centralized decision making, excessive control over information transpiring to outsiders, and concern with public image.

Party administrators supplied data based on parties' bylaws on leadership transitions and on the plural and gender composition of membership. Female and male party elites provided qualitative evidence on whether women share in the decision-making process. Information collected from male and female top-level practitioners is credible, rich, and insightful. It indicates that democratic practices may influence women's leadership, which supports theoretical expectations. In the following paragraphs, leadership transitions and decision-making practices are examined in detail.

Leadership Transitions

Tessler notes that " Institutional and process considerations call attention to the need for mechanisms that make political leaders accountable to those they govern, including free, competitive, and regular elections" (2002: 337). Thus, I explore democratic practices and compile information on term in office, periodicity of elections, eligibility rules for nomination to office, right of contestation, and related bylaws, ensuring transparency, peaceful, and smooth transition.

Statistics compiled from party administrators show that only 5 of the 18 relevant parties pursue democratic process in leadership transitions, notably, the 3 leftist parties (Communist, Qawmi-Suri, and Ba'ath) and 2 of the 3 Sunni Salafist parties (Jama'a Islamiah and Jabhat Al-'Amal). These are outliers among the religious parties, which dismisses the risk of overdetermination.

Leadership is personalized and/or inherited in the remaining 13 parties. The same leaders are voted again and again into office, violating or amending parties' bylaws in the process. Cases in point include leaders of Hizbullah, Amal, Tayyar, Mustaqbal, Quwwat, Ahrar, Marada, and Ishtiraki who are either founders or took office when the founder or predecessor was assassinated. The leaders are either automatically renewed or they continue to lead by acclamation, with no one daring to run against them. More often than not, leadership is simply inherited as a family heirloom or as head of a religious sect. Party leaders are generally the feudal lords (Zai'm, political boss or patron, charismatic leader) of the birth region of the party. Leadership, especially in

monosectarian parties, is but a reflection of the dominance of confessional identity over democratic process.

How can democratic practices in leadership transitions influence women's advancement? In principle, democratic practices should apply across the board in operating procedures, and leadership transition is an indicator that is tangible and measurable. When a party pursues due democratic process, expectations are that women will be given equal opportunities as men to compete for leadership. Responses of female interviewees in civil-confessional parties point to a gap between de jure bylaws and de facto practices. Some claim that there is built-in gender bias and/or fear that running for leadership may rock the establishment or antagonize the leader. This may take place even in parties that claim following democratic process in leadership transfers like holding regular elections, open nominations, and free and fair competition. Women are skeptical about running for top-level position, for fear of alienating the current leader or in worst-case scenario for fear of failure because of internal party gender bias. As mentioned earlier, polls give a mixed message on gender bias in Lebanon, which does not rule it out and may support women's skepticism (see Tessler 2011; Atallah 2012; Arab Barometer data II). However, the female secretary-general of Wa'ad advises that "Women have not managed to build alliances with men and are not supported by the party's rules and bylaws. It may be against the conventional wisdom to run for the top post." That is, women should build alliances with male elites and party bylaws must include special measures to advance women. However, dismissing gender bias, she admits:

> I have a dream to lead the party one day. But, I know that I will have limited support not because I am a woman, but because the party unanimously elected the son of the assassinated founder of Wa'ad. He is young, driven, and performing well. I strongly believe that women can be effective and influence decision making, provided they remain visible and continue to impose their presence.

This supports Phillips's (1995) argument that "[t]he only way that institutions will change is through the politics of their (*women's*) presence" (in Duerst-Lahti 2006: 10). Similarly, a female activist in Mustaqbal stresses that "Nothing prevents women from running for party leadership. However, why run against our leader? He is young, liberal,

modern, tolerant, and charismatic. I believe that continuity in leadership outweighs change." She also does not feel right about rocking a boat on track. However, she highlights that democratic procedures are employed, but running for top position is a matter of personal choice not a failure of due process.

In contrast, a female activist in the Communist party musters her courage and runs for top post declaring, "I am determined to run for party leadership. I have slim chances of winning, but I am making a statement. Women constitute a good proportion of the party's membership and they deserve more representation in leadership positions." In 2009, she ran and was elected a vice president. Also, a female was elected president of Quwwat for 11 years while the founder, her husband, was imprisoned. However, this case may still count as "within-family" leadership transition, rather than transparent, democratic, and rule-guided process. Nonetheless, she informs that she encountered resistance from the old-guard, but managed to impose her presence and gain political maturity. She is a role model as a female MP. This demonstrates that democratic process is in place, women are not blocked from leadership, and when in charge they impose their presence.

Thus, qualitative evidence in leadership transitions shows the positive influence of democratic practices on women's leadership, while democratic deficits have often deterred women from seeking top-level posts. The following section examines women's involvement in parties' decision-making process.

Decision-Making Process

Political parties may have centralized or decentralized systems of decision making. Lane and Ersson suggest that "It may make a difference whether the party is centralized, whether it has close connections with interest organizations of various kinds, and how large its membership is" (1987: 96). Kittilson (1997) maintains that centralization, understood as decisions taken centrally but not necessarily by top elites, is better for women's leadership. In this work, centralization or decentralization in decision making refers to "how" and "by whom," not "where" decisions are made. Hence, decentralized decision making would involve women in consultation, contestation, and freedom of expression, reflecting parties' egalitarian stance. This aspect is explored by collecting information from party elites whether decision making is concentrated (centralized) with few top-level all-male elites or decentralized and whether women are involved in the consultative process.

Such qualitative evidence will also provide support to the expectations that democratic process in decision making influences female membership and leadership.

Responses of interviewees to the question "Are women involved in the party's decision-making process?" were essential to determine which parties pursue decentralized decision making and which do not. We find that 12 of the 18 relevant parties pursue decentralized decision-making in which women are involved. These include all four secular parties (Communist, Qawmi-Suri, Ba'ath, and Tajaddod), and eight of the nine civil-confessional parties, except Ahrar. As anticipated, all five religious parties do not involve women in the decision-making process. This challenges Hatem (1994) that there is no difference between liberal and Islamist parties with respect to women, or Casanova (1994) that public religion enhances liberal democracy. Otherwise, how does one explain women's absence or meager presence in leadership bodies in democratically deficit Islamist parties?

A male party official responds that "The legislative body of the Communist party proposed to nominate at least one woman in each electoral list. After consultation with female elites, the bylaws were amended. This succeeded in boosting representation of youth and women within the party and on electoral lists." Such egalitarian measures demonstrate how decentralized and transparent decision making favor women's advancement. In contrast, the head of the women's wing in Jama'a Islamiah reports that

> Women are not involved in politics but leave this to men. They are the decision makers. We are content providing social services and religious advocacy. We do not coordinate with men, except during elections when we receive our assignments. Women are essential to amass women's votes, because men cannot reach out to women in conservative communities due to segregation.

Similarly, the female deputy officer of public relations in an Islamist party responds that "In our culture and society, men take decisions without referring to women. So, why should you expect this to be different in political parties?" The head of the women's wing in Tawhid informs that, "Women are not members in decision-making bodies. We are consulted 'as needed' and on social not political matters. Political decisions are considered men's specialization and are beyond women's capabilities." This is corroborated by the head of the women's wing in Jabhat Al-'Amal stressing that "Women are neither involved in the

decision-making process nor are they members in leadership bodies. We convey our demands, if any, to the leadership by phone or in writing. We never contest decisions or impose our views on the Sheikh. He is the ultimate decision-maker." In the same vein, a female official in the same extremist party asserts that "Women are not consulted on electoral nominations or political decisions. Our most valuable contribution is during elections. If our opinion is solicited, we communicate our views in writing to the leadership or to the decision-making committee." The marginalization of those highly educated senior officials in extremist religious parties comes as no surprise. The surprise, however, is women's resolve to communicate with the leadership by "remote control" and without direct consultation and contestation of centralized decisions. In most of the Islamist parties, as a female official explains, "The leader consults with us on social and women's issues, which are low priority, but not on party politics; or on matters of 'soft' not 'hard' politics."

This qualitative evidence emphasizes that women are marginalized in Islamist parties, where the space between public and private religion collapses, and in which opportunities for advancement are curtailed. However, the general impressions gained are that female officials in extremist parties do not complain or feel marginalized because they are not involved in decision making. An enlightened, highly educated former official in Jama'a Islamiah explains:

> Women lack political awareness and are not equipped to share in decision making. For example, during elections women are handed the ballot and they just drop it in the box without questioning. Moreover, how do you expect women to share in important decisions in Islamist parties given segregation between sexes? Political decisions are taken at the top without consultation with women.

Her critical remarks about elections apply to male voters as well taking orders from party leadership. It is understandable that women at the rank-and-file are not consulted or informed of critical decisions; but also female officials who are heads of women's wings are not involved. In extremist and conservative parties, women in leadership positions are content to serve God and Islam for which they do not expect mundane rewards or recognition. The outlier among religious parties is Amal of tolerant religiosity, a party not led by a cleric unlike other religious parties. Heads of women's wings are ex officio nonvoting members in leadership committees; as such they have direct access to leadership and are relatively more assertive. The head of the women's wing states that

"We complained to the leadership asking to be involved in decision making, because we are members in the party." This courageous move demonstrates party variation in religiosity and political culture among religious parties.

In secular and civil-confessional parties, women are involved in decision making. The head of the women's wing in Quwwat confirms that "We had a great woman at the helm for 11 years. She set the pattern. As members in leadership bodies, women share in all decisions, soft and hard politics. The leader is a democrat and consults with men and women in decision-making bodies. Democratic practices attract women and ensure they have equal opportunities for leadership." Similarly, a female activist in Ishtiraki progressive party explains that "Democratic practices are explicit in the party's bylaws and are manifest in its operating procedures. This is evident in consultations, dialogue, and contestation. Once women are in leadership committees, they share in all decisions and gain political experience and maturity. Democratic practices build a critical mass of women and men for leadership." In a different line of argument, though driving the point that democratic practices work for women's leadership, a female official in Kata'éb argues that "Christian-dominated parties are more democratic than Muslim-dominated ones. This translates into more opportunities for women's leadership in Christian parties. Christians do not discriminate against women. We follow democratic process in selection, election, and decision making. This explains why there are more women in leadership in Christian than Muslim parties and also in countries." This response is an eye-opener. Variation in party denomination may have roots for women's leadership, since different religions offer women different opportunities.

In exceptional cases, centralized decision making may nonetheless favor women's leadership, as a female activist in Tayyar reports: "The party leader wanted more women in leadership positions, and encouraged the senior female officials who are qualified and eligible to run for executive office. I ran but did not win. So, he appointed me to the Council." Another example is that Amal's leader appointed six women to leadership posts before 2009 parliamentary elections. While this step was hailed by the media, feminists and political observers were skeptical that this is a one-time strike. The decision is not institutionalized, as a national expert remarks, "Boosting female representation in leadership bodies is formidable. If Amal is committed to empowering women, party rules and bylaws should be amended, and an internal quota for women introduced. This will ensure sustainability in

women's leadership. Yet, this move aims to improve public image for elections." Clark refers to one-time fixes as "strategic maneuvering" by parties to advance women for purposes other than empowering them and for discrete objectives (Clark and Schwedler 2003: 303). These sudden decisions do not transform into explicit, transparent, or replicable rules allowing for accountability. Lovenduski and Norris describe this pseudo-positive situation as "benevolent autocracy" (1993: 215). However, they caution of attenuating risks to democratic process that

> [i]f party leaders are sympathetic to the need to promote gender equality, for example, if they want to appeal to women voters, then they have considerable power to do so. Through patronage party leaders can improve the position of women in party lists or place them in good constituencies. As a result under the system of "benevolent autocracy" women can be promoted relatively quickly although without institutional safeguards the gains can be quickly reversed... Since the process is not rule-governed, changing the rules will not change the outcomes. (323)

Thus, the influence of democratic practices in decision making on women's leadership is broadly recognized by parties, but varies by party religiosity. In extremist parties, women do not share in the decision-making process, but do not complain. In Hizbullah of conservative religiosity, heads of women's wings are ex officio, nonvoting members. The head of the women's wing declares: "It is true! I am a member of the executive council, but I have no voting powers." This is corroborated by the only female official in an otherwise all-male politburo: "As a member of the politburo, I am involved and share in decision making. But, this is not the case for heads of women's wings in other Islamist parties, where they are ex officio, nonvoting members in decision-making bodies. I promise you, however, that once more women rise to top-level leadership positions, they impose their presence and their marginalization ceases." Despite assuming leadership positions as heads of women's wings, these highly educated women remain tokens in the overall decision-making process in most religious parties. This has serious ramifications on their leadership prospects. In Amal of tolerant religiosity, women are more assertive and demand to share in decision making as voting members in leadership bodies. In contrast, in secular and civil-confessional parties of lower religiosity, women share in decision making. Heads of women's wings in secular and civil-confessional parties are full-fledged voting members in decision-making bodies.

Pitting these responses against those of male colleagues in religious parties, one finds congruence in attitudes and rhetoric, particularly in statements of party leaders and male elites. For instance, the leader of Tawhid party asserts that "Democratic practices in Islam are by shoura and consultation as stipulated in Shari'a. We consult with women in the party only as needed." Similarly, the leader of Jabhat Al-'Amal stresses that

> Democracy in decision-making originated in Islam not in the West. The Qur'an dictates to "Make your daily decisions by consultation and shoura', but also 'do not let women run your affairs." As for women, they belong at home where their role is more effective. In the party, they are consulted as needed on social and women's issues but they cannot lead men. This violates the Shari'a.

Interventions by male elites demonstrate that party politics, par excellence, determine the station of women. Indeed, the views of male elites in religious parties reveal a circumscribed, subordinate role for women in the decision-making process. Officials of Islamist parties declare, rhetorically, that they follow Shoura and consultative process in operating procedures. This implies that, in principle, women ought to be involved. In practice, however, heads of women's wings, leadership posts nonetheless, are not members in decision-making bodies in Islamist parties, while they are ex officio, nonvoting members in Hizbullah.

In sum, data gathered from party administrators and bylaws show that in 5 of the 18 relevant parties, leadership transitions follow democratic procedures of open and fair competition. In decision making, 12 of the 18 parties have decentralized decision making in which women are involved. As anticipated, secular parties are democratic on both indicators; religious parties are democratically deficit; while most civil-confessional parties are democratic in decision making but not in leadership transitions. The influence of democratic practices on women's leadership is substantively significant, but whether it is also statistically significant is analyzed in chapter seven.

Pluralism in Membership

Pluralism implies tolerance to diversity and refers to inclusive membership without formal restrictions or discrimination on the basis of gender, sect, or ethnicity. The party is said to be plural when the

composition of its membership is multireligious, multisectarian, and is not confined to a single sect. Scholars consider that membership composition affects parties' overall performance and behavior especially toward women.[2] This section explores pluralism as an explanation for female party membership and considers whether pluralism also influences female membership and leadership prospects. I expect pluralism in party membership to attract women to join and plural parties to promote women to leadership more than monosectarian parties (H3).

Information on membership composition was difficult to obtain. Older, prewar parties did not maintain computerized databases to facilitate data retrieval. In some parties, membership rolls were destroyed during the war. However, party administrators were cooperative and allowed access to membership rolls. With assistance from administrative staff, I managed to compile statistics by sect and gender. No records were maintained for membership by sect in secular and civil-confessional parties to demonstrate the privacy of religion and as evidence that this does not matter for membership. I had to resort to guess estimates for sex-disaggregated membership because of the popular use of unisex and multisectarian names and overlapping Christian and Muslim surnames. In addition, in order to validate the estimates, I reviewed districts' electoral registers, which are maintained by gender and sect.

Statistics show that 7 of the 18 parties have plural membership: 4 secular parties (Communist, Qawmi-Suri, Ba'ath, and Tajaddod), and 3 civil-confessional parties (Ishtiraki, Tayyar, and Mustaqbal).[3] Diversity in terms of sects shrunk after the war in the three prewar secular parties, but they remained plural. Founding members of the plural Tajaddod profiled women and men and invited them to join the party. Despite gender balance and confessional representation, this selective process elicited criticism among political circles, as a female scholar remarks, "Pluralism is an asset to parties and attracts women to join. Tajaddod, however, is a sham, because its sole objective is promoting the founder and current leader (a Maronite Christian) to public office and the presidency. The party is elitist and exclusive." The behavior of Tajaddod especially vis-à-vis women's leadership, after its founder and leader passed in 2012, warrants monitoring. It remains to be seen whether a female official runs for the top position.[4]

Data collected indicate that 14 of the 18 relevant parties are confessionally dominated.[5] The five religious parties are monosectarian, exclusive to Sunnis or Shiites, since membership is denied to other sects unless they convert. This is clearly stated in their mission statements

and bylaws, verbally declared by their leaders, and stressed in responses of officials interviewed. The Salafist, Sunni parties (Jama'a Islamiah, Tawhid, and Jabhat Al-'Amal) have strong links to the Sunni community in the North. The predominantly Shiite Hizbullah and Amal have strong links to the Shiites in the South and huge female memberships. The remaining nine plural parties are civil-confessional, of which seven are predominantly Maronites, one Druze (Ishtiraki), and one Sunni (Mustaqbal). Membership in these parties is open to other sects and denominations, since nothing in the bylaws prevents other sects from joining. However, only three of the nine civil-confessional parties boast plural membership, notably, the Druze Ishtiraki, Maronite Tayyar, and Sunni Mustaqbal.

In Maronite-dominated Kata'éb, Kutlah, Ahrar, Wa'ad, Quwwat, and Marada parties, membership is not plural but it is open to other sects. Some scholars argue that pluralism and religiosity are two faces of the same coin. Parties of higher religiosity are monosectarian with closed, exclusive membership, and as such are not expected to be plural. This is true since all five religious parties are plural deficient. However, there are also single-sect civil-confessional parties that are not plural, but membership is open to other sects. There are six civil-confessional parties of lower religiosity but not plural membership. This shows that religiosity and pluralism do not measure the same underlying concept. I maintain that there are nuances between the two variables worth exploring to capture their influence on women's membership and leadership across parties and to avoid the risk of missing variable bias.

The diversity of parties is testimony to how widening religious cleavages, in the wake of the civil war, fragmented the society creating separate islands and religious communities within the polity. The postwar era saw party memberships shift from prewar secular to postwar religious parties. The watershed strengthened confessional identities in such a manner that people joined parties of their own sect and/or religious affiliation, thereby reducing pluralism nationwide. Prewar leftist parties were hardest hit as they saw overall and plural membership decline. Such a fate was shared by several prewar civil-confessional Maronite and Druze-dominated parties. Pluralism in Kata'éb, Kutlah, and Ahrar shrank after the civil war. Religion remains in the private sphere and their platforms contain no explicit religious goals besides protecting the interests of their Christian constituencies. A senior official from Kata'éb cogently remarks that "Plural membership shrank after the war in parties of secular and civil orientations, which discouraged women from joining these parties." Similar sentiments are

encapsulated by the leader of Ahrar party: "The plural character of the party was lost after the civil war as membership became largely dominated by Maronites. Membership from different sects dwindled, as did the number of women willing to join the party." Indeed, statements by several male and female party elites link the loss of plural membership to widening religious cleavages after the civil war. But, Atallah finds that the impact of religious cleavages in Lebanon has been confined to women's role (2012: 24). The impact of religious cleavages must be seen in the wider context since these also reshaped the party system and caused attitudinal and membership shifts, as shown earlier. Further, religious cleavages chilled the enthusiasm of women to join nonplural parties as they saw their leadership prospects dwindle. In this vein, the vice president of Druze-dominated Ishtiraki party recounts:

> The civil war saw growing religious extremism, ethnicities, and racism; but also shrinking pluralism. This is reflected not only in the society but also in its parties in which the multi-religious mix in membership declined. We have less Shiites, Sunnis or Druze in our party, but also fewer women are joining and more who left after the war. I believe that women are attracted to join women-friendly environment in which parties are open, transparent, plural, and inclusive.

Despite the toll on its overall membership, Ishtiraki remains a relatively plural party.

In a civil war setting, Christians' worst fear is marginalization, being a minority among the Muslim-majority population. This led many to emigrate, which implied loss of plural character and membership shifts in several parties.[6] A case in point is reported by a female official in Kata'éb party, who observed that heightened extremism also affected Muslim members. She explains that "Religious extremism increased after the war, especially among Muslims as opposed to the more tolerant Christian members. Muslims in this Christian-dominated party became a minority and withdrew. The decline in pluralism discouraged other women from joining and the rise in fundamentalism chased them away into their own communities." However, a female activist in Tayyar observes that religious extremism hit Christians and Muslims equally. Christian-dominated parties are attracting more Christians, which is undermining these parties' plural membership. Similar sentiments and fears are raised by a female activist in Kutlah party, who notes that the sectarian and confessional discourse, which emerged

strongly and intensified in the postwar era, threatens the mere existence of Christians in Muslim-majority Lebanon. She finds that

> The discourse about the existential status of Christians in Lebanon emerged strongly after the war, which strengthened extremism and confessionalism. Preserving the identity and existence of Christians in Lebanon remains a major concern. Pluralism is suffering in the process, which is bridged by building alliances with Muslim Shiites. However, this loss of pluralism does not influence women's leadership.

This statement may be justified on the grounds that loss of pluralism did not change the party's policies toward women's leadership. This is because membership in the party now hails from a single sect, Maronites. It is not because pluralism does not count, but because it is not readily visible anymore. However, this does not change women's leadership opportunities though it does change membership composition, especially the share of non-Maronite members including women.

Responses of practitioners to the question "Does pluralism matter for women's party membership and leadership?" varied across parties and between male and female officials. Some party officials concur that pluralism influences women's leadership while others are ambivalent about the relevance of pluralism for women. A third group finds that pluralism is an asset for membership but is not relevant for leadership. Another group has a different conception of pluralism and finds it irrelevant for membership and leadership. Responses cut across different groups of parties and some are normative and theoretical.

A female activist in Christian-dominated Tayyar emphasizes that "Pluralist parties are attractive to women and their leadership prospects are enhanced. We have huge female membership and high share of women in leadership. We have Christians from all sects and even veiled Muslim women, who joined in large numbers because of our openness and pluralism." The female chef de cabinet also asserts that "Our party is liberal, modern, tolerant to diversity, and plural. These characteristics encourage women to join as evidenced by their large share in total membership, close to that in Hizbullah. Pluralism is synonymous to religious tolerance and this is attractive to women in politics. We have also high shares of women in leadership." These are strong testaments to the influence of pluralism on female membership and leadership. Another female activist in Wa'ad was not only enthusiastic in expressing support, but also broadened the concept of pluralism to

include minority groups, explaining that "Pluralism implies openness and tolerance to religious diversity. The scope of membership should be broadened to encompass also gays and lesbians. Plural and open parties, by definition, encourage women to join but also promote them to leadership." These views are shared by Christian female elite in the Druze-dominated Ishtiraki party:

> Our pluralism continues to attract women from all sects, Christians, Sunnis, Shiites, and Druze, though in less proportions after the war. Pluralism attracts women, because they are recognized as equals, irrespective of their religious affiliation. I am a Christian in leadership position in a Druze-dominated party. Isn't this ample evidence that pluralism matters for women's leadership?

This qualitative evidence on pluralism, despite its waning after the war, is recognized by practitioners as a positive attribute for female membership and leadership.

A second group of respondents show ambivalence regarding the link between pluralism and women's membership and/or leadership. For instance, a female activist in nonplural Quwwat observes that "Individuals tend to join parties of their own confessional sect. They must be very courageous to join a party outside their own faith, like a Muslim joining a Christian-dominated party or vice versa. In such cases, there is no case for pluralism influencing women's membership or leadership, at least, not in a confessional society as Lebanon." There may be some truth in this observation as a female scholar from Tajaddod plural party highlights, linking pluralism to individual religiosity: "Pluralism may be attractive to women who are more secular. Those who are religiously committed (pious) will join parties formed along their own sect. In this case, pluralism does not influence their choice of a party." This statement highlights that, in religious parties, religiosity and pluralism may effectively explain the same underlying concept or are two faces of the same coin. It also denotes that personal preferences, as individual religiosity and commitment, motivate women to join religious parties more than pluralism does; while the contrary is true for more secularly inclined women. This view is corroborated by a female official in the plural deficit Jama'a Islamiah: "Pluralism in membership is not a must for women. Religious commitment and serving God are much more attractive to women than plural membership. Actually, pluralism is irrelevant, especially in our party." This respondent states clearly that pluralism is irrelevant for women's membership

and leadership in monosectarian religious parties, where members hail from one sect. These statements link women's membership and leadership to party religiosity though not to pluralism, highlighting women's individual preferences and religious convictions. However, they do not deny that pluralism attracts women to other parties.

A third category of responses highlights that pluralism matters to female party membership but is irrelevant for leadership. A female MP in plural Tayyar party remarks that "Plural parties attract women to join. Whether this leads to leadership depends upon the type of party, bylaws, attitude of male elites, and party politics." Similarly, a female activist in the Qawmi-Suri plural party explains that "Plural parties encourage women to join, because they are egalitarian and do not discriminate against women on the basis of religious affiliation. This provides a women-friendly environment. Leadership is a different equation." A senior adviser in plural Sunni Mustaqbal produces statistical evidence: "Around one-fourth of party membership is from other religious sects. The party's openness, tolerance to diversity, and pluralism are at the root of its popularity among women. However, promotion to leadership is competitive depending upon seniority, merit, and performance." These statements highlight that though pluralism increases female membership, it is not an entry ticket into leadership bodies.

A fourth group of responses is from religious parties. Theoretically, officials support pluralism but among sects within the same religious denomination. All religious parties are monosectarian or plural deficient, but tend to downplay its importance or deny it. They also seem to have a different conception or variant of pluralism. A case in point is that the leader of Jabhat Al-'Amal party insists that his party is plural: "The party's membership is composed of Sunnis and "Alawites." For me, this is the pluralism that attracts women and men. As for tolerance to diversity and openness, I am a Sufi Muslim in ideology and philosophy. I will not differ with anyone who does not differ with me."[7] This Sunni cleric considers that since Alawites are not Sunnis, they make the party plural. Apparently, this is a different understanding of pluralism, which may be at odds with diversity and openness. In this context, a female official in Amal party remarks that "Pluralism in thought and ideology enriches the party in all its forms. Confessional pluralism is okay, but only if it does not contradict the main religious goals of the party." This is not only normative but oxymoron, since membership is closed to Shiites. Similarly, a female official in Jama'a Islamiah explains that "Pluralism represents openness, tolerance, and enlightenment.

These are essential prerequisites for spreading the religious thought and for recruiting other women. Other sects are welcome to join and we are willing to teach them the righteous path and the doctrine. This is how we understand pluralism and how we apply it."

In practice, unless membership in religious parties becomes open, pluralism remains irrelevant, despite claims of officials to openness. In effect, they only admit those who convert and commit to their religious and political platforms. A senior adviser to the leader of Hizbullah argues that "The Party is open to all those who believe in its ideology and are committed to its goals. We are open to all sects, all classes, the poor and rich, and all those who believe in our cause. However, only Shiites and those who believe in our ideology can join the party. The others can join our resistance wing, Saraya." Thus, Hizbullah is open provided applicants convert and commit to Shi'ism, as Qassem lays membership rules:

> This does not mean that other groups or individuals would be denied commitment to the objectives and organizational setup of the Party, nor allegiance to its trajectory. This is so given that the participation of some Shi'is in Hizbullah was the result of doctrinal and not confessional allegiance, as many other Party members do not follow the sectarian element—thus rendering the common ground doctrinal as opposed to confessional. (2005: 33)

This declaration of openness to diversity and pluralism is oxymoron, since membership is contingent upon full commitment (including converting) to the tenets of Shi'ism. In effect, this closes the main body of the party to Shiites and puts a hold on any claim to pluralism. Another senior official stresses that "There are applicants for membership who have been declined because they did not pass the basic criteria of religious commitment. Those who are interested but are not believers in our religious thought and ideology can always join as supporters to our resistance movement." Similarly, a female official in Shiite-dominated Amal notes that "The party has a Shiite majority and leadership. In fact, we had more Christians and Sunnis from the South when Imam Musa El-Sadr founded the Party for the dispossessed in the world. Pluralism is lost after the war. Nonetheless, there are no rules that prevent other sects from joining the party, except commitment to our goals and Shiite values."

These statements reveal a de jure but not de facto support for pluralism. Qualitative evidence shows that religious parties view pluralism,

in theory and normative terms, as an attribute they care to project in order to improve their public image. Pluralism is seen as a mobilization and recruitment tool, especially for women, though not for leadership. This tension between reality and perceptions is reflected in a statement by a female official in Hizbullah that

> Contrary to public view and common misconceptions, Hizbullah is a democratic party, where we enjoy freedom of expression and contestation. There is pluralism in the party's resistance wing, Saraya. We are open and tolerant as evidenced from our alliances with parties of other religious sects (Christians of Tayyar). This demonstrates our pluralism, openness, and tolerance to diversity.

This is contradiction in terms and begs the question of the meaning and implications of pluralism in monosectarian religious parties. In contrast to secular and civil-confessional parties, the majority of religious parties will acknowledge that pluralism is attractive to women but argue that it does not matter for their leadership prospects. Indeed, religious parties compensate for their plural-deficient membership via building alliances with parties whose membership is dominated by other religious sects.[8] This also serves as evidence that pluralism is considered a welcome attribute even in religious parties. One should be cautious, however, that responses of party elites, particularly in extremist and conservative religious parties, may be diplomatic or strategic in that they say what they think they should say in order to project a better image of the party.

Conclusions

Party institutionalization is unpacked to identify factors, besides party religiosity, that may influence women's membership and leadership. Democratic practices in leadership transitions and decision making and pluralism in membership are examined. Information culled from male and female party elites show that only 5 of the 18 relevant parties follow democratic process in leadership transitions; and 12 parties involve women in decision making, none of which is a religious party. Parties employing democratic process offer women equal opportunities to compete for top-level posts, while religious parties are democratically deficient except for two outliers, which does not bode well for leadership. Seven of the eighteen parties have plural membership,

none of which are religious parties. In broad strokes, qualitative evidence drawn from elites in nonreligious parties supports the conception that democratic practices and pluralism attract women to join and push parties to promote them to leadership. Elites in religious parties have different conceptions of pluralism and most find it irrelevant for women's membership and leadership. They declare openness to other sects, once candidates convert, which by itself is oxymoron. These expectations are substantively, though not statistically, significant. Some argue that pluralism and democracy measure the same underlying concept. Qualitative evidence dismisses the risk of overdetermination since there are also religious parties that are democratic and monosectarian parties that are not plural. In order not to fall in missing variable bias, it is worthwhile exploring democracy and pluralism for female membership and leadership.

CHAPTER SIX

Finding That Special Niche: Women for Parties


Qualitative evidence in preceding chapters points to party religiosity as a plausible explanation for variations in women's leadership across parties (H1). Since there may be alternative explanations, other aspects of party institutionalization, besides party ideology qua religiosity, are explored in this chapter to make the argument more compelling. Otherwise, I could be open to accusations of monocausal explanations or exaggerating the role of religiosity. Qualitative evidence supports theoretical expectations that democratic practices and plural membership may also influence female membership and leadership (H2 and H3). Women join parties voluntarily, motivated by personal interests and preferences, while their ascendance to leadership is contingent upon party politics and male elites. Thus, party religiosity is not expected to influence women's membership as it does leadership, as argued in the early exposition of the theory of party religiosity.

The postwar era saw a set of parties emerge with a whole new outlook on women in politics. Elites in postwar secular and civil-confessional parties exhibit a liberal, modern, and women-friendlier attitude toward women than most prewar parties. These parties are traditional and conservative toward women's leadership akin to religious parties, except for Amal of tolerant religiosity. In general, prewar parties are less successful in mobilizing women and geared to promoting them to leadership than postwar parties. Thus, female membership is expected to be higher in postwar than in prewar parties (H5).


This chapter proceeds in three sections. It addresses mobilization strategies, motivations, modalities, and mechanisms parties employ. The introductory paragraphs provide statistics on average shares of female

membership in the 18 relevant parties supporting theoretical expectations (H2, H3, and H5). Data on female membership are obtained from party administrators, and/or compiled manually from membership rolls. The first section examines party motivations for mobilizing women, including public image enhancements and the special contributions that women make. The second section lays out modalities employed targeting women, focusing on religious mobilization, and financial and in-kind incentives that parties offer. The third section addresses women's wings as mechanisms that parties employ to expand female membership, studying their effectiveness in recruiting women, amassing women's votes in elections, and creating a critical mass for leadership. This chapter concludes that women's wings may be effective in all but creating a critical mass of women for leadership, because they marginalize them.

Graph 6.1 shows that the average share of female membership is higher in postwar parties (34.8 percent) than in prewar parties (17.0 percent), as expected (H5). The 18 relevant parties are collapsed into 3 generic categories: 4 secular, 5 religious, and 9 civil-confessional parties. Average female membership is higher in religious (34 percent) than in civil-confessional (27.4 percent), or secular (16.8 percent) parties (graph 6.2).



Graph 6.1 Female Membership by Party Age.




Graph 6.2 Female Membership by Party Religiosity (Religious incl. Extremist, Conservative, and Tolerant Parties).


These statistics support expectations that party religiosity does not influence membership. It is individual religiosity and personal piety and not party religiosity that drives women to join voluntarily religious parties. Huge female membership in religious parties is a common phenomenon observed by other scholars studying parties in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, India, Algeria, Yemen, Jordan, Egypt, and Turkey.[1] However, wide variations are observed within each category. Female membership is higher in Shiite-dominated Hizbullah than in Amal and Sunni-dominated Islamist parties. It is also higher in predominantly Maronite Tayyar and Marada than in Sunni-Mustaqbal or Druze Ishtiraki parties. This observation supports exploring party denomination as potentially influencing female membership and leadership.

Average female membership is highest in parties marked by democratic and plural deficits and lowest in democratic and plural parties, against expectations (H2 and H3). It is higher in democratic deficit parties (31.3 percent) than in parties employing democratic practices (15.3 percent). Difference in means between single-sect and plural parties is small (28.2 and 24.9, respectively) for pluralism on female membership (graphs 6.3 and 6.4).


Graph 6.5 depicts a mixed pattern when running female membership by religiosity, pluralism, and democracy. Female membership is higher in parties of higher religiosity, marked by democratic and



Graph 6.3 Female Membership by Party Democratic Practices (Democratic Practices incl. Leadership Transitions and Decentralized Decision-Making).



Graph 6.4 Female Membership by Party Pluralism.



Graph 6.5 Female Membership by Party Religiosity, Democracy, and Pluralism (Democracy incl. Leadership Transitions and Decentralized Decision-Making).

plural deficits, and in parties of lower religiosity, plural membership, and democratic decision making. Variations in female membership are observed at party level: it is highest in Tayyar, Marada, and Hizbullah (50–51 percent), despite differences in party religiosity, democratic practices, and pluralism (table 4.1). Marada and Hizbullah are of different religiosities and denominations, and are marked by plural and democratic deficits in leadership transitions and/or decision making. Islamist monosectarian parties of higher religiosity are not expected to be plural or democratic. Yet, two of the three Islamist parties are democratic in leadership transitions. Six of the nine civil-confessional parties are neither plural nor democratic in leadership transitions. Also, secular parties of lowest religiosity are plural and democratic, but have the lowest female membership. In order to explain these unanticipated findings, I seek additional information from party officials in the following sections.

Motivations for Mobilizing Women

The raison d'être of militarized parties disappeared with the cessation of hostilities in 1990. As parties shed their arms and dismantled their

militias, religious cleavages widened and confessionalism heightened, splitting the fragmented population into separate enclaves and isolated islands of different religious communities, thereby reducing party pluralism, reshuffling memberships, and limiting outreach. This triggered the need to find new electoral niches among marginalized groups and untapped strata within various communities. Women were a perfect target offering that special niche. As Lane and Ersson observe,

> Parties use a number of strategies to reduce the risk of a negative electoral development, ending in organizational extinction. Parties search for electoral niches at a certain level of electoral support... Political parties try to identify key groups on whose continuous support they hope to rely... These core groups often have special social characteristics defining the social niche of the party... Parties propose measures that could attract marginal voters. (1987: 96)

Until 1990, Lebanon was split into East for Christians and West for Muslims. This restricted citizens' mobility for fear of assassination on the basis of identity cards, which then carried sect at birth. These phenomena are manifested, inter alia, in memberships shifting from weakened prewar secular parties to stronger and/or more affluent religious conservative (Hizbullah) and tolerant (Amal) parties. Many women, especially the poor and deprived, turned to religion and took refuge in parties of their own sects, Christians and Muslims alike. During the war, the Lebanese Resistance Front spearheaded by Amal and Hizbullah militias was also composed of most secular, leftist, and progressive parties of plural membership (Qawmi-Suri, Ishtiraki, Communist, and Ba'ath). These membership shifts should not be construed as shifts in convictions or ideologies, but simply changing hats and moving to stronger parties.

Thus, prewar parties spent relentless efforts to regain their plural membership, by mapping local and remote areas and targeting women. Recruitment campaigns were launched reaching out to different communities. The head of the women's wing in Qawmi-Suri party reports that "After the war, I was tasked to recruit women from different sects to expand membership, fight extremism, and sectarianism. I dispatched Christians and Muslims to their respective communities, and vice versa, in a heuristic attempt to regain lost pluralism, which always attracted women." Simultaneously, new parties like Tayyar were expanding membership and reaching out to women, as a female elite cites: "The party leader strategized to expand plural membership by targeting

women. He dispatched Muslims to Muslim-dominated communities. Being a Muslim in leadership position in a Christian-dominated party encouraged other Muslim women to join, which had a domino effect on family members." This upped competition, especially since parties were targeting the same group, women. Similar strategies were adopted by other parties targeting women in various religious communities. In the first strategy, a Christian in a plural party dispatched to a Muslim region or vice versa is evidence of the party's pluralism, despite heightened confessionalism. In the second case, a Muslim in a Christian-dominated party dispatched to a Muslim community demonstrates openness and tolerance. However, data show that the Tayyar strategy was more fruitful, while prewar parties employing leftist or existential ideologies did not regain female membership or pluralism due to widening religious cleavages, entrenched patriarchy, and fierce competition. Since membership rolls were either destroyed during the civil war or were not adequately maintained, it will not be possible to determine whether these parties had higher female membership before 1975. Notwithstanding these statistical glitches, motivations for women to join parties and parties' mobilization strategies targeting women may produce different results for different parties.

On the supply side, information gathered from female party activists shows that women are motivated to join parties for a plethora of reasons. They join secular parties owing to leftist ideologies, pluralism, democratic practices, and tolerance to diversity, advocating for women's rights, and social equity issues. Women join civil-confessional parties because they are politically driven by national sovereignty, civil, or existential goals. In these parties, women are politically ambitious and assertive, demanding recognition and reward in leadership. In contrast, women, including the poor and deprived, join religious parties at the rank-and-file out of religious convictions, commitment, faith, and piety, and for the love of God or 'God's sake." In religious parties and in some civil-confessional affluent parties like Tayyar and Mustaqbal, one finds different classes of women: highly educated and less well-educated, poor and upper class female members of different professions and vocations. Similar observations are made by Arat (2005) on Islamist women in Turkish Refah party.

However, women in most religious parties articulate minimal interest in leadership positions, per se, arguing that they do not seek material gains for serving God. They also concede that "politics-is-a-man's-turf" and the society is not yet ready to accept women as leaders. To demonstrate this, a female in a religious party cites, "[I] lived in a poor

and deprived area in the South. I joined the party because I found in religion the solution, key to justice, and fairness. For the marginalized and oppressed poor in the South, religion holds the promise of change, improving the quality of our lives." Norris and Inglehart also observe that "[The] more vulnerable social sectors within any given society, such as the poor, the elderly, those with lower education and literacy, and women, will be more religious" (2004: 29).

On the demand side of the equation, parties mobilize women in order to face competition, avoid risk of loss in elections or extinction, and ensure party stability and strength (measured by party share in parliamentary seats). Mobilization themes in Lebanon shift in response to political events, particularly a watershed like the civil war. In the prewar era, ideological mobilization prevailed and was effective. Several prewar parties adopted imported leftist, secular, and egalitarian ideologies premised on Marxism, Communism, socialism, and Arab adaptations thereof, like Ba'athism, Nasserism, and Arab Nationalism. These parties address women's concerns, especially education, emancipation, equality, and suffrage rights, which attracted female activists to join. For instance, the first ever chairperson of Qawmi-Suri executive council reminisces: "[I] joined in the early 1960s, attracted to the party's leftist ideology and democratic stance, especially its egalitarian goals for women's emancipation and equality. It was a mix of all religious sects and denominations, unlike now." Another female official cites that "[I] joined the Communist party after attending several lectures on Marx and Engels. I embraced leftist ideology and egalitarian principles, especially those advocating women's rights." Also, an old timer in Ba'ath party notes that "The party represented all my dreams to eliminate discrimination against women and ensure equality. I felt deeply about these issues, which this party advocates for."

During the sectarian civil war, militarized parties were preoccupied with resistance and survival of their respective confessional communities. Parties mobilized women to provide social and relief services. In the postwar era, these existential themes are reenforced by widening religious cleavages, building a civil state, and maintaining national sovereignty given the prolonged Syrian sponsorship (until 2005) and ongoing threats from neighboring Israel. Parties aimed to establish a strong foothold in their local communities by expanding membership into untapped and marginalized groups. *Women provided that special niche.* Several interviewees highlight that parties also mobilize women to enhance parties' public image and for the special contributions that women make. These are addressed in the following paragraphs.

Enhancing Public Image

Parties hit two birds with one stone by having women on board: membership expands and public image is enhanced since women are looked upon as a *symbol of the modern*. This improves parties' marketability and competitiveness, thereby increasing voter turnout, the ultimate goal of electorally competitive parties. In this vein, a former female MP from Mustaqbal remarks that "The reality is that parties need women as bait to recruit other women. They are also aware that women's presence improves public image and electoral strength. Parties often use rhetoric in their public speeches, like claiming that they advocate for women's rights. This is window-dressing and for public consumption." Similarly, a female scholar in Tajaddod secular party exclaims that

> All parties consider women's presence an indicator of modernity, openness, and an added value. They invite women to public gatherings and nominate them for municipalities. Women increase parties' visibility and up their marketability in elections. But, what are parties offering women in return? They showcase women without formally committing to empowering them. This is window-dressing at little cost.

Also, a female activist in Ishtiraki progressive party remarks that "Indeed, all parties use women for window-dressing and projecting a liberal, tolerant, and modern image. In reality, however, none of these parties is committed to gender equality." In this connection, Norris and Lovenduski refer to three strategies that parties use to demonstrate their responsiveness to female representation, namely, rhetorical, affirmative action, and positive discrimination strategies (1993: 8). Hence, rhetoric is common among parties. For instance, 4 women were nominated by parties for the 35-member 2009 cabinet. The media and political observers hailed this move. However, a female journalist questioned parties' motives: whether this is commitment to empowering women or a ploy and "strategic maneuvering" to gain female supporters? (*As.Safir*, September 9, 2009). This cogent criticism fell on deaf ears, and only two women were appointed, one of them without a portfolio! The flip side of such anecdotal evidence is that parties recognize that women's presence, even symbolically, is a useful tool for fighting competition. In this respect, scholars also find that parties in Canada and America ceased to be inherently opposed to women and even to "feminism" when they saw the potential for electoral benefits. Lisa Young describes this pattern

of parties' responsiveness as "co-optation . . . in an effort to mask or soften the party's stance on these issues" (2000: 26). This is qualitative evidence that parties use women to improve their public image and amass votes.

Religious parties frequently organize large conventions in which women have huge presence. These events receive wide national, regional, and international multimedia coverage. Since mostly religious parties employ such tactics, this indicates that showcasing women in these public fora is part of a rhetorical campaign. Qualitative evidence shows that religious parties do not hold deep-seated commitment to advancing women. Party leaders and male elites invoke the doctrinal, patriarchal, and "antiwomen-as-leaders" discourses, which leads one to infer that they are less likely to promote women to leadership. The contradiction between rhetoric and practice prompts the question "Do women improve the party's public image?" soliciting views of practitioners in this regard.

Leaders and male elites in some religious parties deny that they target women to enhance public image. Others confess that by publicizing the huge presence of women in the party, they are sending a message to the West that Islam advances women. In either case, women are considered a *symbol of the modern* and as such their presence in the party brings added value. The leader of Jama'a Islamiah (extremist) party exclaims that "Gender equality is a Western-oriented and politically-motivated concept. After 9/11, they started linking the station of women to Islam and Islamist parties. We invite women to these conventions to raise their political awareness, not to showcase them and improve our public image." The leader of Tawhid also dismisses this absurdity, stressing that "Religious parties do not 'use' women to enhance their image or for political motivations. This is Western propaganda. Women attend these conventions as full-fledged party members." Basu observes a similar reaction by clerics in Bangladesh noting that "[t]here has been the growth of organizations of Muslim clerics . . . that have attacked what they deem to be Westernized" (2005: 35). Similarly, Arat flags the "anti-Western worldview" among Islamist women in the Turkish Refah party (2005: 37).

Responses of female officials in religious parties provide more nuanced perspective than the defensive, indignant attitude that their male colleagues project. A female head of public relations in Amal (tolerant) party responds that

> Women improve the party's public image. The huge presence of women in conventions sends a strong message to the West that

> Islam is no bar to women's political activism. For instance, the international media was intrigued by the overwhelming presence of veiled women sitting side-by-side with men in demonstration tents, when we closed downtown Beirut in December 2006 for nine months.

This statement highlights the parties' keen interest in improving their public image nationally and internationally. At the international level, they are adamant to correct misperceptions linking Islam to conservatism and the substandard station of women. In this respect, Arat argues that Islam is not incompatible with democracy nor is it mutually exclusive with liberalism as commonly perceived (2005: 90 and 112). I add that it depends how Islam is interpreted and by whom. This determines its liberalism and democratic orientation toward women. There are contending arguments on both sides of the debate (see chapter one). At the national level, parties are concerned with improving their image to recruit more women and ensure higher voter turnout, as a female elite in Amal explains:

> Religious parties use women to improve their image, but also take special measures to attract them. True, they transport them in large numbers to sites of congregations and public conventions from the South to Dahiyeh in Beirut. They arrange for women to appear on TV talk shows to demonstrate that the party is modern and tolerant. They delegate women to represent the party in political meetings. These are powerful and effective marketing tools. But this is also window-dressing and rhetoric. We need action!

This is shared by female activists in secular and civil-confessional parties that are staunch allies of Hizbullah and Amal. For instance, a female activist in Tayyar responds that "Women's huge presence in these conventions improves the party's image, but also transmits to the West that the party is building women's capabilities and politically empowering them. The positive side is that the leader recognizes that by empowering women, he is elevating the whole community." This defense highlights that in a political coalition, one's view may be tinted for strategic reasons as the head of the women's wing in Qawmi-Suri also justifies: "The huge presence of women in popular conventions improves the parties' marketability, because it projects a modern and tolerant image. It sends a message to the West that Muslim women are not confined at home but are in the public sphere. Such exposure

raises women's political awareness, but has yet to empower them." Thus, responses of female interviewees highlight that parties showcase women to improve their public image, but also use rhetoric and strategic maneuvering for electoral strength.

More critical views emerge from parties in the opposition bloc. For example, the head of the women's wing in Jabhat Al-'Amal is skeptical that "Women are summoned to these conventions in large numbers. Their overwhelming presence definitely improves Hizbullah's image. The party is sending a message to the West that it is modern and securing electoral strength. However, if transportation were not ensured, I wonder whether there will be such huge presence of women in these gatherings. As one may surmise, she is critical of Hizbullah, but recognizes the benefits of women's presence to counter Western stereotyping, but cautions that women's presence might not be that huge if transportation were not offered. Paradoxically, a female heading the media sector in Quwwat argues that the overwhelming presence of women in these conventions may produce unintended consequences. She explains that "Instead of appreciating the huge participation of women in these conventions, the international media looks at them as a mockery and theatrically staged by religious parties to convey a false message to the West about the parties' inclusiveness and tolerance." Another female activist in Kata'éb also observes that "Definitely, women sitting in the front rows project a better image for any party. But, segregation in religious parties' conventions makes women stand out. They are especially conspicuous in their black chadors. I am not sure this projects a good image in the West."

Even when allegations of rhetoric, strategic maneuverings, or public image enhancements are denied, the impact on the media of women's huge presence in party conventions cannot be disregarded or dismissed. Parties recognize that women's presence carries weight, which motivates them to mobilize women.

Contributing to Parties in Special Ways

Parties also target women because of the special contributions they make. In this respect, the leader of Jabhat Al-'Amal extremist party remarks that, in addition to their central role as mothers, daughters, sisters, and wives, "Women may be more committed religiously than men. They are also more dependable and less corruptible. We have observed this fact over the years." This statement is testimony that women are sought because they possess special qualities and added

social value to the party. Leaders and male elites in secular and postwar civil-confessional parties also point to women's special contributions, as these sample responses show: "Women bring a new perspective to party politics and a breath of fresh hope for peace in the country"; "Women bring dynamism that men do not possess. They are more serious, committed, and effective"; or "Women are an asset. They make a difference. They are sharp and skilled negotiators, patient, and less aggressive and confrontational than men." But, the testimony of the Tayyar leader sums it all up: "Women are less corrupt and more committed than men. They take up the challenge, are resilient, diligent, and driven. Men work in return for material reward, and when they don't get it, they leave the party."

Such testimonies essentialize women and go against the grain of the gender paradigm in that gender roles are socially constructed and dynamic. Nevertheless, some of the attributes are corroborated by scholarly findings as a party elite flags: "Studies have shown that women are less corruptible than men. This is an asset. They are central to the performance of the party." This controversial issue is receiving scholarly and global attention (Bjaarnegard 2008; Pande and Cirone 2009; Tessler 2011; Arab Barometer II). In addition, studies by international organizations on the Grameen Bank established in Bangladesh by Mohamad Yunis, the Nobel Prize laureate, show that 95 percent of poor women who received micro-credit loans repaid them. These studies support women's less corruptibility, although this also risks essentializing both women and men (see chapter eight).

Several party elites recognize the valuable contributions that women bring into party politics, including patience, tolerance, dialogue, commitment, drive, dedication, consensus-building, and sharp negotiations skills. These views tally with Fish's findings that "[t]he social marginalization of women may remove distinctive voices and influences from politics. Some political psychologists have found that women are superior to men in some aspects of building consensus" (2002: 30–31). Other party elites note that women are also skilled in fund-raising, organizing social events, and providing social and welfare services. Therefore, parties stand to gain from women's presence, because they make a difference and empowering them is for the public good and national interest. Moreover, a female scholar in Tajaddod flags that "It is in the interest of the party and the nation to have women on board. The society is missing out if women are not politically involved and empowered. Women are value-added to the functioning of parties." These views converge with the findings of economists that parties and

politicians will seek women when they realize that their contributions are substantial to the economy. Having women on board is in the parties' and national interest (Rosenbluth et al. 2006: 165–189).

In sum, party religiosity is not expected to influence female membership but pluralism and democratic practices are. Statistics show that female membership is lowest in secular parties that are plural and democratic, and has highest shares in religious parties of plural and democratic deficits, against expectations. A mixed pattern of female membership across parties emerges due to different mobilization strategies. Parties find a special electoral niche in women and target them for public image enhancements and for the special contributions that women make including women's less corruptibility. This increases competition among parties and translates, as anticipated, into higher female membership in postwar (Hizbullah, Tayyar, and Marada) than in prewar secular parties. The huge presence of women in religious parties is evident at the grassroots and in popular conventions, showcasing women as *a symbol of the modern* and dispelling Western propaganda. These factors provide partial explanation of variations in female membership. The following section addresses modalities employed by parties.

Modalities: Religious Mobilization, Financial, and In-Kind Incentives

Chief among the modalities employed to attract women are ideological, including religious mobilization. Prewar secular parties employing leftist ideologies brought limited success, while religious mobilization succeeded in expanding significantly female membership. Responses of male and female party elites to the question, "What modalities parties employ in mobilizing women?" provide insight and rich qualitative evidence on the effectiveness of various modalities that parties employ. This is essential to explain the mixed pattern observed in statistics, which is inconsistent with theoretical expectations that pluralism and democratic practices enhance female membership across parties. I examine religious mobilization and financial and in-kind incentives in the following subsections.

Religious Mobilization: Tools and Tactics

In the postwar era, religious mobilization gained momentum and attracted more people to join parties with religious platforms than leftist

ideologies did for secular parties. Deeb also observes that "[r]eligion emerged as a mobilizing factor for Lebanese Shi'is in response to the failures of the left, the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and the Israeli invasions and occupation of Lebanon" (2006: 6). Indeed, the influence of the Iranian experience on Shiite-dominated Hizbullah and Amal cannot be denied, which filters down to female membership in both parties. In another vein, Bouhamdan finds that in religiously pluralist systems, like Lebanon and Israel, "With the State offering no secular support for women . . . , women's dominant avenue . . . to participation in the state apparatus often becomes dependent upon their association with or adherence to religious values and norms" (2009: 19). Thus, in these settings, more women tend to join religious parties.

Religious mobilization is a powerful tool and most effective in recruiting women, as evidenced by women's sizable shares in Islamist parties. This is especially depicted in Hizbullah, which boasts a female membership of 50 percent, according to official party sources. Civil war atrocities saw more women, especially the poor and young, than men and from all sects turn to religion. Some joined religious parties seeking spiritual support and refuge in religion, as a female official observes: "Religious mobilization is attracting young women, because of the violence they have seen in wars. They find that their salvation lies in religion. Spiritual and moral incentives are paramount to material and financial incentives." In this context, Fish argues that

> [m]en hold attitudes that are more conducive to authoritarianism . . . , that men have a stronger "social dominance" orientation than women; women are generally less comfortable with hierarchy and inequality . . . women tend to be more averse to extremism and violence in politics. (2002: 30–31)

A female official in Hizbullah explains that religious mobilization attracts women because they are more religious than men, and during difficulties, they turn to religion for the solution. She adds that "Religion promises women better life and reward in the afterlife. This is why there is huge presence of women in the party." Tessler also finds that

> Religion is a more salient independent variable among women than among men, apparently because women are more religious and are thus more likely to be influenced by the teachings of their religion, as they understand it . . . In all probability, women are

> discontent with the socioeconomic status quo, more so than men, and thus favor policies guided by the values they associate with Islam. (2002: 8)

Indeed, when women join parties with religious platforms they tend to be more conservative and traditional than men, as Tessler maintains (2002: 4). This is not Islam-specific, but applies to Christians as well, as a female activist in Christian-dominated Tayyar informs:

> During the war, we used ideological mobilization and publicized our political platform via fact-finding missions, disseminating information, writing flyers and distributing them door-to-door and even car-to-car. After the war, we are fighting growing extremism and confessionalism by targeting youth and women. Imagine, young women who wore bathing suits before the war are now wearing veils and chadors; and women who never went to church, now go every Sunday. The war transformed Lebanese society.

This may explain women's massive presence, ranging between one-third and one-half of religious parties' memberships. Thus, clergymen, doubling as party leaders, are in a position to provide not only spiritual, moral, and religious support but also more control over the social and political lives of their followers, especially women. In this vein, Kandiyoti remarks that

> It is no accident that Zia ul-Haq's "Islamisation" package took women as its prime target. Establishing Islamic credentials through retrogressive legislation primarily affecting women was a logical step in a context where the control of women and their appropriate conduct had long been used to demarcate the identity and boundaries of the Muslim community. (1991: 6)

This rich information sheds light on the rush of women to religious parties. Turning to religion as the solution to violence, class, and poverty is not surprising especially when the state does not provide and when religious authorities or groups take on board social welfare and serve as social safety nets (see also Corstange 2012; Cammett and Issar 2010). Women join religious parties as a recluse. However, this is sustained via various tools and incentives that religious parties offer to feed the soul and body. When these elements are combined, one finds an influx of supporters, especially women, in parties with religious platforms that

are not found in secular, leftist parties. This may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for justifying the huge share of women in party membership, especially since there is also sizable female membership in some civil-confessional parties like Tayyar and Marada. In this respect, a female MP from Mustaqbal offers a plausible explanation: "In practice, religious parties are smart because they employ traditional tools in a resourceful and creative manner to mobilize more women."

One of these tools is entrusting women with the task of providing religious advocacy, guidance, and counseling to women. Until lately this was male-dominated, as a female official in Jama'a Islamiah (extremist) reports: "Before the war, only men were preachers and counselors. After the war, women are also carrying this missionary torch of recruiting women and guiding them to piety. But, we also try to convert Christians to Islam, as missionaries did in Lebanon." Religious advocacy emerged as a viable tool to attract women. It is being extensively used by religious parties to mobilize women by women who are well-versed in jurisprudence with explicit missionary goals (see Arat 2005). Female counselors are dispatched by party leaders to teach the Shari'a during social events organized by women at homes, in parties' headquarters and branches, or in special spaces allocated in mosques. In order to obtain statistics on female counselors and whether contents of lectures are cleared by the party beforehand, I enquire from the leader of Tawhid. He responds that "We do not have statistics on the number of female counselors but they are numerous in the Islamic movement. They double as recruitment officers and guide other women to join the righteous path to Islam. The party does not clear the contents of these lectures but Dar-El-Fatwa does."[2] A female counselor clarifies that "Dar-El-Fatwa lays the program and topics we should cover and guides us. There is an Arab network of religious counselors to exchange lectures, disseminate them, and air them on Arab satellites." Religious counseling is supported by the government, since counselors are on Dar-El-Fatwa payroll. The postwar period saw a surge of women attending these religious events, as a female counselor reports:

> I started giving religious lessons to women on a voluntary basis, without financial remuneration, at homes of family, friends, and neighbors. As these sessions became more popular, the party negotiated with the Imam to allocate special spaces in the mosque for praying and giving religious lessons. As the space in mosques became too small, the party rented special halls to accommodate the larger number of women.

The head of women's wing in Jabhat Al-'Amal informs that counselors perform other tasks: "They also serve as recruitment agents for women. This has a ripple effect on women's husbands, families, friends, and neighbors. Religious advocacy has raised female membership significantly." These testimonies provide empirical evidence that religious advocacy is effective in expanding female membership in religious parties.

As mentioned, special areas in mosques are allocated to women for Friday prayers and Ramadan. As more women joined Sunni Islamist parties, they expressed their wish to pray in mosques, as Shiite women do. Going to mosques is not a common practice among Sunni women. But, it is also not prohibited, since in the Pilgrimage to Mecca, women and men walk and pray side-by-side. According to women, the discrimination limits them from fully practicing their religious rituals. The leaders skillfully negotiated with official government clerics (Muftis, Imams, and Sheikhs) to allocate special spaces with entries and exits for women to pray in mosques. This raised criticism in some ultraconservative communities, as the leader of Jama'a Islamiah exclaims, "Allocating special areas for women to pray in mosques is a "Bid'ah" in Islam. Women should pray in the privacy of their homes and not in mosques alongside men."[3] By accommodating women's demands, these leaders provided additional incentives for women to join parties, thereby demonstrating their resourcefulness in addressing women's concerns. In a sense, this co-optation brought favorable results.

A third tool for mobilizing women is match-making, which is spearheaded by women's wings, emulating similar programs run via the Internet. This is common in some Arab countries (Egypt, the UAE, Tunisia), where special NGOs are set up for match-making and for shouldering marriage expenses. The head of the women's wing in Tawhid describes this process: "We search for pious women and match them with party officials. As an incentive to males, the party covers wedding and post-wedding expenses. This attracts more women to join the party and is particularly effective among poor, single, and widowed women after the war." This is also employed by the Ladies Organization in the Turkish Islamist Refah party (Arat 2005). Other popular forms of marriage have emerged in recent years besides the traditional match-making advocated by parties, like the "Urfi" and "Misyar" marriages.[4] Such arrangements are convenient and effective especially in periods of war and conflict, since these seem to attract widows and older single women, who end up joining parties that offer

such services. This provides additional explanation for the higher shares of female membership in religious parties.

Thus, allocating special areas in mosques, providing religious advocacy, and match-making find fertile ground among women as mobilization modalities. Such needs-based enticements demonstrate how religious parties are employing traditional tools in a resourceful and creative manner to attract women. These findings shed further light on the sizable female memberships in religious parties, which is a common phenomenon in religious parties elsewhere.[5]

Financial and In-kind Incentives

Religious mobilization is most effective in attracting women. However, there are also financial and in-kind incentives that affluent parties employ, specifically Mustaqbal and Hizbullah (see Cammett and Issar 2010; Corstange 2012). These tools are succinctly summarized by a female elite in Amal:

> During the civil war, patriotism and resistance attracted women to join warring parties. These parties offered financial and in-kind incentives in terms of clientilistic favors such as employment and job placements, and provision of health, social, and educational services but also money enticing women to veil. In the postwar period, new tactics emerged targeting university students, including women. However, our party faced severe competition in attracting women to join, especially from Hizbullah. It is affluent, uses modern tools, and offers financial incentives to lure women.

A former female minister stresses that "Tangible incentives are offered by all affluent parties, motivated by clientilistic, ideological, and electoral purposes. Rich parties employ financial incentives to attract members, including women who are easier targets when poor." She adds that "Financial and in-kind incentives come in a package, including monthly allowances, provision of educational, social, and health services, employment, and even low-cost housing facilities." The importance of these incentives cannot be underestimated because they are offered directly to women. In this regard, a female scholar from Kutlah remarks that "Ideology and religious convictions combined with financial incentives are powerful tools to attract women, especially the poor and deprived. In Hizbullah, for instance, males go to the resistance

front, while women are given all sorts of compensation including financial security for the husband when he returns from combat." A female activist in Qawmi-Suri adds that

> In the 1980s, resistance mobilized us into the party. After the war, our party became too traditional, lost clout, outreach, and membership to parties like Hizbullah and Amal. Affluent parties employ religious mobilization combined with incentives that our party cannot match like jobs, social, health, education, and housing services to attract new members, including women. Some even give women monthly allowances if they veil.

Financial Incentives: Money for Veiling

"Money for veiling" is a financial incentive to attract poor women and young girls to veil and join Islamist parties. Vote-buying is another financial incentive to ensure electoral strength. Both are controversial issues that affluent parties refute and claim to be defamatory propaganda by opponents.

A female parliamentary candidate states that "In 2009 elections, women constituted 60 percent of voter turnout. This justifies why parties use any means at their disposal, including financial incentives and vote-buying, to mobilize women. They make a difference in elections." Cammett and Issar also find that "The predominantly Sunni Future Movement's long-standing emphasis on vote-buying helps to explain its more extensive targeting of out-groups and communities" (2010: 417). Thus, under fierce competition, financial and in-kind incentives offered by affluent parties, including vote-buying and money for veiling attract women, especially the poor and young. A female former minister clarifies that such incentives are most effective in conflict-stricken Lebanon, with widening class and religious cleavages, and increasing poverty, especially among women. She adds that "What is unique, however, is that this is contingent upon women veiling. This explains the phenomenon of veiled women after the war."

Money for veiling is generally administered by female religious counselors, as a female official in Tawhid extremist party reports: "Through religious counselors, the party offers women monthly allowances to veil and join the party." This tool proved to be especially effective among the poor and less-educated women in rural and remote areas. "SOS Fantomes" reports that there are around 1,900,000 veiled women in France, raising the phenomenon of financial incentives for veiling (*Paris Match*, July 22, 2009). Money for veiling is actually being used by the

Iranian government to impose the veil on Russian women working in Boushahr nuclear facility in South Iran (*Al-Hayat*, December 12, 2012). The Iranian influence on Shiite Hizbullah and Amal is strong, especially by emulating religious mobilization strategies and tools to attract women, including offering financial and in-kind incentives. Arat also reports that in Turkey, "The orthodox seculars believed and used arguments of how women were manipulated, brainwashed, or paid to cover their heads" (2005: 24). Similar remarks are made by some officials from Islamist parties that money for veiling is a defamatory rumor from competing parties. The head of the women's wing in Jabhat Al-'Amal states: "These are mere rumors. I am the first young woman in Beirut who wore the veil in the 1960s, when all were unveiled. Women wear the Hijab out of religious conviction and not for money." Her claim is difficult to substantiate. Several female interviewees point that the postwar period saw a phenomenal rise in the number of veiled women. There are no statistics, though, to substantiate these observations or compare the number of veiled women before and after the civil war. However, looking at the huge share of female membership in religious parties, where all women are veiled, justifies looking deeper into the money for veiling syndrome.

The question "Did religious parties offer women 'money for veiling'?" is posed to interviewees from religious parties, since statements by officials from competing parties may be construed as defamatory or unsubstantiated rumors. Officials in religious extremist and conservative parties argue that "There is no compulsion in Islam. However, veiling is not a matter of choice for women. It is stipulated in the Shari'a."[6] In contrast, a female activist from Amal states that "There is no religious connotation attached to wearing the veil. I wear the Hijab as a statement. Therefore, nothing prevents parties from paying and women, especially the poor or young, from receiving money for veiling. I cannot vouch except for myself: I did not receive money to veil. I have been veiled since I was nine years old." It is true that some Muslim women veil as a statement but also are unveiling as a statement, as events in Egypt after 2011 demonstrate with Ikhwan in power. Moushira Khattab writes that "Some women are removing the head scarf. They realize that it was a means to identify Muslims from Christians nothing more" (May 6, 2013). Indeed, enlightened interpretations of Shari'a stress that the veil is explicitly used to differentiate the Prophet's wives from others.

Qualitative evidence from some female interviewees and leaders in religious parties justifies use of money for veiling on religious grounds. They argue that there is no ethical problem in enticing women to veil,

since this guides them to the righteous path to Islam for their own salvation. The leader, a cleric, of Jabhat Al-'Amal, an offshoot of Jama'a Islamiah extremist party, states that

> We must use any tool at our disposal, even money, to convince people to commit to Islam. There is no problem in offering financial incentives to women for veiling. This tool was used by the Prophet himself. We even buy them the veil and offer their husbands jobs. This is not only ethical but also in the spirit of Islam. However, we do not put conditions or force women to veil. It is their choice, since there is no compulsion in Islam.

This testimony by the leader of an Islamist party sanctions employment of money for veiling on theological and ethical grounds, or "ends justify the means." Other testimonies attach monetary value to donning the Islamic garb and veiling, as this female religious counselor states:

> During the war, rich parties paid poor women money for veiling (Hijab) and for wearing the chador (Jilbab). Secondary school students in Shiite Dahiyeh of Beirut receive until today a monthly allowance of LL 350,000 ($200) for veiling and LL 450,000 ($300) for the chador. However, I am confident that once these monthly allowances stop, the girls will most likely unveil and withdraw from these parties.

Another official from Amal cites that "During and after the civil war, money was paid to poor women for veiling (around $500/month)." Other female officials also state that compensations ranged between $300 and $500 a month, which is a lot of money for the poor and/or young in Lebanon. However, many interviewees caution that while there is no compulsion or coercion in Islam, "If women receive money to wear the veil or the Islamic dress, they tend to remove it once funds stop flowing." A female official in Hizbullah also argues that "Women must be convinced to not be paid to veil. It is easy to unveil by removing the pin, but very difficult for a believer to do so."

In contrast, other respondents deny categorically that religious parties employ money for veiling to expand female leadership. The leader of Tawhid extremist party considers this a "blasphemy." The most vehement reactions were from Hizbullah officials, as this female denies: "Hizbullah never pays money to women for veiling. However, we do not accept unveiled women or employ them if they veil for that

purpose. Women must be committed to Islam and the party's religious platform in order to be accepted as members. Other parties might accept, but we do not!" Similarly, the leader of Jama'a Islamiah refutes such allegations stressing that

> Women are veiled because of their religious convictions and not for money. Women in Hizbullah and Amal are all veiled. However, as a party, Amal is by far less religiously committed than Hizbullah. We are on top of the list in religious commitment. Yes, these parties have funds but they use them as in-kind incentives and not for veiling their women. All Shiite girls should veil when they are 9 and Sunni girls by 12.[7]

Female officials in extremist and conservative parties also stress that spiritual gains are paramount to material gains and that they joined these parties for the love of God, Islam, and the public good, not for personal gains. The head of the women's wing in the same party explains that "We do not need to use such a tool. We are veiled out of conviction and not for financial gains. Suffice it to say that in some Muslim countries, unveiled women are abducted, or acid water thrown on their faces, and are forbidden from entering religious shrines and mosques. These practices violate the Shari'a." Arat (2005) reports similar reasoning offered by Islamist women in Turkish Refah party. Similarly, a religious counselor remarks that "Salafists do not need to pay pious women for veiling. Most of their female members are veiled. They are wives, sisters, or daughters of Salafi members who work toward an Islamic country." She adds that "One cannot meet with these women or interview them without permission of their husbands or party leaders; even then it is doubtful that permission is granted." I can confirm this, since I had to go through party leadership to interview heads of women's wing in these parties.

The head of women's NGO in the progressive Ishtiraki party also cautions that "Poverty and deprivation may force women to accept money for veiling, job placements, and basic services to ensure their families' livelihood. However, I am afraid that once the flow of money stops, women will unveil and recipients will revolt against donors, as the unfortunate events in 2007 in Nahr-el-Bared demonstrate." Some reports also flag a dark side to veiling (Hijab) versus the head scarf (covering hair).[8] Thus, unless parties offering the money or the women receiving it confirm this, evidence remains inconclusive as to whether the tool money for veiling is used by affluent religious parties. Female officials from religious parties interviewed for this research are all

highly educated professionals, occupying leadership positions. As such, they would not belong to a category of women who would veil for money. This tool targets poor and less-educated women being lured to join religious parties at the rank-and-file. The fact that among Islamist women one finds higher and lower classes and highly educated professionals is also observed in the Turkish Islamist Refah party (Arat 2005: 21). This research covers women in leadership positions and not at the grassroots level and uses political parties and not women as the unit of analysis. Future research should investigate this issue further.

Qualitative evidence from interviewees may explain the surge of veiled women in the postwar period and consequently the high share of female membership in religious parties. However, two facts emerge: First, veiling is a phenomenon given the growing number of veiled women; and, second, female membership in religious parties is huge. There is no iron clad proof or admission from women or affluent parties that money for veiling is employed. This tool is being employed in Iran. So, why not in Lebanon? What this tells us, however, is that religious parties, as other political parties, are willing to go to any length to guarantee electoral success and strength, going by the concept ends justify means. If and when employed, Money for veiling is an effective tool, especially for poor women. Poverty is a fertile ground for the provision of financial and in-kind incentives, because women become captive to the continued flow of material support in return for their votes. This is particularly effective when topped by vote-buying.

In-kind Incentives

The affluent Shiite Hizbullah and Sunni-dominated Mustaqbal employ in-kind incentives to attract young men and women. During the early 1970s, Mustaqbal established a foundation to offer scholarships for higher education without discrimination on the basis of sect or gender. This benefited some 300,000 young men and women across Lebanon from all districts and religious sects, which created a plural wide base of highly educated youth, prospective party members as a show of loyalty. Such long-term needs-based mobilization tools are smart and proactive, albeit have a lagged effect. This supports the findings of Cammett and Issar (2010) that Mustaqbal serves "a broader array of beneficiaries" than the Shiite-focused Hizbullah. In addition, affluent parties also offer short-term, in-kind incentives with immediate effects, such as providing social and health services, and setting up schools, health-care facilities, and mobile infirmaries with fully equipped dispensaries. In addition, as a party elite states, "Mustaqbal party distributes clothing

and staple food items such as oil, wheat, sugar, and rice; builds low-cost housing complexes, and offers employment opportunities targeting the poor and deprived." In this vein, Cammett and Issar also find that "Beyond material benefits, welfare programs provide enormous psychic benefits by building and maintaining a sense of community" (2010: 391). The impact of the civil war and the Arab-Israeli conflict on Lebanon combined with the adverse effects of globalization have increased poverty, especially among women. The number of female-headed households has more than tripled in Lebanon after the civil war (UN-ESCWA 2006). These women are among the poorest of the poor, what is referred to as the "feminization of poverty" syndrome in postconflict areas. Poor women are the main beneficiaries from food staples, social, and health care services, and other in-kind incentives. Indeed, women become vehement supporters of their benevolent providers as a female MP and minister observes: "Parties fill the vacuum left by the state by providing social and welfare services. This guarantees their votes." In fact, this vacuum is often filled by civil society, including parties and NGOs, in the absence of a state-managed social safety net. Given this, one should not wonder what makes such in-kind incentives effective, when state institutions are absent. Cammett and Issar reach similar conclusions: "[This] may widen social cleavages in society with 'politicization of social and welfare services' due to uneven distribution of benefits" (2010: 417). Thus, when parties have political ambitions and are affluent as Hizbullah and Mustaqbal are, they tend to co-opt their poor beneficiaries in order to secure their vote. This also shows that in both, the religious Hizbullah and civil-confessional Mustaqbal, there are poor and less-educated women at the grassroots. This refutes an endogeneity argument of self-selection of women's leadership in religious parties because of being less-educated than in the more secular parties (chapter five).

In contrast, responses of officials from prewar parties show that they tend to use traditional tools and techniques. Postwar parties employ more modern, state-of-the-art tactics and show more resourcefulness in targeting women. These tools include, inter alia, nationwide recruitment fairs and public gatherings, town hall meetings, recruitment drives at universities and women's dormitories, and women's NGOs as well as vast use of all forms of multimedia communications including the Internet, websites and blogs, newspapers, audiovisual broadcasting, pamphlets, and dissemination of door-to-door flyers. These modalities have succeeded in securing higher female membership in postwar than prewar parties, which are significantly lagging behind.

To recap, statistics show that, on average, female membership in postwar parties is higher than in prewar parties, as hypothesized. However, against expectations, lower female membership is recorded in prewar parties that are plural and democratic. This is largely due to the traditional tools they employ but more importantly to fierce competition from affluent parties offering financial and in-kind incentives. Parties employ modern and state-of-the-art techniques and offer financial and in-kind incentives to recruit women. They target women in poor and deprived districts. Ideological and religious mobilizations are the building blocks for enhancing female membership. The variety of mobilization tools and smart tactics employed by affluent Hizbullah and Mustaqbal (religious counseling, arranged marriages, or financial incentives, social services, and aggressive recruitment sprees) bore fruit and succeeded where efforts of prewar secular parties lagged behind. These external tools are avenues that parties utilize to mobilize women. Parties also employ internal mechanisms as special women's wings, which is addressed in the following section.

Mechanisms for Mobilization: Women's Wings[9]

Women's wings are arms of parties and a central mechanism for mobilizing women. The functions, forms, and goals for which these entities are established do not vary across parties. These are either set up within parties' inner structures or externally as autonomous, parallel women's NGOs. Information obtained from party administrators and elites shows that only 5 out of the 18 relevant parties (Kutlah, Ahrar, Wa'ad, Ba'ath, and Tajaddod) do not maintain women's wings whereas all 5 religious and 8 of 9 civil-confessional parties do (table 4.1). Lovenduski and Norris also find that in the 1950s, Communist and leftist parties in Western democracies did not have separate women's wings, while Catholic and Protestant parties did:

> In the religious parties separate organizations for women were formed... In general the women's organizations have been, and still are, an important factor in the process of getting more women involved in party politics... Their main aims were to educate women politically and to mobilize them into becoming party members. Now the women's wings are much more concerned with party policies on gender equality... Currently the most important goal is to increase the number of party delegates. (1993: 210–211)

Islamist parties in Arab and non-Arab Muslim-majority countries also maintain separate entities for women because of segregation between the sexes.[10] Arat reports that the Turkish 1981 constitution banned parties from maintaining women's wings. So, Islamist parties like Refah, established separate "Ladies' Organizations" (2005: 42).

Political parties establish women's wings as recruitment mechanisms, but as importantly—albeit implicitly—as electioneering machineries to amass the female vote. These units address women's issues but are also entrusted with organizing social events, fund-raising through welfare and charity work, and providing social and relief services. Sacchet holds that "Political parties have a greater propensity to respond to gender-related demands when a number of structural, institutional and agency factors are in place . . . Political parties that have an internal organization of women that is well coordinated, and which are able to mobilize resources, tend to respond better to women's demands" (2005: 9). This highlights that women's wings engender parties and increase their receptiveness to women's demands. In contrast, Clark and Schwedler argue that "[t]he introduction of separate, "parallel" women's sectors reflects the efforts of party leaders to ghettoize women's activities rather than envision meaningful gender equality within the party" (2003: 302). Similarly, Basu maintains that

> Most political parties have women's wings that mobilize women to vote during elections. Whether, these increase women's involvement with party politics is another matter. Women's wings allow parties to "ghettoize" women and women's issues; . . . Even when parties have neglected women's interests, they have profited from employing gendered imagery, drawing on women's votes and using women in electioneering. (2005: 14, 33)

Having served as director of the UN-ESCWA Centre for Women and regional coordinator for the 1995 Beijing conference, I worked closely with national machineries for women in Arab countries for more than two decades. From this vantage point, I find that women's wings are useful in the short term as temporary mechanisms to engender parties by placing women's issues and concerns on their agendas. The effectiveness of these wings is enhanced only when they are supported by top leadership, led at the highest levels and not by junior officials, and share in the decision-making process (Sbaity Kassem 2005a). However, more often than not, this is not the case. These entities marginalize women instead of creating a critical mass for leadership. However, the

extent to which these units are effective as recruiting, electioneering, and empowering mechanisms is dependent upon the salient features of parties that maintain them and above all party politics.

Along these lines, a female MP remarks that "Women's wings are effective in mobilizing women before and during elections. However, it is indisputable that they marginalize women and are ineffective in empowering them. These units must be dismantled." Another female official remarks: "These separate wings keep women outside the decision-making circles and hold them tokens. However, I must admit that they are effective in increasing female membership." The effectiveness of women's wings in increasing female membership, amassing the female vote, and creating a critical mass of women for leadership is examined in the following paragraphs. Information gleaned from some 92 interviews conducted between 2006 and 2008 points to a significant role that women's wings play in female membership and leadership. This was followed by 58 interviews during 2009 with updates in 2010. Views of heads of women's wings are pitted against those of male party elites to gain insight from responses to the question "Are women's wings effective mobilization mechanisms?"

Before the civil war, the feminist discourse attracted women to join secular parties with leftist orientations, which was largely done via women's wings. During the civil war, militarization and violence drove many women away from parties. They turned to relief work and/or assumed new roles in more modern postwar parties lobbying for women's rights.[11] As several interviewees observe, female membership in prewar secular and civil-confessional parties declined in the postwar era. This prompted parties to look for ways and means to recruit women, which included setting up new women's wings or entrusting existing ones with additional functions. However, not all parties succeeded. A female activist in Qawmi-Suri reports that "In the post-war period, the women's sector exerted efforts to mobilize women in addition to its traditional role of providing family support, eliminating discrimination against women, and lobbying for women's rights. Unfortunately, it failed to increase female membership or be instrumental in elections." She concludes that "It takes much more than women's wings to empower women. It requires women to be more assertive, and parties to have the political will to introduce special measures to promote them."

Views of female officials from prewar secular and postwar civil-confessional parties often converge. Some argue that these wings place women "in a small box and throw it in a corner separating women from

real politics." The female secretary-general of the Wa'ad party explains why the party does not maintain a women's wing: "These wings frame women and marginalize them instead of empowering them." This is why a female activist in the Communist party suggests taking radical measures: "Women's wings outlived their utility overtime and must be dismantled, especially since they failed to increase female membership." A female activist in Tayyar is more proactive. She submits a proposal to party leadership toward this end. This was approved but implementation postponed because of the need to meet and liaise with women's wings of religious parties for the June 2009 elections. This trend is growing among several postwar civil-confessional parties.

The head of women's section in Ishtiraki notes that "Women's sectors provide relief during conflict. They are effective in recruiting women and guaranteeing the female vote. But, this may also be accomplished from within the party. These parallel entities isolate women, dilute their demands for leadership, and marginalize them instead of empowering them. I proposed to dismantle them and the leadership approved." This is analogous to Ware's description of women's wings in the early European parties:

> These sections were peripheral to the power structure of the party and did not provide a route for women into positions of political influence…, since positions of influence in parties were scarce, parties did not want to make it easy for women to enter these positions. This would have created conflict with the existing hierarchies, and that conflict could be avoided by admitting women only as "second-class participants," because they were usually denied positions of influence, women had little incentive to become involved in parties. (1996: 81)

Indeed, a female activist in Mustaqbal exclaims that "Parties deliberately keep women in a separate corner and women's wings are just the perfect mechanism. Also, men do not want to have to compete with women for the limited leadership positions, since they consider politics a man's turf and women are trespassing. The advantages of these sectors are limited to recruiting women and electioneering." Arat reaches a similar conclusion that Islamist women in Ladies' Organizations in Turkish Refah party are "leftout of the decision-making process" (2005: 88).

Women's views are shared by party leaders and elites in secular and civil-confessional parties. For instance, a senior executive in the Communist party reports that measures have been taken to dismantle

the women's wing since "it is ineffective in raising female membership and amassing votes in elections." Similarly, the dean of interior sector in Qawmi-Suri asserts: "Competition is severe. Other parties appear to be more attractive to women and offer them more chances in leadership. Instead of containing women in separate units, we should mainstream them across the party. This may encourage more women to join. We should do better by emulation!" Similar testimony is given by the leader of Tayyar: "The women's sector is instrumental in mobilizing women and amassing the female vote in elections, but not as effective in creating a critical mass of women for leadership. It keeps them away from party politics, thus marginalizing them. We are seriously deliberating dismantling this sector after 2009 elections." Leaders and senior advisers in other parties reiterate similar intentions, indicating that such radical measures are postponed until after 2009 elections to maintain strategic alliances with religious parties. Thus, the majority of postwar secular and civil-confessional parties perceive that women's wings marginalize women and declare their intentions to dismantle them. Following up in 2010 on declared intentions to dismantle women's wings after 2009 elections, I found that parties have not dismantled these units due to strategic alliances with religious parties.

In contrast, heads of women's wings in prewar civil-confessional parties maintain that women's wings should be retained because they are effective mechanisms in recruitment and elections. The head of women's wing in Kata'éb states that "women's wings have succeeded in recruiting more women, coordinating with women's sectors in religious parties, fund-raising, organizing social events, and running campaigns for elections." Another female official highlights the advantages of women's wings in addressing women's issues, representing the party in conferences and joint meetings, and catering to different generations of female members. She explains that "Younger female members prefer to work in professional and specialized sectors; while older members are more comfortable working with other women in special women's wings. Therefore, both arrangements are doable. Female membership increased." In addition, the head of women's parallel sector in Ishtiraki justifies retaining these units because "We are still in a patriarchal society, where these units are needed to reach out to women. I don't see them as marginalizing women, rather catering to their needs, building their political capabilities, and empowering them. They offer women the choice to be as involved in politics as they want." Another female official cites that "Even in developed countries, parties maintain special women's wings, ministries for women and equal opportunities,

or other forms of national machineries for women. We should emulate these practices because they succeeded in empowering women and improving female representation."

Similar views on the effectiveness of women's wings are expressed by female officials from religious parties. The head of women's wing in Amal states: "Women's wings are not only mechanisms for recruiting women, but are excellent electoral machineries. They spearhead electoral committees at the district level and work efficiently during elections." Another female official notes: "We do not only recruit women but we are extremely effective during elections. These are our main function, whether publicized or not!" Furthermore, the head of the women's wing in Jama'a Islamiah boasts of women's involvement in 2009 elections:

> The women's section mapped prospective voters, estimated their number and paid them visits to discuss their needs and the party's electoral platform. I represented the party on TV talk shows to show that women are politically active and empowered and to publicize our role in running the electoral campaign for the party. We arranged to transport female voters to ballot sites and monitored elections. We proved to be very effective, as indicated by the high (over 60 percent) voter turnout of women.

The key role that female party officials played in 2009 elections is recognized by the NDI, as international observers of elections: "Despite the decrease in the number of parliamentary seats they occupy, women were active in other parts of the electoral process, serving as poll workers (for the first time), and in key positions in their political parties" (2009: 54). Other parties cite similar experiences of women's wings in 2009 elections. The high voter turnout of women demonstrates the effectiveness of women's wings in elections.

In general, views of leaders and elites in religious parties on women's wings coincide with those of female officials. For instance, the leader of Jama'a Islamiah extremist party stresses that "The most important task of women's wings is recruiting women, employing religious advocacy to mobilize other women, and helping the party during elections." However, some party leaders boast that these wings empower women downplaying their role as recruitment and elections mechanisms. A senior official in Hizbullah stresses that "Our women's association is creating a critical mass of women for leadership starting at middle management. We have women heading their own sectors and, as such,

they have an informal influence on the party's decisions. We have very few women at the top but this should definitely improve over time." The head of the women's wing in the party corroborates these views: "Women's wings are essential and effective mechanisms for recruiting women and bringing them to the ballots. They do not marginalize women, but empower them. This is the only way that women will become politically active, given the segregation between sexes in our party." These units are effective in mobilizing women, guiding them through the righteous path, and amassing votes during elections. The large share of female membership in religious parties attests to their effectiveness in this respect. Statements by officials in religious parties carry hope that eventually women's wings will have sufficient influence to demand and lobby for women's leadership. They are hopeful that women's wings will eventually create a critical mass of women.

However, Basu is skeptical in that religious parties have an "enormous capacity to mobilize women's movements while undermining women's advancement" (2005: 35). Moreover, Lovenduski and Norris (1993) find that women's wings within parties in Western democracies in the 1950s were also concerned with mobilization and elections more than with female leadership and representation. Adopting a linear approach to development, one perceives that postwar secular and civil-confessional parties marked by lower religiosity, pluralism, and/or employing democratic procedures are avant-guardiste in prioritizing the creation of a critical mass of women for leadership.

In sum, women's wings are maintained in 13 of 18 relevant parties. Mostly secular and leftist parties do not maintain women's wings while all religious parties do, given the segregation between the sexes. Women's wings are formally established to mobilize women, serve as "electioneering" mechanisms, and create a critical mass of women for leadership. Postwar civil-confessional parties attest to their effectiveness in expanding female membership and in electioneering, but are of limited effectiveness in creating a critical mass of women for leadership. In contrast, religious parties hold on to women's wings as effective mechanisms for mobilizing and electioneering and are hopeful that these units will eventually create a critical mass of women for leadership.

Some parties plan to dismantle women's wings, because they ghettoize women by keeping them away from parties' decision making and party politics. As such, these units fail to create a critical mass for leadership or promote women to leadership. This is a common complaint and not Lebanon-specific. Scholars studying religious and Islamist parties in Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries reach similar conclusions.

Conclusions

Parties find a special electoral niche in women to expand membership. The supply and demand for women in parties is contingent upon women joining voluntarily and given opportunities to assume leadership in synch with party ideology and party politics. Parties target women as a *symbol of the modern.* As such, women enhance parties' public image and add value to their performance because of the special contributions they make, including their less corruptibility. Statistics show that, on average, female membership is higher in postwar than in prewar parties, as hypothesized (H5). This is lowest in secular parties despite their plural membership and democratic practices, and highest in religious parties of plural and democratic deficits, against expectations (H2 and H3). A mixed pattern emerges with huge membership in both religious and civil-confessional parties, notably in Hizbullah, Tayyar, and Marada. These findings may be due to failed mobilization strategies, old fashioned modalities, and fierce competition facing prewar secular and civil-confessional parties from stronger postwar parties. Affluent postwar civil-confessional and religious parties targeting women, especially the poor, tend to employ effective mobilization strategies, modalities (financial and in-kind incentives), and mechanisms (women's wings). Women's wings play a central role as mobilization and electioneering machineries. They are frequently seen as marginalizing women, which makes them ineffective in creating a critical mass for leadership. Religious parties sing the praises of women's wings as effective mechanisms in recruiting women and amassing the women vote in elections, which explains women's huge shares in membership, while failing to promote women to leadership. Does female membership matter for their leadership prospects? This will be addressed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Party Politics Explaining Women's Leadership

The traveling theory of party religiosity predicts that as party religiosity rises, women's leadership falls. The robust findings in the cross-national statistical study paved the way for in-depth research in Lebanon. Party religiosity is the core explanatory variable for women's leadership. Party institutionalization is unpacked to identify other aspects of potential influence on women's leadership, notably democratic practices, pluralism, female membership, strength, and denomination. The single case study provides the opportunity to explore in-depth interesting associations established in the cross-national study linking female membership, leadership, and nominations to public office. Qualitative evidence collected from 150 male and female party elites substantiate the conceptual framework of the theory and related hypotheses.

This chapter uses quantitative tools of analysis to validate the qualitative findings. It is organized in three sections. The first section provides comparative statistics across the 18 relevant parties for variations in women's leadership by religiosity, pluralism, democratic practices, and female membership. Qualitative evidence from practitioners explains variations in these variables and in political culture across the civil war timeline. The second section responds to the question whether female membership matters for leadership. In the third section, multivariate regression models for women's leadership in Lebanon are estimated. The results are robust, supporting the theory of party religiosity and women's leadership. It is powerful, explanatory, and predictive.


At the outset, few concerns are worth highlighting. Working with few data points ($n = 18$) is a caveat for estimating a multivariate regression model. This is combined with a large number (seven) of variables, reducing the parsimony of the theory and degrees of freedom in the

model. However, in any one country there can only be so many parties. Nevertheless, whatever specifications are used in the model, party religiosity emerges as statistically significant for women's leadership. This adds confidence in the theory and quantitative results. Another concern is the risk of endogeneity in the causal argument, particularly self-selection, due to women assumed to be less educated in religious than nonreligious parties. Qualitative compelling evidence provided in this chapter shows that it is not women's educational qualifications, or lack thereof, but party religiosity informing party politics that determines women's leadership. A third concern is the risk of overdetermination since pluralism and democratic practices may measure the same underlying concept. Statistical and qualitative evidence produced in chapter five dismiss this risk, since there are some monosectarian parties that are also plural or inclusive and open to other sects and some parties of higher religiosity that are also democratic. Therefore, these variables are specified in the regression model. A fourth concern is maintaining transparency and accuracy in the ordinal measure of religiosity developed to code the 18 relevant parties for quantitative analysis. This pioneering, heuristic exercise involved all stakeholders including male and female party elites and national experts.


Women's Leadership in Party Decision-Making Bodies

Statistics on the share of women in leadership bodies of the 18 relevant parties are compiled from party administrators. Leadership bodies may have different names in different parties, but must discharge similar decision-making functions for inclusion in computing women's share therein. The mean of women's leadership is calculated as the sum of female members in leadership bodies divided by the total number of members in the same bodies.

Graph 7.1 shows that female leadership is higher in postwar than in prewar parties, as anticipated (H5). The difference in means is significant (12.4 percent and 7.6 percent, respectively). Inter alia, this is attributed to attitudinal shifts in political culture, with postwar parties exhibiting more modern and women-friendly attitudes toward women's leadership than prewar traditional and conservative parties. Graph 7.2 shows that average female leadership is highest in postwar secular parties of lowest religiosity (score 5) and lowest in religious parties of highest religiosity (score 1), as theorized (H1). Women's leadership in Sunni Salafist parties of highest religiosity is the lowest across all parties. Besides heads




Graph 7.1 Female Leadership by Party Age.




Graph 7.2 Female Leadership by Party Religiosity (Religious incl. Extremist, Conservative, and Tolerant Parties).

of women's wings, women in leadership of prewar extremist parties are not visible and their share in postwar extremist parties is infinitesimal. Sunni Islamist parties exhibit an ultraconservative stance toward women compared to Shiite Hizbullah and Amal. Women's leadership in Amal (tolerant) party of lower religiosity (score 3) is higher than in other religious parties. These statistics validate the core hypothesis (H1) that as the intensity of religiosity rises, the share of women in leadership falls to infinitesimal levels.


Graphs 7.3 and 7.4 show that, as expected, the mean of women's leadership is higher in parties employing democratic practices and have plural membership than in those that have democratic and plural deficits (H2 and H3). The mean is 11.1 percent in parties employing democratic practices, while it is 7.5 percent in those marked by democratic deficits. The difference in means of female membership is significant between plural (14.2 percent) and single-sect (7.8 percent) parties. Graph 7.5 shows that, on average, the highest share of female leadership is observed in secular parties (21.5 percent) of lowest religiosity (score 5), decentralized decision making, and plural membership. The lowest share of women's leadership is in extremist parties (5.3 percent) of highest religiosity (score 1), and plural and democratic deficits. Prewar civil-confessional parties of lower religiosity (score 4) are also characterized by plural and democratic deficits, which partially explains why,



Graph 7.3 Female Leadership by Party Democratic Practices (Democratic Practices incl. Leadership Transitions and Decentralized Decision-Making).



Graph 7.4 Female Leadership by Party Pluralism.



Graph 7.5 Female Leadership by Party Religiosity, Democracy, and Pluralism (Democracy incl. Leadership Transitions and Decentralized Decision-Making).

as a group, these have lower shares of women in leadership than their postwar counterparts. Extremist parties of highest religiosity, and plural and democratic deficits, show the lowest shares for women's leadership, as expected. This provides initial statistical support to the theory of party religiosity and related hypotheses on pluralism and democratic practices.

In order to draw a full picture of which parties are superior for women's leadership, the views of male and female elites are solicited, including party leaders, MPs, heads of women's wings, and other practitioners. At the outset, I reiterate that all women interviewed are in leadership positions, highly educated, career and businesswomen, and professionals. Therefore, the claim that there is a shortage of qualified women or it is an issue of self-selection because women are less educated falls by the wayside. It is rather party politics at play. In contrast to male elites, few female elites see that religious parties offer women chances in leadership. The large majority finds that secular, leftist, and civil parties offer women more leadership chances than religious parties. Responses of practitioners to the main research question "Which parties are superior for women's leadership?" provide rich information and validate the coding developed for parties by religiosity. These are summarized, for easy reference, by the three generic party categories and split along the civil war timeline.

Prewar Parties

1. *Secular:* Secular, leftist, not religious parties; *barriers*: culture, patriarchy.
2. *Civil-confessional*: Civil, not religious parties; *barriers*: culture, patriarchy.
3. *Religious*: Religious parties are same or better than secular parties; *barriers*: women's leadership violates the Shari'a, culture, patriarchy.

Postwar Parties

1. *Secular*: Secular, pluralist, not religious parties.
2. *Civil-confessional*: Secular, civil, never Islamist extremist parties.
3. *Religious*: Secular and religious parties share the same difference; may change in tandem with parties' interests; *barriers*: women's leadership violates the Shari'a; culture, patriarchy.

The majority of practitioners, except in religious parties, find that secular parties are superior for women's leadership. The large majority of interviewees highlight political culture and patriarchy as barriers to women's leadership. Those in religious parties invoke the Shari'a to block women from leading men. Prewar secular and civil-confessional party elites stress that there are no internal structural obstacles to women's leadership. However, they blame women for lacking political maturity and insufficient interest in politics to compete with men for leadership posts. In contrast, elites in postwar secular and civil-confessional parties boast their superiority in promoting women compared to religious parties. These parties exhibit a women-friendlier political culture toward women's leadership. The attitude vis-à-vis women's leadership of male elites in prewar and postwar parties, secular parties aside, is significantly different. In the following paragraphs, responses of male elites are pitted against female colleagues in prewar and postwar parties, secular and civil-confessional parties, and religious parties. In general, one observes a disconnect between normative statements of party elites and the reality described by their female colleagues, or between the de jure and de facto.

Prewar versus Postwar Parties

Most prewar parties attribute the low share of women in leadership bodies to cultural barriers while postwar parties encourage women and plan to introduce internal quotas to enhance their already relatively higher shares in leadership bodies. Male elites in 4 secular and 7 civil-confessional parties (11 of the 18 relevant parties) declare that while restructuring after the civil war, they adopted, recommended, or are in the process of formally introducing voluntary internal party quotas for women. The five religious parties and two prewar civil-confessional parties (Ahrar and Kutlah) do not have such intentions.

Parties with secular and civil goals are more modern, forward-looking, encourage women to compete for leadership, and are willing to adopt internal party quotas to improve their share in top-level positions. Similar sentiments are depicted from avant-guardiste secular and civil-confessional parties employing gender-sensitive terminology such as gender roles, gender equality, gender mainstreaming, and commitment to gender equality and equity. This reflects a women-friendly political culture, which bodes well for women's leadership. Disposition to modern paradigms and a feminist discourse are attractive to women, especially since this holds promise for promotion. For instance, the

Tayyar leader stresses that "Our actions are self-explanatory. We are gender-sensitive, serious, and committed to gender equality. We have a significantly high representation of women in leadership." Indeed, postwar secular and civil-confessional parties boast high shares of women in leadership bodies and consider women *a symbol of the modern*, to borrow from Dahlerup (2006: 295). Nonetheless, a female elite in Tayyar complains of discrimination and sexism:

> Patriarchy prevails and is reproduced by male elites even in modern and avant guardiste parties like ours. Women are tasked with secondary and supportive roles, while men remain at the helm, even if they are not as qualified. I am always appointed secretary of the executive committee. I do all the work, while the chairman gets credit. I resigned because I felt slighted. Although the party leader is a feminist, he is surrounded by advisers who are sexist, threatened by qualified and competent women.

This strong statement is corroborated by the female chief executive in Wa'ad party:

> Sexism and discrimination against women prevail even in women-friendly parties. Men receive preferential treatment irrespective of qualifications and competence while more stringent eligibility requirements are imposed on women. Unless women are exceptionally qualified, assertive, and aggressive, they are not nominated or elected to leadership positions. Parties demand that women must be 100 percent perfect, while they settle for much less in the case of men.

Dahlerup argues similarly that "Stigmatization of political women... [is] based on double standards (women are seen as tokens as if the men in politics were never that), and the femininity of women politicians is questioned—a woman politician is a kind of a she-man" (2006: 297).

Critical of the attitude of religious parties toward women, an avant-guardiste party leader remarks that "Religious parties are dogmatic and hostile to women's leadership. These parties are hierarchical and run by dictat. How do you expect women to become leaders in such parties?" Another party leader adds that "Religious parties will not promote women as long as they continue to interpret the doctrine conservatively." Indeed, postwar secular and civil-confessional parties are

more women-friendly than the "antiwomen-as-leaders" of most religious parties.

Party variation in political culture vis-à-vis women's leadership—when individual religiosity informs party religiosity—provides additional explanation for the lower shares of women in leadership bodies of religious parties compared to those in postwar secular and civil-confessional parties. Women's leadership in Hizbullah is slightly higher than in prewar and postwar ultraconservative extremist parties, but still lower than in Amal of tolerant religiosity. Thus, while political culture cannot be measured, it maps on male elites' attitude nevertheless, which reinforces the link with party religiosity and translates it into measurable terms.

Secular and Civil-Confessional Parties

Male Elites

Views of male elites toward women's leadership in prewar civil-confessional parties are traditional and closer to those in religious parties. The senior adviser in Kata'éb states that "Even if we want to promote women to leadership positions, we do not have a sufficient number of women who are willing and able to assume leadership positions." This argument is moot, since there is no shortage of highly qualified Lebanese women, as statistics show. The Ahrar leader admits that "Despite patriarchy and the hostility of men toward women for trying to snatch their traditionally acquired rights to leadership positions, once women prove themselves, men will accept them." This argument is cogent because it reflects the underlying reasons for male hostility toward women's leadership as Dahlerup explains: "The problem is not seen as the absence of women from the political institutions, but rather their intrusion. The argument is that political involvement will ruin the family, and who is going to take care of the children?" (2006: 297). The reality is that men are not willing to relinquish leadership posts to women, whether in parties or in parliament. It is a power game. However, men are bound to accept women in leadership when women impose their presence, following Phillips's (1995) argument. This also points to a vicious circle of the "chicken and egg." How can women prove themselves in politics if they are not given the chance to do so? A case in point is a young aspiring female MP who led Quwwat (civil-confessional) party for 11 years. She proved herself and imposed her presence until she was accepted by the old guard, male elites.

Female Elites

The large majority of female elites find that secular parties are superior for women's leadership. The former female leader of Quwwat emphasizes that "Secular parties with civil goals are, by far, more open and accommodating to women's leadership than religious parties. I led this party for 11 years and created a critical mass of women for leadership. Now women occupy one-fourth of leadership positions, maybe one of the highest among our counterparts." Other female practitioners stress similar opinions but provide different reasons grounded in varying political and electoral interests defining party politics vis-à-vis women's leadership. For example, a female activist in the Communist party asserts that "Secular, leftist, pluralist, and democratic parties offer women more leadership chances than other parties. These parties are modern and premised on liberal, egalitarian, and progressive ideologies." Indeed, the Communist party elected its first-ever female vice president in summer 2009 and Tajaddod followed suit in summer 2013. However, few female activists in weaker secular leftist parties in strategic alliance with strong religious parties see that religious parties might work for women's leadership, if and when they transform.

Responses of female activists highlight the hostile attitude of religious parties toward women's leadership, in comparative perspective. In this context, a female scholar from Kutlah highlights that the religious value system shapes parties' attitude toward women's leadership, justifying this on the following grounds:

> Women's chances in leadership are highest in civil parties, which are premised on religious value system but have a civil agenda. They are pluralist, tolerant to diversity, democratic, and gender-sensitive. Secular parties got caught after the war between their liberal, leftist ideologies, and traditional values. Women's chances in these parties are, in principle, good, but shrinking due to fierce competition and weakness. Their chances are least likely in religious parties because of conservative and discriminatory practices, considering women inferior to men. These parties are antiwomen's leadership.

Further, a Lebanese female scholar explains that "Women in religious parties have no mundane expectations, guided by religious convictions and a different value system. They are not after personal and material gains but spiritual returns and the public good, while women in secular and civil parties are vocal, assertive, and demand recognition

and tangible rewards." However, a female official in Mustaqbal flags that "Value systems change imperceptibly but are contextual. Parties, including those with religious platforms, transform over time to reflect emerging political interests and the setting within which they function. Their attitude toward women's leadership will eventually change. They will promote women when it is in their interest to do so, even if this involves overlooking the Shari'a for political gains." In studying Islamist parties in Jordan, Clark notes that "[t]he Executive Bureau took a strong stance against Jordan's new electoral quota system for women, arguing that quotas violate the principle of equality articulated by Islam . . . the IAF [Islamic Action Front] nominated Musini [a female member of Shoura Council] for purely strategic reasons, over the objections of party members who declared her candidacy *haram* (prohibited by Islam)" (2004: 7). In this vein, a female MP in Tayyar responds that "All parties, including religious parties, offer women leadership positions when it is in their interest to do so. Parties function along 'ends justify means.' One sees women in leadership posts in some Islamist parties in Palestine, Algeria, Morocco, and Jordan." It is questionable whether having women in party membership leads to women's leadership. As Clark reports, an Islamist party nominated a female in Jordan's 2003 elections, which raised criticism but did not boost hopes for female representation:

> While Musini's candidacy was a landmark for IAF women, it does not ensure an expanded role for women in the party in the future. So long as ideological contention over women's roles continues to exist within IAF, the party's leaders will avoid creating a firm policy that could provoke further divisions among the rank-and-file. Instead, the leadership will continue to balance ideology with pragmatism, evaluating women's participation on a case-by-case basis and advancing women when strategically useful. (2004: 7)

Scholars studying women in Islamist and other religious parties conclude that it is party politics that determines women's advancement (Clark and Schwedler 2003; Basu 2005; Sacchet 2005; Arat 2005). A female official in Kata'éb substantiates these views: "Women have a thorny route in religious parties. These may promote women to leadership or nominate them on their lists to compete with other parties, but definitely not to empower them." Findings of Clark and Schwedler in Jordan and Yemen demonstrate that "Women's presence in the councils has not, thus far, resulted in an influential or vocal role for women in

the party" (2003: 309). This requires in-depth examination of formal versus informal avenues of influence that women have within party structures, which future research should address.

Interlinkages between party elites, party religiosity, and women's leadership are recognized by a female in charge of media in Marada stating that "Parties with strong bonds to religion and where the cleric and politician are collapsed into one, offer women less chances in leadership than other parties. Religious tenets affect politics and take precedence over democratic and egalitarian values." The female chef de cabinet in Tayyar emphasizes that "Religious parties have theocratic and dictatorial tendencies which block women from leadership, while democratic parties offer women equal chances as men."

In addition, several female activists observe that Christian-dominated parties offer women more chances in leadership than Muslim-dominated parties. In fact, scholars studying parties in Western Europe also argue that different religions impact women differently. Lane and Ersson find that "Besides the influence on the party system and the government, it has been assumed that religion has special effects on the development of society . . . It seems possible to demonstrate that different religions are coupled with differences in attitudes to the development of society" (1987: 56).[1] Extending this argument to women invokes "modern-ness" versus "traditionalism" between Christians and Muslims, and "conservatism" versus "tolerance" between Muslim Sunnis and Shiites. This is relevant for a multifaith society like Lebanon, which is composed of 18 religious sects where cultural differences may still arise between Christians and Muslims or even between Muslim Shiites and Sunnis. In this vein, a female official compares the station of women across parties of different denominations: "Islam looks at women as second-class citizens, inferior to men. Our Christian parties offer women more leadership chances than Muslim parties, like Mustaqbal. However, religious parties like Hizbullah are more conservative than Mustaqbal. Hizbullah has one woman in its politburo and never nominated women to parliament, as we do." Similar views are offered by another female activist: "Christian parties like Marada, Quwwat, Wa'ad, and Tayyar promote women more than Muslim parties like Mustaqbal." Others maintain that confessional affiliation may be more relevant to women's leadership than different religions and there are variations even within the same religious families, as this female elite argues that "Kata'éb, Marada, or Quwwat have more religious components in their platforms than Tayyar or Wa'ad. These have more women in leadership bodies than other parties. Sunni Mustaqbal is less religious than

Sunni ultraconservative, extremist, Wahabi Jama'a Islamiah that has no women in leadership." Indeed, Sunni-dominated, ultraconservative, extremist parties are less hospitable toward women's leadership than Shiite-dominated parties. Shiites are open to Ijtihad, enlightened interpretations of Shari'a while Sunnis are strict orthodox sticking to the letter of Qur'an. A female official in Mustaqbal states:

> Religious parties offer women limited leadership opportunities with Shiites doing better than Sunnis. These parties will promote women for public consumption or strategic "artificial" reasons but not to empower them. Women remain tokens not decision makers in religious parties. Secular and modern civil parties like Tayyar and Mustaqbal offer women more leadership chances.

Thus, studies show that different religions (Christianity, Islam, or Judaism) and/or sects (Catholics, Protestants, Shiites, or Sunnis) impact women in different ways. Lovenduski and Norris find that Christian religious parties in the West, "SGP, GPV and RPF . . . are openly against women participating in the public sphere" (1993: 210). This is akin to the attitude that male elites in Islamist parties project toward women's leadership. These views are substantiated by data on women's leadership in 18 parties and support the multivocality of religions and how this influences political culture and party behavior toward women's leadership, even within the same religious family. Three observations emerge from this: (1) parties of higher religiosity are Muslim-dominated; (2) civil-confessional Christian-dominated parties outnumber Muslim-dominated ones; and (3) the share of women in leadership bodies of affluent Maronite-dominated Tayyar party is double that of Sunni-dominated Mustaqbal (table 4.1). As mentioned, even within the same religious family there are variations in women's leadership that prompts examining party denomination as potentially influencing women's membership and leadership. This is examined quantitatively in the third section.

Religious Parties

Male Elites

Responses of party leaders and male elites in Sunni extremist Jama'a Islamiah, Jabhat Al-'Amal, and Tawhid reflect an ultraconservative attitude toward women's leadership than that projected by elites in Shiite Hizbullah and Amal, or secular and civil-confessional parties.

A party leader dismisses women's issues exclaiming that "We have more important business in these odd times than to worry about women's leadership when people are being assassinated and killed every day." Similarly, a senior adviser in another Salafist party stresses that "Women lead NGOs but not men. They should leave hard politics to men. When women moved beyond their God-given roles and worked like men, the society became dysfunctional as it is the West. Women's place is her home, as God dictated. They are not fit for leadership because of menopause, mood swings, and emotional imbalances!" Religious parties invariably invoke discourses that women's leadership violates the Shari'a:

> Our society is patriarchal. Men are responsible for women, not the reverse, by the principle of Al-Qiwama. Women's involvement in politics is not acceptable. The *Hadeeth* is clear that no community *Ummah* shall ever succeed if led by a woman. If women relinquish their domestic duties and join the labor force, families break, and the society will become dysfunctional.[2]

Male elites highlight that women are content. They do not demand leadership positions or public office. Even if they do, the party will not support them, as a party leader cites: "Women comprise one-third of our party membership, but aside from heads of women's wings, there are no women in leadership bodies. The party was against a female member who defied the rules and ran for parliamentary elections, violating Shari'a and Qur'an. Women are not made for hard politics."[3] Another male elite clarifies that "Muslim women are veiled and should not mix with men, let alone lead them. This is *haram* forbidden and violates the Shari'a. Women should leave politics to men and stay at home. They should not join secular parties, because only Islamist parties can secure happiness in the afterlife."

Another issue raised relates to women's role in the family. A party leader cautions that "Once women step out of their homes, they are forced to make a trade-off at the expense of family welfare. Nurturing and domestic duties will suffer. Families will become dysfunctional." Further, a leader in an extremist party argues that "By keeping women at home as care-takers of their families, we are doing them a favor by relieving them from the heavy burden of politics and protecting them from fierce competition with men." This condescending attitude reflects poorly on women's abilities to meet challenges of a political career, while women are known for multitasking and balancing

domestic and work duties. Interestingly, most male elites in religious parties dismiss differences with nonreligious parties, arguing that all parties, irrespective of their programmatic orientations, offer women the same slim chances in leadership. A male MP from Hizbullah emphasizes: "I do not see any difference between religious and other parties with respect to women's leadership. Politics is for men not women. Customs and traditions keep women at home for domestic and family duties."

However, few male elites admit that "Islamist parties are bound by built-in barriers in the doctrine, which prevent women from leading men. This is why secular parties offer women more leadership chances." Similarly, the leader of Jabhat Al-'Amal extremist party self-locating his party highlights that "Islamist movements, like ours, cannot allow women to lead men, unlike moderate movements like *Ikhwan* that allow women and even nominate them to parliament." Such qualitative evidence carries weight coming from the leader of an Islamist party. This demonstrates that there are multiple religiosities causing variations in women's leadership, which supports the conceptual framework of the theory of party religiosity. These responses show that even party leaders and their advisers, who are expected to support their parties' reputation, will sometimes acknowledge that their religious framing constrains the roles they can offer women. Moreover, this is qualitative evidence to the fact that women's leadership chances in religious parties are indeed slim. These extremist views are not close by any measure to notions of gender equality or concepts embraced by a gender paradigm. In this vein, Lovenduski and Norris find that

> Where traditional attitudes prevail it might be expected that women would be hesitant to pursue a political career, selectors would be reluctant to choose them as candidates, and parties would be unwilling to introduce effective gender equality policies. In contrast, in egalitarian cultures we would expect the goal of gender equality to be widely shared by all parties across the political spectrum. (1993: 312)

Female Elites

Echoing views of some male elites, a female official in Jabhat Al-'Amal responds that "Women's leadership is at the same low level across all parties: Christian or Muslim parties. Maybe women in secular leftist parties have a better chance in leadership because these do not have religious goals." This statement emphasizes party goals, ideology, and party

politics as decisive for advancing women. Similarly, a female executive in Amal remarks that

> Women have negligible chances for leadership in all parties. But, their chances are better in secular parties that are plural and democratic. As a value system, religion unites party members, but it is not a barrier to women's leadership. Religious extremist parties offer women the least leadership chances, while other parties promote women because they recognize their merit and competence. We are confident that women will prove themselves overtime and assume leadership posts in our supreme council.

Another female official in Amal raises the critical issue of doctrinal interpretation: "The Shari'a must be interpreted in favor of women. Any interpretation that puts women back home leads to inefficient use of human resources. This is not in the interest of the country." Thus, some voices conceive of a light at the end of the tunnel, pending women-friendlier attitudes of male elites entrusted with Shari'a interpretations. This demonstrates that women in tolerant parties aspire to leadership contrary to those in conservative and extremist parties. Using the counterfactual, a female official states that "If our Islamist party is led by a religious leader who is young, educated, and enlightened, women will rise to leadership levels. I am willing to run for leadership positions as long as my husband approves." Except for tolerant Amal, leaders of other religious parties are all clergymen. The fact that party leaders are also clerics does not only influence the intensity of religiosity on party platforms but also tunes their attitude toward women's leadership—qua political culture.

In contrast, a female official in Jama'a Islamiah draws a sinister picture that "Even if women were given the chance, they remain followers. Let us face it: Women have no place in politics. That is why Islamist parties do not offer women leadership positions." Echoing views of party elites, she remarks that "If women are assertive and impose themselves as they do in parties like the secular Qawmi-Suri party, they will be promoted on meritocratic grounds. These are the parties that offer women more leadership chances. Our parties are interested in wider welfare issues. However, I am not in this party for leadership but to serve God, Islam, and society." In this vein, a female official harps that "In our party, women prefer to stay in second or third-level roles, as recipients and followers not as leaders. However, I believe that secular and leftist or civil parties offer women more chances in leadership than

our parties. Parties like Quwwat build men's and women's political capacities." Qualitative evidence points to the huge presence of women in religious parties' conventions, claiming to build their capacity, not to showcase them. Indeed, Quwwat requires men and women to enroll in political formation institutes attached to the party and to take competitive examinations for promotions. Such a party strategy creates a critical mass of women for leadership, which explains the high share of women's leadership.

Heads of women's wings in extremist and conservative religious parties emphasize that they are content with their station. They refrain from demanding leadership posts on traditional grounds and unwillingness to violate the Shari'a. A female official in Tawhid extremist party argues that "In Islam, the principle of Al-Qiwama prevents women from leading men. So, how do you expect pious women to violate the doctrine and aspire to leadership positions?" Similarly, a female from Jabhat Al-'Amal extremist party stresses that "We should leave politics to men; our task is to provide social services, religious advocacy, and amass women's votes in elections." One observes that, in general, heads of women's wings, particularly in extremist parties, tend to be passive. They stress that they are working for God's sake and do not expect material gains and mundane rewards. In contrast, Clark and Schwedler find that "[I]slamist women's struggle for voice within their own political parties illustrates not an exceptional case, but a more generalizable phenomenon of intraparty mobilization within an environment of changing political opportunity structures" (2003: 309).[4] Arat (2005) finds a similar assertive attitude among Islamist women in Turkish Refah party. I heard these female voices demanding leadership only in Amal tolerant party; female officials in other parties are silent. A female official explains this silence thus: "Poor women at the grassroots are passive because of the financial and in-kind incentives that affluent religious parties offer them and their families. This may explain why some women are silent." Women's passiveness is more serious when they are in top-level echelons, not at the rank-and-file. However, there is more to it than material incentives or mundane rewards; women tend to be more religious than men and are convinced that they are ultimately serving Islam and God. Indeed, responses by other female officials reveal that women in religious parties prefer to remain on the receiving end and accept a passive role in politics as dictated by the doctrine. For example, a female official in extremist religious party recognizes that "Women's chances in leadership are limited in all religious parties, especially in extremist Salafist, like ours.

However, I have no problem and no leadership ambitions at all, since I believe that religious commitment is essential and I work for Islam as the solution and righteous path."

A few female officials are bold and venture to voice their personal opinions. But, this gives the impression that they are saying what they think they should say for public consumption, and not what is actually taking place within the inner structures of parties. For instance, the only female in Hizbullah's politburo compares women in extremist Afghanistan (Taliban) or Saudi Arabia (Wahabi) to drive the point that women in Hizbullah are better off:

> Religious extremist parties bar women from leadership. In Lebanon, there are no fully secular parties but only confessional communities around which parties form and where patriarchy prevails. In our party, decision making is consultative or by *Shoura*. This paves the road for qualified women, and there are many in the party, to assume leadership. I am the perfect example that there are no barriers for women's leadership.

Coming from a female leader in a conservative party, this testimony carries weight in that the Shari'a is no bar to women's leadership, in contrast to what male elites in extremist parties claim. Another female official asserts that "Hizbullah has never stopped anyone from demanding leadership positions. But, women have to prove themselves and summon their courage to move up. There is no shortage of politically mature, qualified, and educated women in the party." However, a female official disagrees, complaining that "Despite women's hard work and qualifications, their leadership chances remain slim because of Shari'a. The Qur'an is our guide and salvation, but we are not extremists in Hizbullah. We are much better off than Salafists following Wahabi Saudi Arabia, where women's leadership is nil."[5] This is revealing and instrumental for coding parties by religiosity.

These testimonies respond to contending arguments that women's poor educational level and qualifications in religious parties explain their slim leadership chances. In other words, religious parties are willing to advance women but the available pool of women is not qualified for leadership. This is why there are fewer women in religious parties' leadership bodies than in other parties. Using the Arab Barometer survey data, Tessler (2011) finds that less-educated women and men are more likely to favor a political role for Islam than are better-educated individuals. Tessler's findings are not direct evidence with regard to

political parties. However, this may lead one to assume that women joining religious/Islamist parties may indeed be less educated than those joining more secular parties. Data on the educational background of all female party members were not compiled. However, qualitative and statistical evidence points to Lebanese women being highly educated; and in affluent Hizbullah and Mustaqbal, of different religiosities, there are women from all classes and all educational levels. Similar findings are reported by Arat in that "[o]ne finds among Islamist women lower and higher classes, highly educated and professionals of all walks of life" (2005: 23). Further, all women interviewed in Lebanese religious and nonreligious parties are in leadership positions, hold, at least, first-level university degrees, are academics, professionals, entrepreneurs, and career businesswomen of high socioeconomic profiles. These female activists constitute a critical mass of women for leadership.

Moreover, women in religious parties are appointed to leadership positions as heads of women's wings, leadership position nonetheless, and in executive committees. Qualitative evidence on female leadership in women's wings of religious parties dissipates concerns for endogeneity in the causal argument and dismisses the presence of a direct relationship between women's educational level and their leadership prospects in these parties. There is no possibility that some sort of self-selection of women is at play, which is independent of party religiosity. There are also men in leadership positions who may be less educated than women in religious parties. The link between lower education, poverty, individual religiosity, and female membership and leadership may be a valid concern, but applies to both men and women. Therefore, explanations for women's limited leadership in religious parties do not lie in their educational or other attributes, but in party politics informed by party religiosity. This is especially the case when clerics double as party leaders, are entrusted with interpreting the Shari'a, and deliberately conflating it with culture. Female interviewees highlight that how Shari'a is interpreted and by whom is critical for women's leadership. This applies equally to Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, as former president of the United States, Jimmy Carter, cogently writes:

> Christian leaders, all men, twisted and distorted Holy Scriptures to perpetuate their ascendant positions within the religious hierarchy. The truth is that male religious leaders have had—and still have—an option to interpret holy teachings either to exalt or subjugate women. They have, for their own selfish ends, overwhelmingly chosen the latter. (*Observer*, January 25, 2013, Fairfax Media)

He adds that this is the foundation and justification for the station of women, which is in clear violation of teachings of all world religions and prophets. This is powerful, especially when applied to clerics doubling as party leaders.

Hence, echoing their male colleagues, statements by female officials in religious parties justify their limited leadership chances invoking Shari'a and employing discourses that "women's place is at home" and that, "politics is men's business." If the Shari'a informing party platforms is interpreted to imply that women should not lead, it is unlikely that such parties will advance women to leadership positions or that women will demand it. However, when political interests are at stake, the behavior of religious parties does not differ from non-eligious parties, as female officials realize. Religious parties allow political interests to override theological considerations, as a female official indicates: "If the party finds it in its interests to promote women to leadership or to nominate them for public office, we will comply with orders; otherwise we are content and have no political ambitions." In other words, "strategic maneuvering" may prompt religious parties to overlook Al-Qiwama, promoting women to leadership or nominating them to public office. This is a tangible translation of party politics, ideology, and strategy determining party behavior toward women's leadership and the measures parties are willing to take therein. To some extent, differences in value systems, religious commitment, and adherence to Shari'a may explain the reluctance—dilemma—of female officials in most religious parties to demand recognition and leadership positions.

What does this statistical and rich qualitative evidence imply for the theory of party religiosity? Statements of interviewees highlight that, parties with religious agendas in which religion is *deprivatized* block women's leadership chances, in contrast to parties where religion remains in the private sphere. Religious parties with infinitesimal shares of women in leadership invoke the Shari'a and/or raise patriarchy and culture as barriers thereto. Nevertheless, all parties are willing to promote women for strategic reasons and/or if it is in their electoral interest to do so. Religious parties are even willing to overlook Shari'a, justifying this as "ends justify means." This implies that party politics and strategy rather than women's personal qualifications and political maturity or lack thereof determine women's leadership.


To recapitulate, some may argue that the pool of women is less well-educated in religious than in nonreligious parties and as such may not be eligible for leadership. Though this may be a valid argument, qualitative evidence from Lebanon does not substantiate this. Given the puzzle

motivating this research of a mismatch between women's low political and high socioeconomic (female to male tertiary level enrolment is 1.2), this argument seems unlikely. There are also women from different classes and different educational levels in nonreligious parties who boast high shares of women in leadership bodies. Further, education does not seem to be a bar to leadership in religious parties, as evidenced by women's appointment as heads of women's wings, which is a leadership position nonetheless. There are also men in top-ranking positions in religious parties who may not be that well-educated. I maintain that party politics informed by party religiosity determines women's leadership more than any other exogenous or endogenous variable. However, one wonders whether had women been more assertive in extremist and conservative parties would results differ.

Qualitative and statistical evidence shed light and dispel endogeneity in the causal argument that women's educational level explains their leadership chances. Variation in women's leadership may be attributed to party denomination besides party religiosity, which informs political culture. Religious parties as all political parties change their policies toward women when it is in their electoral interest to do so. Male party elites recognize the influence of party religiosity on women's leadership. Prewar secular and civil-confessional male party elites stress that women have equal chances for leadership in all parties, because they face the same cultural and patriarchal barriers. Elites in religious parties invoke the Shari'a, Al-Qiwama, and antifeminist discourses to block women's leadership. Postwar secular and civil-confessional party elites offer women more leadership chances, as reflected in women's higher shares in leadership bodies. In contrast, female officials in religious parties concur that extremist parties offer women least leadership chances. These testimonies carry weight and are instrumental for coding parties. In general, interlocutors highlight that how the Shari'a is interpreted and by whom have serious implications for women's leadership in religious parties, particularly when clerics double as party leaders and are "antiwomen-as-leaders." What is intriguing, however, is the mismatch in religious parties between huge female membership and female leadership. The following section examines this puzzle.

Does Female Membership Matter for Party Leadership?

Based on data in table 4.1, Graph 7.6 plots the mean in female membership against leadership in the 18 relevant parties. In secular Tajaddod,



Graph 7.6 Female Party Leadership by Membership (%).

a 21 percent share of women in party membership is matched by 21.5 percent in leadership bodies. In civil-confessional Tayyar, a 51 percent female membership translates into 25 percent in leadership. Putnam's (2000) law of increasing disproportions indicates that representation at higher organizational levels will always be lower than in other levels. This implies that the share of female leadership would always be lower than female membership. Kittilson also finds that "[r]epresentation of women should be lower at higher organizational levels" (1997: 13). Thus, I do not expect female membership in all parties to match their share in leadership as in Tajaddod. In other secular (Communist, Qawmi-Suri, and Ba'ath) and postwar civil-confessional parties (Tayyar, Mustaqbal, Marada, and Quwwat), female membership and leadership are not exactly matching, but follow Putnam's law. However, statistics for other parties are inconsistent with theoretical expectations and with findings in the cross-national study (chapter two), that as female membership expands, the share of women in leadership increases.

More specifically, the corresponding shares in extremist and conservative religious parties are much lower and less meaningful than expected, pointing to a mismatch between female membership and leadership. This is most pronounced in Hizbullah in which women comprise half of the party's membership while their share in leadership

is 7.1 percent only (see table 4.1). Also, extremist parties have sizable female membership (one-third) but infinitesimal shares in leadership. It seems that this huge female "presence" does not impose itself, as Phillips (1995) maintains, or lobby for leadership as findings of the cross-national study show. This phenomenon comes as no surprise. Scholars also find a similar pattern in other religious popular parties (Basu 2005; Clark and Schwedler 2003; Arat 2005). This indicates that in Lebanon, female membership does not matter for leadership, particularly in parties with religious platforms, calling for in-depth probing to explain why the mismatch is sustained.

The leader of Tawhid admits that "In Hizbullah and other Islamist parties we have an active and a large female membership, unlike secular and leftist parties. But, we don't have many women at the top, like other parties." This admission is valuable coming from a leader of an extremist Islamist party. As shown earlier, most female officials in extremist parties and conservative Hizbullah are content with their station, unlike those in Amal tolerant party who are more vocal demanding leadership posts. The head of women's wing clarifies that "Religious commitment attracts women to join Hizbullah or other religious parties. They do not join because of political or leadership ambitions. We are believers not politicians." Another female official stresses that "Women in Hizbullah do not feel marginalized and rarely complain. Pious women are better off when not in politics. But, women's leadership prospects are limited even in secular parties that claim to be egalitarian." A female in charge of public relations and media in Hizbullah remarks that she does not feel marginalized or slighted, because she joined the party out of "religious convictions, for God's sake, and not for personal gains or political ambitions." Arat (2005) reports similar responses from Islamist women in (Refah) Turkish party, stressing that they work for "God's sake," do not expect mundane rewards, demand recognition in leadership positions, or voice complaints about sharing in the party's decision-making process. However, the head of women's wing in Jama'a Islamiah clarifies that "Women join parties much later than men, which explains why there are more men than women in leadership and why women are not politically mature. Politics is not a woman's domain, women are meant for social work. Why don't you pose these questions to my husband, the party leader?" Such replies demonstrate that even when female elites in extremist parties are in leadership posts, they defer to men as more politically savvy. One observes that in religious parties, the majority of heads of women's wings are wives or family members of party leaders and/or male elites.

Female activists in nonreligious parties are more aggressive, vocal, and proactive in demanding leadership. They lobby for leadership posts, build alliances with male colleagues, and propose concrete measures toward this end. However, some parties have concerns about the life cycle of female members. Several party leaders in prewar civil-confessional parties express these concerns that "Even if women are politically active, once they get married and start forming a family their involvement declines." A female activist in Qawmi-Suri secular party notes that "Unless women get organized in balancing their multiple tasks and men share domestic duties, the active involvement of married women in parties is jeopardized during a period in their life cycle when they are raising a family." However, another female activist is skeptical cautioning that

> Even if there is partnership in the family, the share of women in leadership might not increase. We cannot claim that being married is an obstacle to leadership. Some women have the ambition, interest, or drive for political leadership, while others do not. Women often reproduce patriarchy and willingly allow men to remain the decision makers.

A female activist defends the life-cycle approach: "It is normal that women's activism declines once they get married and resumes when their kids grow up. This explains parties' reluctance to invest in women, just as employers hesitate in employing single, young women of child-bearing age." In religious parties, information obtained from heads of women's wings confirms that a high share of women in the rank-and-file are indeed married. More often than not, both wives and husbands are members in the same religious party.[6] However, what is not obvious is whether women's political careers follow a life-cycle path truly and whether this influences their leadership chances. Parties do not compile statistics on the marital status of female members or the share of those who withdraw upon getting married in order to substantiate these claims. This may be interesting for future research.

The role of family and female domestic responsibilities may provide additional explanation for the mismatch between female membership and leadership. A female activist suggests that "The mismatch is a joint responsibility of party leadership and women. Women should get organized, build alliances, and be proactive by lobbying for leadership. Rights are acquired not granted. Parties should introduce affirmative action measures, establish implementation mechanisms, and set a

time-frame to improve women's share in leadership." Lovenduski and Norris (1995) suggest that once women join parties at the lower ranks, they could directly increase the pressure for representation at higher levels. Kittilson also argues that the presence of women at higher levels and in leadership positions within parties' inner structures reinforces female representation. She adds that "[w]omen's participation inside the party as party activists at the local level, as organizers of intraparty women's groups, and as internal officeholders should buoy women's power in the party." She concludes that "[p]arties with higher proportions of women activists will display correspondingly high proportions of women MPs" (1997: 5). This draws a career path for women in politics associating female membership to leadership and highlighting that women's participation at the grassroots is a stepping stone to leadership within parties and into public office. Statistical findings in the large (N= 330) cross-national study establish such career path associations, paving the way to exploring this in the small (n = 18) of Lebanon (chapter eight).

Modern mobilization strategies, modalities, and mechanisms employed by parties largely explain variations in female membership. However, these factors cannot simultaneously explain variations in women's leadership or the glaring mismatch between female membership and leadership in religious parties.

On the one hand, women join religious parties out of conviction, but the huge membership is also associated with receipt of financial and in-kind incentives, although this is not readily admitted by female interviewees.[7] Women at the grassroots are not expected to complain, because they are captive of financial incentives and wish to sustain their source of livelihood. This phenomenon may be comparable to the inability of citizens to hold political representatives accountable because they receive handouts as in rentier states, instead of paying taxes: akin to "no representation without taxation" in democratic deficit polities. A similar phenomenon is found in party systems where representatives and party leaders are not accountable to their constituencies because of clientelism.

Although female membership in most religious parties is sizable, heads of women's wings are mostly passive and lack political ambition or zeal for promotion. They are not "activists" or agents of change, which is why I refer to them as "officials" but less so as "activists." Except for Amal, Islamist women in other religious parties do not lobby, form pressure groups, or demand leadership. Qualitative evidence highlights women's reluctance to demand advancement, because they are working for God's sake and not for mundane gains. This may partially explain

women's passive attitude toward leadership. They articulate minimal interest in politics, while invoking the Shari'a, conceding that "politics is a man's turf," or that society is not yet ready for women in leadership. Women appear to be content with the role that their male colleagues bestow upon them. A female activist in Amal metaphorically but cynically describes women's status in most religious parties as "A masochist tendency in that women like it that men continue to subjugate them, while they remain subversive and obedient followers." In this vein, a female official in Tayyar observes that

> The paradox is that the media projects women in Hizbullah and Amal as being the most politically involved compared to women in the other parties. They are visible in congregations and joint meetings, engaged in talk shows, and recipients of awards as best TV hosts and anchor persons. However, they remain tokens within their own parties and their influence in decision-making remains negligible.

In my view, this is not a paradox, particularly in the case of Amal, the only religious party not headed by a cleric. This provides evidence linking political culture to party religiosity, which explains labeling Amal as tolerant and assigning 3 to code its religiosity. Female membership in Amal is 30 percent, which translates into a meaningful 10.9 percent in leadership, higher than in other religious parties.

On the other hand, male elites in religious parties, especially when clerics double as leaders, determine contents of political platforms in line with the elements of their faith. As such, party religiosity informs party politics, which is reflected in antiwomen-as-leaders political culture. The question that poses itself is: Do Islamist parties' have any policies to empower women? The answer is negative. I argue that it is not women's lack of qualifications, education or skills, political maturity, or women's passiveness, rather women-hostile party politics closely intertwined with party religiosity that minimizes women's leadership in Islamist parties. To a large extent, this explains the mismatch between female membership and leadership in religious parties, except in Amal.

The rich qualitative evidence produced explains the gap between theory and practice in drawing a career path for women in politics and between female membership and leadership. Female membership in most religious parties does not matter for party leadership. This is not sui generis to Lebanon. Similar findings are found in other Arab,

Muslim-majority non-Arab and South Asian countries, and some consolidated democracies in the West (Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Clark and Schwedler 2003; Basu 2005; Arat 2005). Religious parties do not advance women despite a sizable share at the base. Even when Islamist women are in leadership bodies, mostly in women's wings, they are ex officio, nonvoting members and as such remain voiceless and lack influence in decision making. In contrast, female membership matters for leadership in postwar secular and civil-confessional parties. These findings are substantiated by statistical and qualitative evidence.

Party variation in religiosity explains variations in women's leadership. Higher religiosity in party platforms largely explains the low share of women in leadership bodies. Besides religiosity, pluralism and democratic practices also explain women's leadership. Contending arguments also point to women's education as an independent variable. As I have argued earlier, the causal relationship for women's leadership is party politics, not women's qualifications or lack thereof. Qualitative evidence produced throughout the book is substantiated by findings of multivariate regression analysis. While some may find this redundant, I maintain that only through such tools can we determine the relative importance of these variables for women's leadership. This argument makes the theory of party religiosity and women's leadership more compelling and robust.

A Model for Women's Leadership in Political Parties

This section highlights the complementarity between the qualitative and quantitative data for testing the theory of party religiosity and women's leadership. A model for women's leadership in political parties is estimated, with values of variables compiled from 18 relevant parties in Lebanon. This is a more elaborate albeit less parsimonious model than the model estimated for the cross-national study for which values of variables were gathered from 330 parties in 26 countries (chapter two). This section links the large N = 330 in the cross-national statistical study to the small n = 18 in the Lebanese case study, shedding light on interesting associations like the career path established in the comparative study.

Qualitative and statistical evidence produced in previous chapters provide good grounds for inferring that party politics intertwining with party religiosity strongly influence women's leadership. Parties of lower

religiosity are superior for women's leadership than those of higher religiosity. These findings, though positive, do not show which variables have statistical significance and whether party religiosity explains a large proportion of the variance in women's leadership across parties. Results of the multivariate analysis will tell whether party religiosity is still observed to have a significant effect on outcomes once we control for other party factors that are likely to affect women's leadership.

This exercise covers 18 relevant parties that occupy at least 1 seat in 2009 parliament. I use this low threshold in order to include as many and as diverse parties as possible out of an almost 80 active parties, many of which are weak and fringe parties. Nonetheless, the small number of observations (n = 18) is a major caveat in this multivariate regression exercise. This is coupled with seven independent variables, reducing the parsimony of the model and producing fewer degrees of freedom. However, as argued earlier, there are only so many parties in any one country: 18 relevant parties in Lebanon.[8] Further, in a single case study we are able to control for exogenous factors like the political and electoral systems, which are of potential import to women's leadership. What is reassuring, however, is that whatever we throw into the regression equation, religiosity remains statistically significant. This is a robust finding.

Political parties are the unit of analysis. Women's leadership in parties' legislative and executive bodies is the main dependent variable. Party religiosity is the core explanatory variable. Secularism is used interchangeably with religiosity in the model to demonstrate that parties' platforms compose both religiosity and secularism components. Other institutional party-level aspects include pluralism, democratic practices, denomination, and strength. Female membership is an endogenous variable, which is also expected to influence women's leadership, although it may not be a prerequisite for it. It may be an intervening variable having indirect effects on women's leadership through any of the other variables. The interaction between membership and religiosity will be examined, but is not expected to have significant effects.

A multivariate regression model for women's leadership in Lebanon is estimated. Female leadership is regressed on secularism, pluralism, democracy, female membership, age, strength, and denomination. The regression equation for women's membership is as follows:

$$\text{Women's Leadership} = b_0 + b_1\,(\text{secularism}) + b_2\,(\text{pluralism}) + b_3\,(\text{democracy}) + b_4\,(\text{female membership}) + b_5\,(\text{age}) + b_6\,(\text{strength}) + b_7\,(\text{denomination})$$

Table 7.1 Lebanon: Models for Women's Party Leadership and Nominations for Public Office

Independent Variables (Standard errors)	*Leadership in Parties*	*Nominees for Parliament*	*Nominees for Municipalities*
Secularism/Religiosity	3.1169⋆⋆⋆	–1.1776	1.6188⋆⋆⋆
	(.9607)	(1.5366)	(.5798)
Pluralism	6.7459⋆	1.4767	–.6957
	(3.4156)	(4.4959)	(1.6965)
Democracy	–1.7394	3.5831⋆	1.7830⋆
	(2.1217)	(2.4470)	(.9234)
Female membership	.0060	–.0452	.1848⋆⋆⋆
	(.1024)	(.1144)	(.0432)
Party age	8.1361⋆⋆⋆	–.2899	–.4455
	(2.6343)	(4.1109)	(1.5512)
Strength	–.2153⋆	.8635⋆⋆⋆	–.0085
perentage of seats in parliament	(.1372)	(.1710)	(.0645)
Denomination	1.1611	2.9381⋆⋆⋆	–.5328
	(1.0142)	(1.2042)	(.4544)
Female leadership		.3791	–.1818
		(.3530)	(.1332)
Constant (base)	–7.5836⋆	–7.7206	–6.8935⋆⋆⋆
	(4.4140)	(5.6082)	(2.1162)
N	18	18	18
Degrees freedom	10	9	9
R^2	0.8118	0.8691	0.8092
Adjusted R^2	0.6801	0.7528	0.6395
F	6.16 > 3.22	7.47 > 3.23	4.77 > 3.23
	Critical value	*Critical value*	*Critical value*

Source: Processed by the author based on Lebanon dataset on women in parties; www.icpsr.umich.edu/cgi-bin/bob/dd?/depno=23355 (doi:10.3886/ICPSR30742); and www.theARDA.com;

Notes: ⋆⋆⋆ = P.01; ⋆⋆ = P.05; ⋆ = P.10.

Women's leadership is operationalized by computing the mean for women in leadership bodies (sum on female members in leadership bodies divided by the total number of members in same bodies). Female membership is the percentage share of women in total party membership. Party strength is the share a party occupies of parliamentary seats. Parties are coded along a 5-point religiosity continuum on a scale from 1 for highest and 5 for lowest religiosity. Secularism is used instead of religiosity in the model: 1 lowest secularism/highest religiosity to 5 highest secularism/lowest religiosity. Democratic practices are measured by leadership transition and decision making. This is operationalized by assigning 0 to democratic deficit parties; 1 to parties employing either one of the two indicators; and 2 to those employing both indicators. Pluralism is operationalized by assigning 0 to single-sect parties and 1 to multisect membership. Party denomination is operationalized by assigning 0 to nondenominational; 1 to Shiite-dominated; 2 to Sunni and Druze-dominated; and 3 to Maronite-dominated parties. Party age (birth year) is a proxy that captures party variation in political culture and distinct differences in party elites' attitude vis-à-vis women's leadership after the civil war. It is operationalized by assigning 0 to prewar and 1 to postwar parties (table 4.1).

Table 7.1 shows that the influence of religiosity/secularism on women's leadership stands out in terms of statistical significance of the coefficients. The predicted marginal increase in women's leadership of jumping one category on the secularism/religiosity scale is estimated at 3.12 percentage points, controlling for other variables. However, rather than assuming that incremental changes between categories have uniform effects, the model was reestimated using dummies for different sets of nonreligious parties. Results are substantively similar.[9] This provides robust support to the theory that as religiosity increases, the share of female leadership in parties' inner structures diminishes. The influence on women's leadership of pluralism and party strength are also statistically significant, as expected. The combined effect of the variables in the model produces an R^2 that can explain 0.81 of the variance and adjusted R^2 at 0.68 (68 percent) of variations in women's leadership across parties. These results are also substantively significant, since the lowest shares (zero) are in Jama'a Islamiah and Jabhat Al-'Amal of highest religiosity, and highest shares are in Tayyar and secular Tajaddod parties of lowest religiosity.

However, the influence of democracy, female membership, and party denomination are not borne out, against theoretical expectations and statistical and qualitative evidence.[10] These results lead us to infer that democracy, contrary to expectations, statistical, and qualitative evidence, has no observed effect on enhancing women's leadership. The results are driven by the number of parties that are fully democratic in leadership transitions and decision making. In effect, three of the only five parties employing democratic practices are prewar secular leftist parties (Ba'ath, Communist, and Qawmi-Suri). These are assigned lowest religiosity and have the highest shares of women in leadership bodies among prewar parties. Several parties that emerged from militarized and/or democratically deficient militias are led by older generation male machos. This may have influenced their attitude toward women, especially candidate selection, which may be based on military male models rather than open, women-friendly, or gender-sensitive, and democratic models. Empirically, women's leadership is highest in postwar secular and civil-confessional parties marked by democratic practices in decision making though not in leadership transitions. In contrast, women's leadership is lowest in religious extremist parties, two of which are outliers, employing democratic process in leadership transitions though not in decision making. Therefore, the counterintuitive results on democracy in the regression model have substantive interpretations in parties' political culture and party elites' attitudes

recognizing the significance of democracy for women. These results should not be construed as the norm, since the work of many scholars and students of parties associates democratic practices with higher chances for women's leadership.

The results of the regression show that female membership does not matter for leadership, contrary to expectations and to the career path for women in politics linking female membership to leadership, established in the cross-national statistical analysis. However, empirical evidence depicts a mismatch between huge female membership in religious parties and their share in leadership bodies in Lebanon. This is also seen in the model for Lebanon. Religious parties maintain large women's wings and huge female membership at the rank-and-file, but very few women in leadership positions. This is not sui generis to Lebanon.[11] Postwar parties found a niche in women and intentionally reached out to them as a marginalized group. Religious mobilization and financial and in-kind incentives expanded female membership in Hizbullah, Tayyar, and Marada. However, in Tajaddod, Tayyar, Mustaqbal, Marada, and Quwwat, female membership translates into meaningful leadership shares, though disproportionately. However, in religious parties, high female membership translates into infinitesimal shares or none at all in leadership, which explains the statistically insignificant results obtained in the model.

Party age is a rough proxy for unobserved changes in prewar and postwar parties' strategies and their attitude toward women's leadership. Other variables in the model capture the effect of party age on women's leadership. Postwar parties are expected to be more plural and have more female members and higher representation of women in leadership bodies (H5). The regression coefficient on party age is positive with a high nominal magnitude of 8.14 and a statistically significant t-score. This is also substantively significant because postwar parties have higher shares in leadership and in membership than prewar parties. Including party age in the model is important in case there are some unobserved features (missing variable bias) of postwar parties that are also helping to drive the results. There is a need to control for party age in the regression model, though it is obvious that as a proxy, it does not fully capture variations in party strategies and behavior toward women's leadership across prewar and postwar parties. The omission of party age from the model might introduce variable bias.[12]

Statistics compiled from party administrators show that prewar secular parties of lowest religiosity have lower shares of women in leadership than anticipated. But, this does not violate the core hypothesis in the

theory, because leftist parties (Communist, Ba'ath, and Qawmi-Suri) lost clout and outreach, as they faced fierce competition from affluent and strong Tayyar and Hizbullah. They fail to attract women not only because they employ traditional mobilization tools but also due to widened religious cleavages after the civil war. This shifted membership from prewar secular to postwar conservative and civil-confessional powerful parties, reduced pluralism nationwide, and limited openings for women's leadership. Prewar civil-confessional parties (Kata'éb and Ahrar) are entrenched in their own ways, more conservative, and less hospitable to women's leadership than the modern avant-guardiste postwar stronger parties (Mustaqbal and Tayyar). These findings support the hypothesis (H5) that women's leadership is higher in postwar than in prewar parties.

Postwar secular and civil-confessional parties (Tayyar, Wa'ad, Mustaqbal, and Tajaddod) of plural and democratic practices in decision making have higher shares of women in leadership than other parties. Statistics also show that parties with democratic deficits (Quwwat) have comparable high shares of women in leadership to those that are fully democratic. Jama'a Islamiah and Jabhat Al-'Amal extremist parties that employ democratic practices in leadership transitions though not in decision making have all-male leadership bodies. Therefore, statistical and substantive findings regarding the influence of democratic procedures on women's leadership do not tally. Contrary to theoretical expectations (H2) and substantive justifications, the influence of democratic procedures on women's leadership is not established statistically. This, however, should not imply that democratic process does not matter for female leadership. It is just not statistically significant.

Referring to the public/private religion discourse, this research finds that whenever religion is *deprivatized*, as in Islamist parties headed by clerics, the space between public and private spheres collapses, and parties suffer from democratic and plural deficits, diminishing women's leadership. In secular and civil-confessional parties where religion is privatized, women's leadership rises. These findings challenge Casanova's (1994) seminal work that public religion helps democratization. The majority of Islamist parties, where the private is public, are hierarchical, autocratic, and democratically deficit, in which women's leadership chances are blocked. I maintain that party religiosity, which informs party politics, is behind women's poor lot in leadership in Islamist and other religious parties. This is observed not only in Lebanon but also in many other Muslim-majority and South Asian countries, as well as in some Christian European countries and

the Jewish state. I am not aware that similar work on religious women in Latin-American Catholic-dominated parties has been undertaken.

The relationship between female membership and leadership is not as hypothesized. But, this should not imply that female membership does not matter for leadership in all parties. This is most likely because of the presence of huge female membership in separate and segregated women's wings in parties of higher religiosity. These parties have managed to block a linear career path for women and redirected them and ghettoized them into women's wings freeing the space for continued male domination. The relationship between female membership and leadership for nonreligious parties (13 out of 18) and for parties that do not maintain women's wings (5 out of 18) produces positive and statistically significant results, as anticipated. This relationship is tight, significant, and substantively important. However, since there are only five parties that do not maintain women's wings, we are unable to estimate the full model for just those parties. For the more secular parties, however, the relationship is positive although less significant, and the estimated marginal effect smaller.

Contending explanations for women's leadership point to the pool of women in religious parties being less well-educated than in the more secular parties. While this may be true elsewhere, the findings in Lebanon do not support this explanation. Parties of low and high religiosity have female members of different classes and different levels of education; yet women's leadership is high in parties of low religiosity and low in parties of high religiosity. Islamist parties have appointed women as heads of women's wings. This implies that it is not lack of qualifications but party strategy, politics, and dynamics linked closely to party religiosity that is behind women's low share in leadership of religious parties.

Advocates of qualitative research may question the need to go into quantitative and multivariate modeling having provided compelling rich qualitative and statistical evidence supporting the theory and related hypotheses. In addition, some may argue that the small number of data points (n = 18) is insufficient to estimate a reliable and valid model. Another more challenging alternative would have been to develop a time-series cross-section model with party election years as unit of analysis. This would require additional time and research, given the paucity and/or nonavailability of sex-disaggregated statistics by parties in Lebanon. I find that despite the small number of observations, a multivariate regression exercise adds confidence to the theory and identifies variables that are statistically significant (party religiosity, pluralism, and strength) and those that are not (democracy,

female membership, and denomination). These variables are otherwise supported by qualitative and statistical evidence, except for female membership.

Moreover, the advantage of multivariate regression is that, whatever variable that I throw into the equation, party religiosity remains highly statistically significant, explaining a large proportion of variations in women's leadership across the 18 relevant parties. Despite the small number of data points, I am able to infer strong results. Indeed, party variation in religiosity continues to be the strongest explanatory variable for women's leadership in political parties. No matter how we change the specifications of the model, religiosity stands out as an explanatory variable for variations in women's leadership across parties, which is a priori a robust finding. The large regression coefficient is associated with small standard errors of much less than half of their numerical values, which is very reassuring. The results of this regression model strongly support the theory that party variation in religiosity explains a large proportion of the variance in women's leadership across political parties.

Conclusions

The rich statistical and qualitative evidence explaining women's leadership across 18 relevant parties in Lebanon supports the theory that as party religiosity rises, the share of women in their leadership bodies falls. Statistics show that average shares of women in leadership bodies are lowest in religious parties of highest religiosity, and plural and democratic deficits, and highest in secular, plural, and democratic parties of lowest religiosity, as theorized. Qualitative evidence from 150 party practitioners substantiates these results, challenging contending arguments that there is endogeneity in the causal argument. The low share of women's leadership in religious parties is due to party politics informed by party religiosity and not a result of self-selection since women in religious parties may be less educated than in secular and nonreligious parties. The puzzle that motivated this research highlights the high female-to-male enrollment ratio at university level. Further, qualitative evidence shows that in religious and nonreligious parties there are highly and poorly educated women targeted by affluent parties. Also, religious parties appoint women to head women's wings, nonetheless. Therefore, the low share of women in leadership bodies is not due to women's poor education or lack of personal qualifications and attributes. The findings also show that female membership does

not matter for leadership and is not a prerequisite for it, in contrast to findings in the cross-national study.

A multivariate regression model is estimated for women's leadership. Qualitative and quantitative findings complement each other. The model is estimated with seven independent variables, thereby reducing the degrees of freedom and parsimony of the theory. Despite the small number of observations (n = 18), party religiosity emerges as highly statistically significant no matter what specifications are used in the model. Party pluralism and strength are statistically significant, but not democracy and denomination. The model explains a large proportion of the variance in women's leadership across parties. This demonstrates that a religiosity argument is superior to country-level development, political, and electoral systems, and society-level political culture and religion, or women's educational level. The theory of party religiosity and women's leadership explains the mismatch between women's high socioeconomic and low political profiles, the conundrum motivating this research.

However, there are few take-away points. First, religious parties have huge female membership but minimal shares in leadership bodies. This is explained by religious mobilization and other tools and mechanisms targeting women. These include financial, "money for veiling" possibilities, and in-kind incentives, which co-opt women into silence. Second, religious parties do not promote women to leadership because they are antiwomen-as-leaders. They invoke Shari'a, particularly *Al-Qiwama*, and traditional discourses that politics-is-a-men's-business and women's place is at home, blocking women from leadership. This is especially decisive when clerics double as leaders of religious parties and are entrusted with interpreting the doctrine to their advantage, setting political agendas, defining party religiosity that adversely influences women's leadership. Third, religious parties may be willing to reinterpret or overlook Shari'a when it is in their interest to do so. They use women to improve their public image for electoral purposes, because women are a symbol of the modern. Fourth, party variation in political culture is shaped by party religiosity and serves as a barometer for women's leadership. Fifth, female membership matters for party leadership relatively more in postwar secular and civil-confessional parties than in religious parties. This is translated into comparable shares in line with Putnam's law of increasing disproportions. In religious parties, there is mismatch between huge female membership and infinitesimal shares in leadership. It is obvious that religious parties are unlikely to advance women to leadership bodies unless they transform and their religiosity falls.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Can Women Break Through the Political Glass Ceiling?[*]

In previous chapters, a theory of party religiosity and women's leadership was advanced, developed, statistically tested cross-nationally, and found to travel. This paved the way for in-depth and particularly useful case study of Lebanon. Information culled from 150 political practitioners and empirical evidence gathered from 18 relevant Lebanese parties strongly support theoretical expectations. This chapter moves beyond women's leadership in party echelons to the logical "outcome" of nominating women for public office. Parties nominate women for municipalities in close consultation with local community networks, dominant families, and religious leaders while they control parliamentary nominations. Impressions gained from interviews during 2006–2008 point to different dynamics governing female nominations to parliaments than municipalities. This motivated another round of interviews during 2009, followed by updates in 2010 for municipal elections.

The chapter is organized into three sections. The first and second sections examine female candidacy for parliaments in comparative perspective to municipalities, respectively. The third section presents qualitative evidence and quantitative findings providing additional support to the theory of party religiosity and women's leadership. Multivariate regression models for parties' female nominations to parliament and municipalities are estimated. Hypotheses H1 to H8 and H10 are tested (see chapters one and two). The results support theoretical expectations that party religiosity explains female nominations to municipalities, but not to parliaments. Hence, municipalities offer women a window of opportunity to break through the political glass ceiling.

Female Parliamentary Nominations

Parliamentary elections in Lebanon are held every four years. At the time of writing, there were five rounds of elections in the postwar era (1992, 1996, 2000, 2005, and 2009). During this period, 72 percent of women nominated or sponsored by parties for parliament were "garbed in black." They all won (table 3.2). To date, only one female nominee by Mustaqbal ever made it to parliament, who was not a widow, sister, daughter of assassinated, deceased, or powerful political leader. All female candidates who ran as independent or were supported by the women's movement lost. This reinforces parties' gatekeeping function in selecting and nominating candidates for public office. The women garbed-in-black invariably amass votes either out of empathy and loyalty to lost leaders or via vote-buying, thus undercutting possible gender bias. The Arab Barometer survey data show that 83 percent of Lebanese people find that women can become prime ministers in Muslim nations; however, over 50 percent find men better political leaders than women (www.arabbarometer.org/Lebanon I; Atallah 2012). These polls do not dismiss internal party gender bias and give a mixed message on voter gender bias, especially that vote-buying is also used to ensure success of male candidates.[1]

As shown earlier, there is no shortage of highly qualified women for leadership. Also, when women are nominated by parties, there is 100 percent success rate. Despite these assurances, the share of female MPs dropped from 5.9 percent in 2005 to 3.1 percent in 2009 (table 3.2). Therefore, women are able and capable, but are they willing to run for office? Or, is it parties that are not willing to nominate women for parliament? I seek to explain this puzzle by exploring the influence of party religiosity, democracy, pluralism, denomination, strength, and female membership and leadership on female nominations to parliament and municipalities.

Statistics gathered from official sources and party administrators show that four civil-confessional parties (Mustaqbal, Tayyar, Quwwat, and Kata'éb) of lower religiosity and Amal of tolerant religiosity nominated women for parliament in 2009 (table 8.1). Mustaqbal fielded the highest share (30 percent) of female nominees followed by Tayyar (16.7 percent).

Prewar secular parties of lowest religiosity, plural membership, and democratic practices did not nominate women to parliament. These leftist, egalitarian parties lost clout and strength after the war. They are not affluent to afford vote-buying and are weak. They cannot risk

Table 8.1 Lebanon: Female Party Nominations for Municipalities in 2010 and for Parliament in 2009 (%)

Municipal Candidacy by Gender, Denomination, and Urban/Rural Divide

	Gender	*Christian*	*Muslim*	*Urban*	*Rural*
Females	5.6 (100 %)	51.2	48.8	47.8	52.2
Males	94.4 (100 %)	45.9	54.1	52.8	47.2
Total	**100.0**	**46.1**	**53.9**	**52.7**	**47.3**

Municipal Candidacy by Party Religiosity, Gender, and Urban/Rural Divide

Party	*Religiosity Score*	*Gender (%)*		*Urban (%)*		*Rural (%)*	
		Female	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*
Marada	4	7.8	92.2	0.0	100.0	7.8	92.2
Qawmi-Suri	5	7.0	93.0	0.0	100.0	7.0	93.0
Communist	5	6.7	93.3	0.0	100.0	6.7	93.3
Tayyar	4	3.5	96.5	3.5	96.5	3.5	97.5
Ba'ath	5	3.0	97.0	0.0	100.0	3.0	97.0
Mustaqbal	4	2.9	97.1	3.1	96.9	2.8	97.2
Ishtiraki	4	2.0	98.0	2.5	97.5	1.8	98.2
Quwwat	4	2.0	98.0	1.7	98.3	3.3	96.7
Hizbullah	2	2.0	98.0	1.7	98.3	2.3	97.7
Amal	3	1.1	98.9	1.1	98.9	1.1	98.9
Total		**5.6**	**94.4**	**2.6**	**97.4**	**3.0**	**97.0**

Parliamentary Candidacy by Party Religiosity, Denomination, and Strength

Party	*Religiosity*	*Denom.*	*Strength (%)*	*Female Nominees (%)*
Mustaqbal	4	Sunni	34.0	30.0
Tayyar	4	Maronite	6.2	16.7
Quwwat	4	Maronite	4.7	12.5
Kata'éb	4	Maronite	6.2	12.5
Amal	3	Shiite	6.2	0.5

Sources: www.moim.gov.lb and estimates based on official sex-disaggregated data by electoral districts.

losing even one of the few parliamentary seats they occupy by nominating women, who might be struck out of the ballot in a Block Vote (BV) electoral system. Party strength, measured by the share of parliamentary seats a party occupies, is critical in selecting female parliamentary nominees.[2] Parties of highest religiosity, and plural and democratic deficits, notably, Hizbullah and the three extremist parties, never nominated women to parliament. For instance, even when an enlightened female Islamist mustered her courage to run, the extremist party did

not support her, but nominated her late husband, founder and leader of Jama'a Islamiah. She had to withdraw but ran again as independent and lost twice. She cites her daunting experience:

> The party refused to nominate me. I borrowed money to pay for nomination fees and ran as independent. I wanted to make a statement and encourage other enlightened Islamist women to run for office. The Shari'a and Al-Qiwama, which the Sheikhs invoke and use as *fatwa*, do not prevent women from leadership. It is the women-unfriendly interpretation of the doctrine by clergymen. Party elites ran defamatory stories unworthy of holy men that I am violating the Shari'a. They criticized my political platform stressing women's rights as human rights and gender equality as Western-oriented and the devil's work.

In fact, among the five religious parties, only Amal nominated women for cabinet and parliament. This may have been strategic maneuverings, because Mustaqbal could not nominate her due to technicalities embedded in the electoral law, which distributes seats across electoral districts by confession. This demonstrates one of the several shortcomings of the gender-blind, confessional electoral law.

The electoral system in Lebanon is not women-friendly by any stretch of imagination. It is a plurality/majority BV system with multimember districts and built-in systemic limitations. Electors have as many votes as there are candidates to be elected. Candidates with the highest vote totals win the seats. Parties have no incentives to include women on their open electoral lists. Electors vote for candidates rather than parties and use as many or as few of their votes as they wish. This raises the risk of electoral loss due to possible gender bias (inconclusive in Lebanon). The Lebanese electoral law has no provisions or quotas for women, neither as shares nor as reserved candidate seats.[3] Parties do not employ voluntary internal or electoral quotas for women, although some parties declare intentions to do so, as shown earlier. Confessional quotas are the only quotas in place, by which the 128-seat parliament is split equally between Christians and Muslims. Under this women-unfriendly BV system and where the dominant political culture makes parties hesitate in nominating women, improving female representation becomes a difficult endeavor (see also Basu 2005; Matland and Tezcur 2011). In preparation for the June 2013 elections, several parties and political blocs called on the parliament to amend the 1960 electoral law and/or replace it by a proportional representation law.[4]

Civil society and national machineries for women are still lobbying for parliamentary or electoral lists gender quotas. To date, these efforts did not bear fruit.

All six female MPs (2005 parliament) see that secular and civil parties offer women more leadership chances, including nominations for public office, than extremist and other religious parties. A female MP and former minister states that "The debate is really not about secular or religious parties, but about women taking men's seats in parliament. Parties prefer to nominate winners, women or men, and those who toe the line." A female official in Hizbullah explains that "Religious parties refrain from nominating women to parliament because they are afraid that veiled women will not be accepted in the public sphere. Look at what happened in Turkey. Our society is not yet ready for women in politics, let alone veiled women." Similar concerns are expressed by Turkish Islamist women regarding the head scarf (Arat 2005). This is a lame argument, since a female MP from Mustaqbal started wearing the head scarf in 2005 and is perfectly accepted and respected in parliament and government.

Male elites in prewar civil-confessional traditional parties posit that it is women's choice not to run for parliament, because they shy away from a political career, are not interested in politics, or lack political maturity. However, to judge by over 60 percent female voter turnout in June 2009 parliamentary elections, it seems unlikely that Lebanese women are disinterested in politics. Qualitative evidence points to patriarchy being reproduced by women and influencing their nomination and representation in parliament. In 2009 elections, two female MPs ceded their seats to their sons, which led to almost halving the share of women in parliament. A female MP from Tayyar offers supporting anecdotal evidence: "I approached the daughter of Lebanon's former president to run for 2009 elections. Her response was: 'Why? Are there no men in the family?'" This is counterintuitive coming from a young, highly educated woman. The head of the women's wing in Jama'a Islamiah reacts similarly: "Why should I run for leadership if my husband is doing the job. He has experience and knows politics." Similar reactions from two different women, an Islamist and young Christian, reveal that patriarchy is entrenched and is being reproduced by women themselves. The female chef de cabinet of Tayyar leader also flags that

> Women tend to reproduce patriarchy within their own families by discriminating between their sons and daughters. They rarely

> support or vote for other women. Most parties expect remuneration in return for nominating men or women. Some women are reluctant to leave lucrative business or professional careers for politics.

This highlights that patriarchy and culture may explain some women's reluctance to run for office. My concerns lie in explaining what makes parties hesitate to nominate women when women are able, willing, and winning?

The Women and Child Parliamentary Committee chaired by a female MP from Tayyar submitted a joint proposal with Marada to introduce a quota for women. Hizbullah with its March 8 bloc allies (prewar secular and Shiite-dominated parties) seconded the motion. A male MP from Hizbullah's supreme council proudly declares that "Hizbullah voted for a parliamentary quota for women, which our allies proposed. It did not pass, because the majority bloc is afraid that this will give the opposition an upper hand in parliament." Hizbullah's support demonstrates that oftentimes religious parties tend to overlook the Shari'a when it is in their political interest to do so and/or for strategic reasons. Hizbullah's higher religiosity did not prevent voting favorably for a gender quota. One would expect secular and civil parties to vote in favor of a quota for women but not extremist and conservative religious parties. However, this proposal was opposed by March 14 majority bloc (Mustaqbal and allies from predominantly Christian civil-confessional parties, secular, and extremist Islamist parties). Nonetheless, this should not be construed as indicator of Hizbullah's commitment to gender equality. On closer scrutiny, it appears to be far more a show of support for a staunch political ally by employing rhetorical strategies to diffuse public impressions that the party is not antiwomen-as-leaders, even by overlooking Shari'a tenets. Otherwise, one should have seen these parties introduce internal and voluntary electoral gender quotas, express intentions to do so, or show higher shares of women in leadership bodies and/or on electoral lists. But this is not the case. Religious parties will not promote women unless it is in their electoral interest to do so, as Clark and Schwedler report on the 1993 Yemeni elections:

> Conservative voices within Islah . . . questioned whether it was acceptable for women to vote because they would have to reveal their faces to a stranger to be photographed for their voter registration card. Aware of this potentially pivotal role female voters might play in elections, Islah officials urged the party's (elected)

> spiritual leader, . . . to issue a *fatwa* stating that it was acceptable for women to be photographed in order to vote. They need to mobilize voters and win seats to enable the party to realize its goals, they argued, far outweigh other concerns. (2003: 300)

The controversy around a parliamentary quota for women is more of a demographic, denominational concern than a gender or patriarchal one. In 2009 parliament, there are 12 Christian-dominated and six Muslim-dominated relevant parties.[5] The proposal to reserve 14 additional seats for women did not pass because of confessional considerations. The overarching tension in Lebanon is that both, Muslims and Christians, do not want "the other" to gain political supremacy. No electoral change will be countenanced if it might upset this delicate balance between the politico-confessional blocs. Cultural differences between Christian and Muslim women influence the extent of their political involvement, as Lane and Ersson suggest: "Besides the influence on the party system and the government, it has been assumed that religion has special effects on the development of society . . . It seems possible to demonstrate that different religions are coupled with differences in attitudes to the development of society" (1987: 56). Empirical evidence shows that there are fewer Muslim than Christian female parliamentary candidates, which translates into lower representation. All five postwar parliaments had more female Christian than Muslim MPs. Even the Muslim-dominated Mustaqbal nominated a Christian female in 2009 electoral list. In 2009 parliament there are four female MPs: three Christians and one Muslim. In 2005 parliament, there were six female MPs: four Christians and two Muslims. Thus, if a quota of 14 additional seats reserved for women were to be approved, it is likely that more Christian than Muslim women end up in parliament, which tips the fragile confessional balance. This is why including party denomination as another variable in the equation for female nominees may add explanatory power.

Thus, as statistics show, four civil-confessional parties (Mustaqbal, Tayyar, Quwwat, and Kata'éb), and Amal, all of lower religiosity (scores 4 and 3), nominated women to 2009 parliament. Hizbullah and Islamist parties of higher religiosity and prewar secular parties of lowest religiosity did not nominate women to parliament. This mixed pattern is inconsistent with expectations. While it is not anticipated that extremist parties would nominate women, weaker prewar parties of lowest religiosity also did not. The parties cannot risk losing precious parliamentary seats, given the women-unfriendly electoral system and a

potential for gender bias, despite inconclusive evidence. This highlights the plausible influence of party strength on decisions to field women. Parties' female municipal nominations in comparative perspective to parliaments is addressed in the following section.

Female Municipal Nominations

Municipal elections are held every six years. The last round was in May 2010. After the war, parties realizing that municipalities are also a key to electoral strength, forged closer ties with family networks, local communities, and religious leaders. This is particularly evident in smaller villages and rural electoral districts.

Statistics show that 10 of the 18 relevant parties nominated women in 2010 elections: 3 prewar secular leftist (Communist, Ba'ath, and Qawmi-Suri), 5 civil-confessional (Ishtiraki, Tayyar, Mustaqbal, Marada, and Quwwat), and 2 religious parties (Hizbullah and Amal). As mentioned earlier, parties tend to transform over time. In 1998 municipal elections, Hizbullah announced that they do not support female candidacy (El-Helou 1999). However, this policy changed in 2010 and Hizbullah nominated women for municipalities, mainly in the South where it has a strong foothold. However, eight parties did not nominate women for municipalities, notably, all three extremist religious parties of highest religiosity, four civil-confessional parties (Kata'éb, Ahrar, Kutlah, and Wa'ad), and the secular Tajaddod party of lowest religiosity.

In comparative perspective, parties compete over 128 parliamentary seats across 26 electoral districts, but over 11,424 municipal seats across 969 electoral districts. The number of municipalities and seats is not fixed and may change in 2016 municipal elections. The share of female nominees for 2010 municipal elections is almost triple that for 2009 parliamentary elections, the last two rounds at the time of writing (table 3.2). More precisely, the share of female parliamentary nominees dropped from 3.5 to 2 percent between 2005 and 2009, while the corresponding share doubled from 2.8 to 5.6 percent between 2004 and 2010 for municipal nominees. This boost is largely attributed to a 20 percent electoral quota for women in municipal elections, approved by government in February 2010. This encouraged parties to nominate more women on their electoral lists during the campaign until the parliament voted against the quota in May 2010, immediately before elections. In the meantime, many parties decided to nominate one woman on each of their electoral lists in order to beat competition. Thus, while

both councils remain male-dominated, this empirical evidence points to significant relative improvements in female municipal nominations but deterioration in their parliamentary candidacy over time.

Sex-disaggregated statistics on 2010 municipal candidates are broken down by party, denomination, and rural/urban divide, respectively (table 8.1).[6] The share of female municipal candidates is relatively higher in rural than in urban districts. In smaller, rural electoral districts (villages and remote areas), municipal lists reflect strong family networks. Lists are family-centric supported by homogeneous sect-wise local communities, religious leaders, and parties. The close collaboration among stakeholders ensures wider community support for women's municipal candidacy, encourages women to run, and parties to nominate them. A female municipal candidate cites that "Hizbullah reverted to family networks and consulted closely with community and religious leaders before nominating women from our small village." This ensured their success in elections. However, in larger urban districts like cities, where dwellers are of mixed denominations and confessional affiliations matter, parties control municipal as they do in parliamentary elections.

Empirical evidence points to party denomination as potentially impacting female nominations to parliaments and municipalities. Crude estimates reveal that there are three times as much Christian as Muslim female municipal candidates in 1998 and twice as much in 2004 (El-Helou 1999: 425–426; NCLW 2004: 49, 2006: 50). In 2010, more Christian than Muslim women ran for municipal office, in contrast to men (table 8.1). This provides further evidence that Muslim-dominated communities are more conservative toward women's political participation than Christian-dominated ones. As discussed, it may be that different religions impact the behavior of societies in different ways, including toward women (Lane and Ersson 1987: 56). A female activist in Kata'éb notes that "Patriarchy is more prominent in Muslim than in Christian communities. There is a larger margin of freedom for women in Christian than Muslim parties." She reports that female members in Islamist parties fear being accused by their spouses of neglecting domestic duties if they stay late in joint meetings. She adds that "If women in Hizbullah are called for an interview they have to obtain prior permission from the party leadership. We do not." My experience confirms this.

Thus, unlike parliamentary elections, municipal elections cover numerous, smaller electoral districts, and compete over a larger number of nonconfessional seats. Secular and civil-confessional parties of lower religiosity field the highest shares of female municipal nominees,

except for one outlier, Quwwat, while Hizbullah and Amal of higher religiosity show the lowest shares. Plural and democratic but weaker secular parties of lowest religiosity nominate relatively more women in rural than in urban areas. These parties found their niche in municipal elections in smaller districts and stepped in quickly when stronger parties did not accord these elections the same weight they do for parliaments. Municipal elections offer weaker secular parties opportunity in regaining part of their lost strength. Hence, consistent with theoretical expectations, extremist parties of highest religiosity did not nominate women for municipalities, while secular leftist parties of lowest religiosity did.

There are several factors at play. Parliamentary and municipal electoral laws both follow the BV system. At the municipal level, however, this has the advantage of strengthening parties and encouraging cross-confessional voting, as parties/candidates increase the likelihood of winning votes by building alliances with parties from other confessional groups (IFES 2010). Further, unlike the parliamentary confessional law, municipal law is nonconfessional; that is, seats are not distributed across electoral districts by sect. This offers women more chances in getting nominated and winning than in parliamentary elections. Another factor relates to civil registration. Upon marriage, women's civil registration number and district, as well the sect, follow the spouse for personal and electoral purposes. This limits women's chances to run for parliament in their own districts, because voters consider them outsiders to the spouses' community (see also El-Helou 1999: 433). In contrast, municipal seats are not earmarked by sect and smaller communities are homogeneous sect-wise. Thus, municipal law works better for women than parliamentary law.

Moreover, civil servants in public administration including the military and state universities should resign their posts prior to running for office. One of the seven female chairs of municipalities complains that "[I] was reluctant to resign my tenured professorship at the Lebanese University in order to run for office." Finally, she had to resign because of the pressure of the party to run for elections. However, preparing for 2010 elections, she addressed an open letter to the president proposing an amendment to this unfair law (*As.Safir,* February 3, 2010).

In addition, the public sector is the largest employer of men, especially in poorer districts in North and South Lebanon. In order to retain their tenure and lifelong privileges as public servants, men encourage their wives to run in municipal elections. A national expert explains that "Since civil servants, including men in smaller and poorer districts,

are not allowed by law to run for public office unless they resign, women's municipal chances increase." These cases are more pronounced in lower civil service echelons, which explains the higher share of female municipal candidates in rural than urban districts, despite religious, traditional, and class considerations. Thus, smaller rural electoral districts work more for female municipal candidacy than larger urban areas. El-Helou (1999) finds similar results in 1998 municipal elections. These findings may not tally with prior scholarship that larger electoral districts are better for female parliamentary representation than smaller districts. Municipal representation may demand a different combination than that for boosting female parliamentary representation, notably, larger districts, closed electoral lists (rank-ordered), and parliamentary quotas for women.[7]

Municipal elections also differ from parliamentary elections in several other important ways. The influence of clerics at the small community level seems to be critical in nominating women for municipalities. Qualitative evidence from female municipal candidates reveals that in conservative, traditional villages, party leaders should intervene with religious leaders to secure their blessings for female nominees. Religious leaders have more clout at the village level than in urban areas. This collaboration among families, community leaders, clergymen, and party leaders is indicative of how politics and religion work in tandem in Lebanon. Parties are increasingly aware that they are not the sole players in municipal elections as they may be in parliamentary elections. A female municipal candidate remarks that "Support of the party is not sufficient at the municipal level. Families and the village community as well as the clergy are essential in the selection process and together with political parties they determine winners or losers, women or men." For instance, in order to avoid antagonizing her community and the clergy of a small conservative village, a veiled female candidate running under municipal elections for *Mukhtar* (mayor or official civil registrar), posted her husband's picture with the caption "vote for my wife" as a show of family support. She won. Another example is given by a female chairing seven municipalities: "Since village communities are generally homogeneous, the clergy have stronger influence in municipal elections. Our Druze Sheikh opposed women's involvement in politics or running for office. However, the party leader intervened seeking his support for my candidacy as a service to the community." He intervened because it was in the interest of the party to have a female from the Ishtiraki party in the municipality.

However, when parties disregard community preferences, the consequences are not favorable. A female candidate from Amal describes the strong resistance she faced from the community and the clergy in running for municipal elections: "In our conservative village, dominant families and religious leaders insist on selecting men not women for municipalities. The party disregarded this and nominated a woman, because the competing list has a woman. She did not win." This demonstrates the power the community wields in municipal elections. Therefore, parties find it in their interest to seek the clerics' intervention and collaborate with local communities in managing the municipal electoral process.

Another incident points to the contradictory Lebanese mozaique society and to family-centric candidacy. A female municipal candidate was selected by a religious community in a conservative Shi'ite village although she is leftist. She cites that 270 people signed a petition nominating her for the municipality because of her contributions to community development. She adds that "Hizbullah nominated me because I am a winner, despite my being a woman and a leftist, but also because the competing list includes a woman. This projects a modern and tolerant image of the party." Indeed, such anecdotal evidence demonstrates that family and community networks, especially religious leaders, weigh heavily in municipal elections, which forces parties to collaborate with them to ensure electoral success. In contrast to parliamentary elections that are party-centric, municipal elections are family and community-centric.

Thus, different dynamics are discerned between municipal and parliamentary elections vis-à-vis women's candidacy. Municipalities hold many more seats than parliaments. There are 969 municipalities and each council holds an average of 12 seats (in large districts up to 24 seats). Therefore, women's chances are greater in municipalities than in a 128-seat parliament distributed proportionally among 18 confessions. Statistics show that (1) the share of women nominees for municipalities is greater than for parliaments; and (2) secular leftist and civil-confessional parties of lower religiosity have higher shares of female municipal nominees than religious parties of higher religiosity. Further, municipal law is nonconfessional while parliamentary law is. Family networks play a greater role in municipal elections especially in smaller districts where everyone knows everyone else, than at parliamentary level. In larger districts and urban areas, female candidates have to have party support first and foremost especially if they come from minority confessional communities. More importantly, parties

maneuver strategically with family networks and the local community including religious leaders, while they play a solitary but more controlling and decisive role in parliamentary elections. The interaction between parties and clerics also represents strategic maneuvering for parties' political interests. This has also been observed in Yemen where parties intervened with the clergy to issue a *fatwa* so that veiled women can unveil to be photographed for voting purposes. Also, in Jordan, the clergy intervened to support the nomination of a woman by an extremist party for parliament. Another case in point is the 2005 Family Law Al-Mudawana in Morocco where the women's movement allied with religious leaders to interpret the family law in favor of women. Thus, as Kristof (2010) cogently remarks, "[w]hile religion is part of the problem, it can also be part of the solution."

Two issues stand out. First, Amal lost when it failed to secure community and clergy support for female candidates. This factor combined with competition from prewar secular parties over the same turf may partially explain the meager share of female nominees on Amal's municipal lists (1.1 percent) relative to their higher share in its leadership bodies (10.9 percent). This mismatch may be due to the short time span between appointing six women to leadership in June 2009 and campaigning for the May 2010 municipal elections, which did not give female elites sufficient time to lobby for a higher share on electoral lists. This is inconsistent with the career path hypothesis (H8), which is not borne out between female membership and leadership in Lebanon (chapter seven). Second, Hizbullah's policies regarding women transformed over time. The party seems to be willing to overlook Shari'a by nominating women for municipalities, because it is in its electoral interest to do so.

In brief, women are running in municipal more than in parliamentary elections. They are being nominated by parties that have stronger presence in smaller than in larger electoral districts. Women's opportunities are greater in municipal than parliamentary level and in parties of lower religiosity. In villages where family networks have the upper hand, electoral lists are drawn by parties in close consultation with community networks and religious leaders. Therefore, one may infer that municipalities augur well for women's leadership and may offer them a window of opportunity for a career in politics. Is this the expected breakthrough for women? The following section responds to this question and estimates regression models for female party nominations to public office.

Qualitative Analysis and Quantitative Findings

Parties nominate relatively more women for municipalities than for parliaments. A female municipal member from Amal succinctly summarizes factors driving these results:

> Female nominations for municipalities are higher than for parliaments because of the larger number of municipal seats available. Municipal elections are family-based, relying heavily on personal networks. Women are better known in smaller communities than larger cities. Nominating women for municipalities is less risky scenario than for parliaments. Parties nominate women to compete and to showcase modernity. Above all, parliamentary representation carries more prestige, visibility, and financial remuneration than municipalities.

Additional factors are raised by a municipal candidate from Tayyar:

> In parliamentary elections, parties select candidates; whereas, in municipal elections, families select and parties field candidates. Municipal candidates do not need huge financial outlays, which is a major hurdle for women running for parliaments. Parties accord less importance to municipal than parliamentary elections. Hence, they nominate women, as second-class party members, to appease them and accommodate their leadership demands. Parties see that women fit more for social municipal than for political parliamentary work. Municipal service is akin to community development and social service. Some parties believe that women are less corruptible than men.

These issues are especially relevant since municipalities are increasingly being considered by parties as the key first tier to wielding power and building electoral strength.

Qualitative Analysis

The comparative analysis by these two interviewees calls for in-depth exploration into factors motivating parties to nominate relatively more women for municipalities than for parliaments: (1) to fight party competition and a less risky scenario; (2) to fit more for social than political

work; (3) to be less corruptible than men; and (d) to be a stepping stone to parliaments. The following paragraphs address these issues.

Women Are Used to Fight Competition and Are a Less Risky Scenario
Information collected from female municipal candidates reveals that in districts where there is no competition and electoral lists win by acclamation, women are rarely nominated. For example, a female candidate cites that "Hizbullah's list included 21 male candidates but not a single woman. There were no other competing lists. The list won by acclamation without elections." Another female candidate from Qawmi-Suri notes that "The party decided to nominate women on every municipal list to fight competition. They nominated me since the opposing list included a woman." Therefore, when there are competing lists, women are invariably included, even in the most conservative villages. This is not sui generis to Lebanon. Lovenduski and Norris also find in Canadian local elections that, "[w]hen at least one woman's name was officially placed in nominations for a local party candidacy, a female candidate was selected 73 percent of the time" (1993: 75). They maintain that "[t]here is a different 'logic of choice'... parties have a rational incentive to present a 'balanced ticket.' With a list of names it is unlikely that any votes will be lost by the presence of women candidates on the list. And their absence may cause offense, by advertising party prejudice, thereby narrowing the party's appeal" (314–315). For instance, a female chairing the municipal council of seven villages cites that "In 2004, the party leadership convinced me and nominated me as head of the list. The competing list had a woman but she did not win. I was supported by the party leader, family, community, and the clerics. I received majority votes and was elected chair of municipality."

Similarly, Lebanese parties nominate women as a *symbol of the modern* in order to fight competition and amass the female vote. They are consumed by "peer pressure" or "emulation" to match other parties and for strategic, electoral purposes. If this calls for drastic measures like overlooking traditions or Shari'a to nominate women and improve the party's image, then so be it. In this connection, male elite from the Communist party describes that "The South is the stronghold of Hizbullah and Amal. In such conservative and religiously committed communities, leftist parties like the Communist party are not easily accepted. Being the weaker party, we allied with Hizbullah for elections. My wife ran for the municipality on the joint parties' electoral list, which forced the competing list to nominate a woman." This pattern is observed in other villages. A female candidate from the

Christian-dominated Quwwat describes that her cousin "[d]rew-up a competing list with the party that traditionally runs in municipal elections. He invited me to join. The competing party also approached me because they wanted to showcase that their list also includes a woman. To avoid a village feud, I withdrew. Since the two lists did not include women, the village ended with an all-male municipality." These testimonies demonstrate that, in districts where there are competing parties, there would be invariably one woman on each electoral list. This bodes well for women's municipal candidacy, especially in smaller districts. This pattern is observed in 1998 municipal elections that "[h]igher female candidacy is associated with more competition between parties" (El-Helou 1999).[8]

This is paradoxical. Party competition is sometimes associated with higher female municipal candidacy but lower parliamentary candidacy, especially for weaker parties that risk losing precious parliamentary seats by nominating women. Lovenduski and Norris question this mixed pattern in ten Western democracies:

> Accordingly, does the nature of the party competition influence women's representation? It seems plausible to hypothesize, as Sainsbury suggests, that increased competition, combined with the growth of new parties, would provide more opportunities for women candidates. Yet once more the evidence is mixed, there is limited systematic research, and we need to take care to observe the complex interactions of political culture, the party system and the electoral system.... We can conclude that this would be a fruitful area for further research, to establish a systematic case, but we need to go beyond simple classifications of party competition, to see how party ideology and party organization also play a role. (1993: 319)

These phenomena are depicted mostly in South Lebanon where weaker secular parties compete or ally with stronger Hizbullah and Amal. For secular parties, nominating women is strategic to fight competition and is a less risky scenario than parliamentary nominations. This pattern prompts Hizbullah and Amal to nominate women and is also observed in other parties. For instance, the leader of Tayyar admits that "We nominate women on our municipal lists to show competing parties that we are also modern and women-friendly." Including a woman on the party's ballot is bait for more hesitant voters. Competition becomes keen when there are two female candidates. This implies that women

are used to market the electoral lists of competing parties in municipal, but not in parliamentary elections. Moreover, statistics show that secular parties of lower religiosity have higher shares of female municipal nominees on their lists than on those of Hizbullah and Amal of higher religiosity, highlighting the impact of party religiosity. These weaker, secular parties succeeded in fighting competition from stronger parties in smaller electoral districts. Kittilson observes a similar behavior:

> Smaller, weaker parties, which tend to be fringe parties, may be positively related to women's representation . . . Left parties are more likely to support women's candidacies than Right parties because Left parties espouse more egalitarian ideologies . . . Left parties may be more likely to see fit to support an underrepresented group, such as women . . . feel a need to be sensitive to groups traditionally excluded from the circles of power. (1997: 4, 10)

What seems to explain this paradoxical phenomenon is that parties nominate women to compete with other parties, or improve their image and, more significantly, for strategic electioneering purposes. Several female interviewees stress that nominating women for municipalities does not threaten male parliamentary incumbents. It does not take away their "acquired" privileges (financial and prestige-wise). The competition is not tight, because municipal seats are numerous, while parliamentary seats are limited. Therefore, parties are also interested in minimizing risks to their electoral strength, especially when they are weak. Qualitative evidence points to women being a less risky scenario for parties in municipal than in parliamentary nominations, particularly in smaller than larger electoral districts. A female candidate from Quwwat observes: "Women are a winning ticket in municipal elections, since they are better known in smaller communities than in large cities. This encourages them to run and enhances their chances in winning. Moreover, their nomination improves the party's public image." To substantiate these views, a female municipal member reports that she was disadvantaged because she is Alawite, a minority in a predominantly Sunni district. Her nomination was a risk to the party because she is not well-known in the larger district. She only made it because she was nominated by the strong Mustaqbal party for strategic, competitive reasons. She explains:

> Nominating women on lists of parties is a competition tool. However, it is less risky to nominate women for municipal than

> for parliamentary councils, where every seat counts. Moreover, the stronger the parties are, the less risk they take by nominating women. Parties realize that municipal elections are essential for their parliamentary electoral base, and women are their winning ticket to face competition. I predict that parties will nominate more women in the 2010 municipal elections than they did in 2009 parliamentary. Municipalities provide an alternative forum for women in public office.

Her predictions materialized since the share of women in municipal nominations doubled between 2004 and 2010.

However, fierce competition between parties is both a blessing and a curse for women. As shown earlier, with few exceptions, competition among parties in smaller districts raises women's chances for municipal candidacy, but lowers them significantly in larger districts as it does in parliamentary nominations. Parties employ all means to serve their interests including nominating more women, building alliances with other parties, intervening with local religious leaders, and collaborating with family networks. This information explains variations in shares of female municipal candidates across parties. These preliminary findings indicate that municipalities may constitute a window of opportunity to break through the political glass ceiling for women's leadership. There are other factors motivating parties to nominate women for municipalities.

Women Are Fit for Social More than Political Work

Traditionally, parties look at municipal elections as less important for their political and electoral strength than parliaments. They see that municipal work falls under the rubric of social and community development, while parliamentary work is hard-core politics. Municipal service is voluntary. Only the municipal chair receives allowances for public relations as long as he/she is in office and a budget for community development projects. Council members do not receive any financial remuneration or fringe benefits from the voluntary municipal service, while MPs do get for life. Thus, parliamentary service is more lucrative, as a female candidate from Amal explains: "Municipal work does not have the same visibility, clout, prestige, financial rewards, and privileges like parliamentary work does." Several municipal candidates voice their concerns that some parties nominate women for municipalities instead of parliaments to camouflage entrenched patriarchy considering women second-class party members, ill-equipped for parliamentary work. Some

female officials in conservative and extremist parties counterintuitively agree with party elites that "Municipal work is more fitting for a woman than parliamentary work. This is a man's world. Women work closer to the community, are patient, committed, resilient, and deliver." In this vein, a female former minister unexpectedly justifies that "Not only is municipal work more social-oriented because it requires closer contact with the community, but it is also more fitting for women. They do a much better job than men." This testimony encapsulates sentiments of several other interviewees and practitioners. However, a female municipal member from Mustaqbal criticizes such stereotyping: "Unfortunately, even women look at municipal service as inferior to parliamentary office. Women should realize that municipal work is as important especially in decision-making and community development. This is the building block for a viable society and polity." Evidently, such a consideration seems to motivate parties to nominate relatively more women for municipalities than parliaments.

Women Are Less Corruptible than Men

Interviewees also highlight women's less corruptibility as a criterion motivating parties to nominate them for municipalities (chapter six). I believe that practitioners are reading more into parties' motivations than meets the eye. Such a consideration is not paramount on parties' agendas. Parties are politically motivated and are more concerned with maintaining their strength than with the public good unless this fits their interests. A female municipal candidate from Tayyar flags that women possess special traits that attract parties and factor into their selection criteria, notably, "Women are patient, better negotiators, less corruptible, and closer to the community than men. Women are winners in municipalities. By nominating women to municipalities, parties are not only appeasing them in response to their demands for leadership, but are also guaranteeing that they will serve them well in parliamentary elections." A few male party officials also find that "Women are likely to succeed in municipal work more than men because of the special contributions they make to municipal work including accountability, diligence, commitment, efficiency, and resilience. Above all, women are less corruptible than men because of the strong value-system they uphold."

Statements by female municipal members point with certainty to women's lesser corruptibility by providing empirical evidence. Chairs of municipalities are either elected by winning members, or the winner receiving the highest vote automatically chairs. Only seven women are

elected as chairs of municipalities (0.01 percent). I interviewed all four of the seven who are party officials. The female chair of a municipal council testifies: "The villagers were convinced that because I am a woman, I will take their requests seriously and deliver. They voted for me. I was elected chair because they were confident that I am not corrupt as the previous chair." She stood up to expectations by being transparent in expenditures and consulting with members on all matters in due democratic process. She also uses her personal funds for public relations as a show of goodwill. She was reelected and is in her second term in office. However, a female official from Qawmi-Suri cites that "The budget for developmental projects and public relations goes to the chair. He manages disbursements unilaterally and reports to the government. This opens a wide margin for corruption and explains why very few women are elected chairpersons of municipalities." In this vein, a female serving as secretary of the municipal council reports:

> [I] sign all expenditures on education, health, and public works after inspecting the specifications and disbursements approved by the Chair. I discovered that the specifications I signed for do not tally with the projects executed, disclosing disparities [kickbacks] collected by the project manager. This was outright corruption, which I reported to the Chairman. He was as corrupt. Now I am convinced that men are more corrupt than women.

She stresses that women are not elected municipal chairs implicitly because of competition over control of resources: "Although I received the highest number of votes on the list, I was not elected chair. First, because I am a woman and single; and second, because they do not want to relinquish the chair's funds to a woman who will have control over men."

The controversy over the less corruptibility of women than men has grabbed attention of researchers. For instance, Pande and Cirone find that

> [e]ven more significantly, current research suggests that women politicians are equal to or better than their male counterparts. Duflo and Topalova (2004), for example, find that women leaders provide more public goods for their villages than men, and that these goods are of higher quality. Women politicians are also less likely to take bribes. Dollar, Fisman and Gatti (2001) also find that, across many countries, higher levels of female representation

> in parliament bring lower levels of corruption. This suggests that not only are women leaders needed to reflect the policy preferences of women voters, but that they may be more effective in doing so. (2009: 4)

Further, using men instead of women as the dependent variable, Bjarnegard provides empirical evidence: "High political representation of women decreases corruption levels, suggesting that women are inherently less corruptible than men" (2008: 2). She also finds a link between male domination in parliaments and parties, and increased incidence of male corruption such as clientelism and vote-buying, which impede women's leadership. And, while I did not find direct evidence on corruption by gender in Lebanon, the Arab Barometer II (2011) survey data show that 96 percent of the Lebanese think that there is corruption within state institutions and over 40 percent find that "most officials are corrupt" (Atallah 2012: 19). Since, public servants and government officials are overwhelmingly male, it is safe to infer that women are less corrupt or corruptible than men.

While these statements may be judgmental, essentializing both men and women, they capture widely held perceptions. For instance, on the occasion of electing Pope Francis on March 13, 2013, Christiane Amanpour, CNN senior international correspondent, remarks that had the Catholic Church admitted women to leadership positions in the Vatican, we might not have witnessed those enormous financial scandals. This is a powerful assertion that women can make a difference and that their involvement may have prevented corruption, even at the Vatican. Therefore, the less corruptibility of women may have also motivated parties to nominating them relatively more for municipalities than for parliaments.

Municipalities Are a Stepping Stone to Parliaments

Some party leaders and male elites declare that they nominate relatively more women for municipalities to prepare them for the harder parliamentary work. These claims remain in the normative realm, unsubstantiated by empirical evidence. The leader of Ahrar, a party that did not nominate women for public office, interjects that "Municipal work is a stepping stone to higher office. It allows women to gain political maturity and leadership skills, which are prerequisites for effective political careers." Similarly, the vice president of Ishtiraki flags: "Let women start in municipalities. If they succeed, we will nominate them to parliament." The senior adviser in Qawmi-Suri also states: "The

party nominated one woman in each municipal list. Municipalities are a stepping stone to parliaments. Women acquire the requisite skills and political experience for leadership through their work in municipalities. They succeed in social, environmental, and developmental work more than men." Similar views are encapsulated in statements of male elites in traditional prewar parties, expressing preference for a phased, gradual entry of women into politics before entrusting them with higher legislative responsibilities in parliament.

There is no empirical evidence from Lebanon that municipalities are indeed a stepping stone for a parliamentary career. Interestingly, few female interviewees share these views. Having served two terms as chair of the municipal council of seven villages, she states that, "I am convinced now that municipal service opens the door wide to parliament and an effective political career." This university professor from Ishtiraki and other female municipal members from Mustaqbal indicate that they plan to run for parliamentary elections in 2013. They are convinced that the rich experience in municipalities prepared them for parliamentary office. Through their municipal service, the community got to know them better and appreciate their contributions, which encourages them to run.

In brief, parties justify why they are nominating more women for municipalities than for parliaments for a plethora of factors. These include that women are less corruptible than men, are more fit for social than political work, are a less risky scenario in municipal than in parliamentary nominations, and are used to fight competition with other parties. Information from interviewees explains the higher shares of female municipal nominees than parliaments. More significantly, parties consider that municipal work is a stepping stone for higher-level parliamentary politics. This is a "levels of analysis" argument for linear development in women's political career: as female membership expands, women's leadership within parties increases, nominations to public office rise, and subsequently female representation in municipalities and parliaments improve. This draws a career path for women's political leadership. However, higher female leadership within parties does not always translate into higher nominations. The mismatch between a relatively high share of women in leadership (10.9 percent) in Amal, and an infinitesimal share of female municipal nominees (1.1 percent) is inter alia largely due to fierce competition from secular parties and failure of female party elites to lobby effectively. The share of women in leadership increased when the party appointed six women to executive posts before the June 2009 parliamentary elections. Subsequently, preparations for 2010 municipal

elections started. Women in leadership posts did not have sufficient time to build alliances, lobby for a higher share of female nominees on the party's municipal lists, or influence party policy.

Thus, statistics and qualitative evidence explain the higher shares of female nominees to municipalities than parliaments. Prewar secular and postwar civil-confessional parties with lower religiosity, plural, and democratic practices have higher shares of female municipal nominees than by Hizbullah and Amal of higher religiosity, and plural and democratic deficits. These findings provide additional support to the theory of party religiosity that as religiosity falls, the share of female municipal nominees rises. This compelling evidence denotes that municipalities may very well be the window of opportunity for women in politics. In the following paragraphs, two multivariate regression models are estimated for female municipal and parliamentary candidates.

Models for Female Party Nominations to Parliaments versus Municipalities

Statistics show that 10 of the 18 relevant parties nominated women to municipalities in 2010, while only 5 parties nominated women to parliaments in 2009 elections (table 8.1). Qualitative evidence from female municipal and parliamentary members and candidates explains what motivates parties to nominate relatively more women for municipalities than parliaments and why some parties do not nominate women for public office. In order to test hypotheses H1 to H8 and H10, multivariate regression models for female nominations to parliament and municipalities are estimated (table 7.1). The regression equation is specified as follows:

Female parliamentary or municipal nominations = $b_0 + b_1$ (secularism) + b_2 (party-age) + b_3 (pluralism) + b_4 (democracy) + b_5 (female membership) + b_6 (female leadership) + b_7 (party denomination) + b_8 (party strength)

As stated earlier, the small number of data points (n = 18) is a caveat for multivariate regressions and the large number (8) of independent variables reduces the parsimony of the theory and the degrees of freedom of both models. Despite this, significant relationships between the dependent and independent variables are depicted linking the results in the cross-national study (large N = 330) to the Lebanese case study.

Female Parliamentary Nominations

Regression results show that party democracy, strength, and denomination are statistically significant for female nominations to parliament, as anticipated. Stronger parties—Mustaqbal, Tayyar, Quwwat, Kata'éb, and Amal—are the only 5 of the 18 relevant parties nominating women to parliament. Results on the strength variable are also driven by the weaker secular parties, despite lowest religiosity. Party denomination is statistically significant driven by variation across these five parties (Sunni, Maronite, and Shiite). The highest shares of female parliamentary nominees are by Mustaqbal and Tayyar civil-confessional parties of lower religiosity (4) than that of Amal tolerant (3) religiosity. These two parties are electorally strong, employ democratic practices in decision making, and have plural membership despite their being dominated by a single sect. However, party religiosity, pluralism, female membership, and women's leadership are not statistically significant, against expectations. Four out of five parties nominating women for 2009 parliament have the same score on religiosity, which is driving the results on party religiosity. Results on pluralism are driven by plural deficit Kata'éb, Quwwat, and Amal parties. Nonetheless, this model explains 75 percent of variations in female nominations across parties.

The model is tried with interactions between membership and leadership, membership and religiosity, and leadership and religiosity, but did not produce different results. The coefficients are not statistically significant, the t-scores are small, and the standard errors are high. Linking the results of female parliamentary nominations in the cross-national study to the Lebanese case study, one finds that in both models, party religiosity is not statistically significant. Since there are only five parties nominating women for 2009 parliament, four of which are assigned the same religiosity score (4), we are unable to estimate the full model for just those parties. Party strength and denomination are statistically significant in Lebanon as anticipated, but are not in the cross-national model. Further, a linear career path for women in politics is established in the cross-national study, but not in Lebanon (H8). Unlike the cross-national models, Lebanon does not have a legislated quota for women and Lebanese parties do not employ voluntary electoral quotas.

The small number of parties nominating women for parliament and women's overall relative share on parties' electoral lists, except in Mustaqbal and Tayyar, is puzzling. This remains a bone of contention for the women in Lebanon, given that in 2009 elections the female vote was over 60 percent. Women can sway election results. The women's

movement is lobbying for electoral and parliamentary gender quotas in preparation for 2013 elections. The debate is not over.

Female Municipal Nominations

The regression results show that party religiosity, democracy, and female membership are statistically significant in explaining variations in female municipal nominations, as expected. However, pluralism, strength, denomination, and female leadership are not statistically significant. The F-statistic (4.77 > the critical value 3.23) implies that we can safely reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients in the equation are not 0. The equation explains 64 percent of variations in women's municipal nominations across parties. Overall, the coefficients on religiosity, democracy, and female membership are small but in the right direction and the standard errors are small. This is substantively important since female nominations start at such a low level. The standardized regression coefficients on religiosity, female membership, and democratic practices show the relative strength of these variables as predictors in this model.

These results are statistically and substantively significant. This is substantiated by the fact that, on average, the highest shares of female municipal nominations are in the civil-confessional Marada party, as well as in the secular leftist parties (Qawmi-Suri and Communist), of lowest religiosity, plural membership, and democratic practices. These parties adopted a policy to nominate women on each electoral list starting in 2004 municipal elections. This ratio increased in 2010 because of the 20 percent quota for women in local councils until the parliament voted against it before elections. Competition between parties enhanced the share of female nominations on parties' municipal lists, especially in rural and small electoral districts. Religious parties (Hizbullah and Amal) of large female membership also nominated women to municipalities, though in infinitesimal shares.

A career path relationship between female membership, leadership, and nominations to public office is not established for Lebanon, in contrast to findings in the cross-national study. Linking the large N cross-national comparative study to the single case study of Lebanon sheds more light on these relationships. Female membership is statistically significant in the municipal but not in the parliamentary model, while female leadership is not. This is especially significant for secular leftist and few civil-confessional parties of lower religiosity. In religious parties of higher religiosity, huge female membership is associated with negligible female leadership, and infinitesimal nominations for public

office. In Amal of tolerant religiosity (score 3), a 30 percent female membership is associated with a relatively meaningful 10.9 percent female leadership, as anticipated, but only 1.1 percent female municipal nominees, making it an outlier.

The results of the model for female municipal nominations support the theory of party religiosity in female nominations for municipalities. It is superior to the parliamentary model. Female candidacy increases as party religiosity falls. Female municipal nominations are positively influenced by democratic practices and female membership; but pluralism, strength, or female leadership are not statistically significant.

Summary and Conclusions

Qualitative and quantitative findings demonstrate different party dynamics governing female nominations to municipalities and parliaments. Statistical findings show that more women ran for municipal elections in 2010 (in absolute and relative terms) than for parliaments in 2009. Secular parties of lowest religiosity and extremist parties of highest religiosity did not nominate women to parliament; while four civil-confessional parties of lower religiosity and Amal of tolerant religiosity did. The share of female nominees for municipalities by secular and civil-confessional parties of lower religiosity is higher than by Hizbullah and Amal of higher religiosity. Extremist Islamist parties did not nominate women either for municipalities or for parliament. The ultraconservative stance of Islamist parties explains their antiwomen-as-leaders discourse. Electoral weakness of prewar secular parties, despite lowest religiosity, democracy, and pluralism, explains their reluctance to risk nominating women for parliaments. These statistics are consistent with theoretical expectations that as party religiosity declines (secularism increases), women's leadership rises in parties' decision-making bodies and on their electoral lists for parliament and municipalities. The higher shares of female nominees in municipal councils attest to the fact that, despite party competition, municipal elections are more women-friendly than parliamentary elections.

Municipalities offer women more chances in leadership than parliaments, especially because of a tripartite relationship between family networks, religious leaders, and dominant political parties. Municipal nominations are family-centric and community-driven. Women are more encouraged to run in municipal than parliamentary nominations, especially in smaller districts. They are well-known and receive great

support because of the special contributions they make to community development and the perceptions that they are less corruptible than men. Parties nominate women to face competition and to avoid losing precious parliamentary seats. Weaker secular parties of lower religiosity find their niche in municipal elections and nominate higher shares of women than other parties do. These parties have less to lose in municipal elections than they do in parliamentary elections, because of the larger number of seats available for competition. Hizbullah nominates women for municipalities but not for parliaments, because municipal work is social not political, more fitting for women, and does not violate the Shari'a. Several parties consider that municipal work is a stepping stone to higher-level political leadership in parliamentary office. Women stand a better chance of winning because of the more women-friendly nonconfessional municipal law. These factors enhance women's chances in municipal more than parliamentary nominations.

Party religiosity, democratic practices, and female membership are statistically significant explaining a sizable proportion of variations in female party nominations to municipalities. Democratic practices, party strength, and party denomination are statistically significant explaining a large proportion of the variance in parliamentary nominations. Party religiosity is not borne out as a core explanatory variable for parliamentary nominations in Lebanon and the cross-national models. A career path for women in politics is not borne out in the Lebanese model but is established in the cross-national model. Therefore, the multivariate regression model for female municipal nomination is superior to the parliamentary one.

There are four main justifications for a positive response to the question whether women can break through the political glass ceiling. First, parties support women's leadership when it is in their interest to do so even by overlooking traditions or the Shari'a. They often look at women as a *symbol of the modern*. Second, political parties work in close consultation with the dominant families, community networks, and religious leaders in municipal elections. Parties nominate more women in smaller electoral districts and traditional rural areas than in larger cities and urban districts. They recognize the special contributions that women make to community development and their less corruptibility than men. Third, some parties consider municipalities a stepping stone to parliaments. Municipalities constitute a second-level intervention point for women's leadership after political parties. Parties nominate more women for municipal than parliamentary councils because this strengthens their foothold at the grassroots level. As such, municipalities

constitute an additional electioneering mechanism akin to women's wings. Parties find more incentives to field women for municipalities than parliaments. Fourth, women muster more courage to run in municipal than in parliamentary elections. Thus, municipalities open a window of opportunity for women to break through the political glass ceiling, if they choose to start a political career.

Finally, a linear career path for women in politics in Lebanon is not borne out substantively and statistically. A positive relationship between female party membership, leadership, and nominations for public office is not established. This does not imply that such a career path or causal relationship is flawed, since it is borne out across 26 countries. I maintain that it will materialize sometime in the future once democracy is consolidated in Lebanon and women's rights are fully acquired.

I conclude this book with an open research agenda on women's leadership in politics. More focused research is needed on women's leadership in political parties, particularly in Arab and other Muslin-majority countries.

Concluding Remarks

Gender gaps linger worldwide, particularly in political participation in developing and Arab countries. This is most pronounced in Lebanon. The first wave of twentieth-century feminism hit Lebanon during the 1950s. It focused on the emancipation of women and suffrage rights as entry points for enhancing women's participation in national development. Subsequent waves and paradigmatic shifts from "women in development" (WID) to "women and development" (WAD), and since late 1980s to "gender and development" (GAD), failed to bridge gender gaps or achieve gender equality. Women's gains in the private sector surpass by far those in the public sector. The conundrum of the mismatch between Lebanese women's high socioeconomic and their low political profiles motivated this body of work.

This book departs from prior scholarship that sought to explain low female parliamentary representation by looking at country-level development, political regimes, and electoral systems or society-level culture and dominant religion. This research moves beyond the domestic level of analysis to the institutional party level. It focuses on political parties, posing the main research question: Which parties are superior for women's leadership? An alternative explanation for variations in women's political leadership, including female representation, is offered advancing a theory of party religiosity. The theory predicts that as party religiosity increases, women's leadership falls. Party religiosity refers to the extent to which religious goals penetrate political platforms. This body of research embraces a multivocal understanding of religions in that there is a continuum of multiple religiosities and secularisms on party platforms influencing women's leadership chances in parties' decision-making bodies. The theory and related hypotheses are statistically tested in 330 parties across 26 countries and found to travel. This paved the ground to conduct an in-depth focused case study in Lebanon, shedding light on associations established in the comparative study.

Political parties are the main vehicles for women's leadership. As gatekeepers, they recruit, select, promote, and nominate women to leadership and public office. Parties committed to gender equality adopt special affirmative action measures and introduce internal and electoral quotas to enhance women's leadership in inner echelons and nominations to public office. These two dependent variables are indicators for women's leadership, in addition to female parliamentary representation, the most commonly invoked indicator for political participation. Parties are the unit of analysis. Party religiosity, democratic practices in leadership transitions and decision making, pluralism in membership, female membership, strength, and denomination are independent, explanatory variables. An ordinal measure of religiosity is developed on a 5-point scale ranging 5 lowest to 1 highest for coding secular, civil-confessional, and religious parties of tolerant, conservative, and extremist religiosity.

Qualitative evidence is based on information culled from 150 structured and semistructured interviews with party leaders and practitioners in 18 relevant parties. Qualitative and quantitative evidence complement each other in supporting the conceptual framework of the theory. Empirical evidence denotes that the share of women in party leadership bodies is higher in parties of lower religiosity, plural membership, and employ democratic practices than in parties of higher religiosity, and plural and democratic deficits. Therefore, secular civil-confessional parties of lower religiosity are superior to religious parties of higher religiosity for women's leadership. This is supported by the results of modeling that party religiosity, pluralism, and strength are substantively and statistically significant for women's leadership. Despite qualitative evidence, democratic practices, female membership, and denomination are not found to be statistically significant for women's leadership. One should go beyond numbers to explain these findings.

Many parties emerged or consolidated in the postwar era. The parties that fought in the sectarian civil war, which debilitated the country from 1975 to 1990, had their own militias. The 15-year civil war widened religious cleavages, reshaped the party system, and intensified extremism. Heads of these militias, wearing the hats of leaders of postwar parties, tend to be autocrats because it is part of the trade to issue orders by dictat. Such authoritarian and dictatorial tendencies leave their imprint on attitudes of party elites toward women's leadership qua political culture, and on democratic practices in these parties. Moreover, parties' democratic deficit, especially in leadership transitions, has its roots in the personalized pattern of political leadership. This is generally based

on family legacies, and/or political and feudal patrons (*Zaim*), in addition to the warlords and leaders of former militias.

These phenomena were most felt in parties of expanse theocratic platforms. Male elites in extremist and conservative religious parties exhibit an *antiwomen-as-leaders* attitude toward women and their political careers. Women-unfriendly attitudes are more pronounced when clerics double as party leaders entrusted with interpreting the doctrine and controlling the fate of female party members. These leaders invariably invoke violation of Shari'a to thwart women's advancement to leadership positions, internally and externally for public office. Hostilities to women's leadership and regressive patriarchal discourses, notably that *politics-is-men's business*, *women's place is at home*, perceptibly block women's leadership in religious parties. Even when formal procedures for leadership transitions are relatively open and democratic, political culture blocks women's ascendance to leadership roles. Thus, there are formal procedures that are not in tandem with informal political culture in parties with theocratic agendas, which invariably bar women's leadership in these parties.

In addition, parties find a special niche in women and target them in their mobilization strategies because they make a difference. Women enhance parties' public image being a *symbol of the modern*, make special contributions, and are less corruptible than men. Religious mobilization and financial and in-kind incentives by affluent religious and nonreligious parties are very effective tools for expanding female membership, especially in targeting the poor and deprived. These women become captive to the flow of money and avid supporters during elections. Furthermore, such tools attract poor women who tend to turn to religion as their salvation and promise of a better life. However, beyond promises of the afterlife, religious parties do not promote women to leadership, in contrast to civil-confessional parties.

Many parties maintain special women's wings as mechanisms to mobilize women and amass the female vote in elections. Special women's wings "ghettoize" women and keep them away from decision-making circles and party politics. *Avant-guardiste* secular and civil-confessional parties recognize that women's wings are not effective in creating a critical mass of women for leadership. Therefore, they intend to dismantle them. In contrast, religious parties rely heavily on women's wings for mobilizing women and succeed in having huge female membership but promote relatively very few of them to leadership. However, women in extremist and conservative religious parties do not complain. They insist that they have no political ambitions and

do not expect material rewards because they are working for Islam and God's sake. The story is different for Amal of tolerant religiosity, the only religious party not headed by a cleric, which is evidence to party religiosity informing party politics. Women are more vocal and demand to share in the decision-making process. They do not suffer from false consciousness and their success is attributed to a women-friendlier political culture.

Religious parties have vast female membership but infinitesimal shares in leadership bodies. Female membership does not matter for leadership or is a prerequisite for it in these parties. This is a far cry from Putnam's (2000) law of increasing disproportions, which is borne out in some secular and civil-confessional parties. In Hizbullah of higher religiosity, and plural and democratic deficits, the huge female membership translates into a relatively small share of women in leadership bodies. In extremist religious parties of highest religiosity, there are no women in top-level leadership other than heads of women's wings. The mismatch between membership and leadership is more pronounced in Sunni ultraconservative Islamist parties than in Shiite-dominated Hizbullah (conservative) and Amal (tolerant) parties. Shiites are open to *Ijtihad* with relatively more enlightened interpretation of the doctrine and jurisprudence (*Fiqh*) than Sunnis. This works more for women's leadership, as empirical evidence shows, that is, the shares of women in leadership bodies of Amal and Hizbullah are higher than in Islamist parties, but smaller than in secular and civil-confessional parties. The fact that Amal is not led by a cleric has positive implications on the programmatic contents, political culture, and behavior toward women in comparative perspective to other religious parties. This attests to the multivocality of religions and how variations in religiosity influence women's leadership. Thus, one can still see light at the end of the tunnel for women's leadership, even among religious parties.

There are a few take-away points. First, party religiosity is not a constant and is not static. Transformation in parties' goals and platforms is inevitable. For instance, Hizbullah's ultimate goal for an Islamic state was tuned down in 1982 and in 2009 on grounds of unseemliness in the light of the political scene. This continuous adaptation and modification of religious goals and components may reduce the intensity of religiosity and as such will positively influence women's leadership, as per the theory of party religiosity. Second, sometimes religion—by male party elites' own admission—is part of the problem; but, I argue that it could also be part of the solution. It is a function of who is entrusted with interpreting the doctrine and how women-friendly and

enlightened they are. Third, some religious parties look at women as a *symbol of the modern*, recognizing their value added for enhancing party image and performance. This may positively influence leadership prospects. Fourth, some religious parties that employ strategic maneuverings overlook Shari'a and Al-Qiwama to promote women to leadership or nominate them for public office, if this is in their electoral interest to do so. They justify this as "ends justify means," which nonetheless augurs well for women's leadership.

Can women break through the political glass ceiling? Qualitative and quantitative evidence show that for women, municipalities are the second-tier intervention point after political parties. By nominating relatively more women to municipalities than to parliaments, parties are opening a window of opportunity for women to break through the political glass ceiling, if they choose a career in politics. Female municipal candidacy projects different dynamics than for parliaments. Municipal nominations highlight that social cohesion at the smaller community level works compared to parliamentary nominations. Municipal nominations are family-centric and community-driven. Parties manage nominations in collaboration with the community and religious leaders, while they are in full control in parliamentary nominations. Women's chances are higher in smaller electoral districts, contrary to scholarly wisdom and parliamentary candidacy. Parties nominate women for municipalities to appease them, and because this does not dislodge men from their parliamentary seats, which has prestige and lifelong privileges. Weaker leftist parties nominate women to municipalities because it is a less risky scenario than nominating them for parliaments and risk losing precious parliamentary seats because of potential gender bias or failure to buy votes. As such, female municipal nominations are enhanced because parties use women to fight competition. Male elites argue that municipal work is more fitting for women since it is social not political work. Parties recognize that municipalities are also a key to electoral strength. The results of modeling support the superiority of municipalities over parliaments for women's political career. This is how an optimistic female interviewee argues:

> Women will make it in politics, given their political abilities and the special contributions they make to political parties and to national development per se. But, this is largely a matter of choice. Women need to break the circle of fear from politics and summon their courage to compete for leadership, provided they are given the opportunity. Women are able, but are they willing?

Table C.1 Summary of Findings

Cross-National (330 Parties across 26 Countries)

Party-Level Variables	*Female Leadership*		*Female Parliamentary Nominations*
	Hypotheses	*Model*	*Model*
Religiosity	H1	Yes	No
Female membership	H4	Yes	Yes
Strength	H6	No	No
Denomination	H7	No	No
Female leadership	H8		Yes
Internal quota	H9	Yes	Yes
Electoral quota	H10		Yes

Lebanon (18 parties)

Party-Level Variables	*Female Leadership*				*Female Party Nominations*			
Hypotheses, Qualitative, and Quantitative Support					*Parliament*		*Municipalities*	
	No.	*Means (%)*	*Qualitative*	*Model*	*Qualitative*	*Model*	*Qualitative*	*Model*
Religiosity	H1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Democratic practices	H2	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pluralism	H3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
Female membership	H4	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Age	H5	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
Strength	H6		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Denomination	H7		Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Female leadership	H8				Yes	No	Yes	No

	Female Membership	
	No.	*Means (%)*
Democratic practices	H2	No
Pluralism	H3	No
Age	H5	Yes

In general, parties require that women be 100 percent perfect and eligible for leadership although many men in these positions are not. The desired outcome, however, should be effective leadership. At present, it is observed that female parliamentary representation is limited to the "women-garbed-in-black," which is not sui generis to Lebanon. This

takes precedence over women's high qualifications for leadership and public office. The Lebanese electoral law is antifeminist and confessional. Parties must be enticed by incentives, such as gaining electoral strength, to nominate more women on their electoral lists and women should muster the courage to do so.

Unfortunately, a critical career path for women in politics is not borne out in Lebanon, one that links female membership, leadership, and nominees for public office to outcomes in parliamentary representation. This was established in the cross-national exercise covering 26 countries.

Qualitative evidence reported throughout the book enriches our understanding of the dynamics driving women's political leadership. Statistics and results of multivariate regression models for women's leadership and municipal nominations are consistent with theoretical expectations that party religiosity is a core explanatory variable for women's leadership (see table C.1). The theory is robust, explanatory, predictive, and generalizable.

The findings answer the questions posed. Party variation in religiosity explains variations in women's leadership and nominations for municipalities. Secular and civil-confessional parties are superior to religious parties for women's leadership and nominations for public office. Female membership does not matter for leadership. Women can break through the political glass ceiling by running for municipalities. The theory of party religiosity explains the conundrum of the mismatch between women's high socioeconomic and low political profiles. I do not claim that joining political parties is a magical wand or formula for women's empowerment and leadership. Lower party religiosity is necessary but not sufficient for enhancing women's leadership. Women must be willing and interested, but above all, must exercise choice in picking their own career path.

The ambition behind this research work is to make a modest contribution to feminist political science. I have attempted to do so through the original dataset collected on women in political parties and the comprehensive information on their inner workings. I call for more in-depth research on women's leadership in political parties in Arab and other Muslim-majority countries. Particular attention must be accorded to building accurate, replicable, and reliable databases on women in political parties.

Epilogue
*The 2011 Arab Uprisings: Will a "Women Spring" Ever Dawn?**

As 2011 dawned, the whole world was taken by surprise as unprecedented popular uprisings swept across several Arab countries from North Africa to Western Asia to the Arabian Gulf. The "Arab Spring"—rather Arab uprisings, as this might be an "Arab Fall"—promised the birth of Arab democracies replacing autocratic regimes. Despots and lifelong rulers in secular Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen were toppled in response to the "People want to down the regime," demanding freedom, dignity, equality, and social justice for all. In Syria and Bahrain, and, to a lesser extent, Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Oman, demonstrations were crushed or demonstrators co-opted by ruling autocrats and monarchs. The Arab uprisings signaled that the *wall of fear* is shattered forever and irreversibly. The 2011 Arab uprisings did not call for Islamization of regimes "a-la Iranian revolution." They were not feminist movements calling for women's rights and gender equality.

Once allowed to form, political parties mushroomed. Islamists gained ground and the role of religion in the new "democratizing" states took shape in competitive elections. Lacking visible leadership, a vision, and an *intelligentsia*, and failing to organize, the uprisings opened a vacuum in governance, which Islamists and Salafists swiftly filled. Islamists are organized, hierarchical, and of varying religiosities. Skepticism grew as the uprisings appear to have opened a window of opportunity for Islamist and Salafist parties to step-in and takeover. The "others" (seculars, leftists, and minorities), argue that Islamists hijacked the revolts. Indeed, the Arab uprisings unleashed the powers and influence of religious-led groups, which have been repressed under the "ancien" regimes. This is a veritable "Watershed" for the Arab World.

The Arab populace is following Islamists because they reject the Western model. They conceive of Islamists as independent of the West and Western values; are less corrupt and corruptible than the despots they toppled, and more concerned with the public good of Muslim *Ummah*. Islamists won democratically held, free, and fair elections. People had high expectations that poverty will swiftly disappear, jobs will become plentiful, equality will reign, and democracy will prevail. *The reality is quite different!*

Against this backdrop, global and public interest intensified to explore interlinkages of Islam, democratic transitions, and women's leadership.

Women's Frustrations Justified

As women stood side-by-side with men in the freedom squares of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Syria, and Bahrain, international and regional media zeroed-in on them as the watershed events were unfolding. Female activists gained popularity worldwide for their courage and enthusiasm. Tawakol Karman of Yemen is the youngest and first Arab woman to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2011. The international community recognizes women's unprecedented visible activism and partnership, but do the Islamists?

The success of these uprisings raised women's aspirations for inevitable equality under the aspiring new democracies. Unfortunately, toppling despots and the subsequent legalization of political parties did not perform immediate democratic miracles. The euphoria of success was marred by the incidence of various forms and guises of violence against young female activists. Hopes for gender equality dissipated as entrenched patriarchy, conflated with religious orthodoxy, visibly resurfaced. Frustrations hit women hard in more ways than one. Instead of sharing the glories of success, women found themselves outside the decision-making circles and their expectations suffocated. The "reform-labeled" transitional councils were formed with all-male and/or token female membership. Women were threatened by a rollback on previously acquired rights and by a wave of newly formed and legalized Islamist parties. Female activists disappeared from the political scene, conveniently for men, as sex segregation pushed them back home, marginalizing their courage and dismissing their partnership. The hostility of Islamists toward women's advancement is baring its teeth, particularly as clerics double as party leaders, offering women-unfriendly interpretations of the doctrine largely to their advantage. As Jimmy

Carter cogently argues, "The truth is that male religious leaders have had—and still have—an option to interpret holy teachings either to exalt or subjugate women. They have, for their own selfish ends, overwhelmingly chosen the latter" (Fairfax Media, January 25, 2013).

However, a few observations are in line. First, the success of the Arab uprisings led impatient activists to believe that the solutions are imminent. Sociopolitical change does not come overnight. Democracy did not replace autocracy; but theocracy did. Poverty did not diminish. Employment did not increase. Social justice was not realized. Stability did not reign but chaos did, despite takeover by the military in some countries. Second, parties allowed to form are conceivably more concerned with consolidating their foothold than with fulfilling aspirations of women for gender equality. Such an item lies low on the agendas of conservative and extremist parties of high religiosity. Third, women are outside the newly formed transitional councils and reform committees. This raised their apprehensions, skepticism, and disappointments. Fourth, Islamists are failing to deliver on promises made, not exhibiting democratic practices, or showing any moderation. As Islamists rose to center stage, women's hopes under the "reforming" regimes dissipated.

Given this environment, one is apt to question the role that religion and religiosity play in Arab countries in transition, even with democratically held elections. And, how this would influence women's station, especially their right to share in governance, leadership, and decision making? Further, under such a "women-unfriendly" setting, can we conclude that women's frustrations are or are not justified?

A myriad incidents justify women's worst fears of losing hard-acquired rights. In Egypt, violence and demonstrations continue to date contesting the government's unilateral decision to redraft the constitution along Islamists' tunes advocating strict adherence to Shari'a, revoke laws, and/or revisit women's rights and family law including early age of marriage, Al-Khul' linked to Suzan Moubarak, the penal code on violence against women particularly female cutting or Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), and the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The amended electoral law did away with the quota for women. And, although the law required each party to nominate one woman, no rank-ordering is specified, which implies that women fell by the wayside. Four of nine female MPs are from the Islamist Freedom and Justice Party. This clearly demonstrates the influence of high party religiosity on the station of women.[1] While Tunisia and Morocco withdrew reservations

on CEDAW after 2011, Tunisia might be reneging upon pressure from Islamist parties. This is one step forward, one step back. In 2013, CEDAW is under revision by Islamists in Tunisian Parliament with the possibility of retaining reservations that violate Shari'a. The family law including on polygamy is also being revisited. In Bahrain and Syria, women are suffering from violence and atrocities committed by the regimes as the crackdown continues.

However, few positive developments are worthwhile mentioning. In Morocco, the Islamic dress or veil was not imposed on women, and a substantial number was appointed to consultative councils. In Tunisia and Morocco, reforms in electoral laws introduced gender parity in nominations. In Algeria, this ratio ranged between 20 and 50 percent. The quota for women on electoral lists was honored by political parties, including Islamists who filled it by nominating their wives, sisters, daughters, and female family members. Thus, even when these parties nominate women, as per legislated quotas, female representation remains, at best, cosmetic. One should go beyond numbers as oftentimes these are misleading. It is quality not quantity that ought to be targeted for effective female political leadership.

The Theory of Party Religiosity and Women's Leadership

The theory of party religiosity and women's leadership can explain these unfortunate developments. Invoking a multivocal understanding of religions, I argue that different Islamist parties offer women different opportunities for leadership depending on the intensity of religiosity on their political platforms. Even when formal procedures for women's leadership are relatively open and formally democratic, a "women-unfriendly" political culture blocks women's leadership. Thus, there are certain formal procedures that are not in tandem with informal political culture in theocratic Salafist parties of highest religiosity, tending to bar women's leadership.

The theory of party religiosity and women's leadership can explain the outcome of elections in democratizing Arab countries, at least for women. To add insult to injury, the result of democratically held elections gave Islamist parties the upper hand and majority share in elected parliaments. Female representation is lowest in Kuwait (0) and Egypt (2 percent), where the combined share of Islamists (Ikhwan and Salafists) is the highest (70 percent). Egyptian elections showed a

doomsday scenario as female representation dropped to its lowest level, a showcase for pessimists. Women's parliamentary representation is highest in Algeria (31.4 percent). This is followed by Tunisia (27 percent) and Morocco (17 percent), where the share of Islamist parties in elected parliaments stood at 40 percent and 26 percent, respectively. An inverse relationship is depicted between strong Islamist parties of highest religiosity and low female representation. This is explained by the theory of party religiosity that as party religiosity rises, women's leadership falls.

Conclusions

The two-year-long popular upheavals in the Arab world are strong and ongoing. These uprisings saw religion swiftly moving from the private to public sphere, from privatization to *deprivatization*. As public Islam becomes communal religion under the Islamists' rule and hopes for moderation subside, women face greater challenges of insurmountable dimensions to their security, safety, and well-being. With uncertainties looming large, I wonder whether public Islam will eventually lead to Arab democratization as public Christianity did for the West (Casanova 1994)? And, the closely linked question: Will a "Women Spring" ever dawn for the Arabs?

Women today are different from women before the 2011 uprisings. Women—like men—have managed to break the wall of fear. The whole world is watching. Women are not voiceless anymore. They are organized, assertive, and aggressive in their demands. They are building alliances, are more connected, and leaning on civil societies in regional and global networks. Women are learning to "impose their presence," are politically empowered and mature. The uprisings are a watershed for all. But, they constitute a turning point for female activism. This process is irreversible.

A "Women Spring" is inevitable. *I look at the cup as half-full.* But, I also recognize the challenges lying ahead. The main challenge is for these uprisings not to be hijacked or become devoid of their contents, their raison d'être, and/or for counterrevolts to takeover. The road to home-grown Arab democracy is long, bumpy, may be violent, and thorny until partnerships are forged, and peaceful consolidation replaces chaos. It might not be a replica of Western-style liberal democracy. A major prerequisite is equal citizenship, for women and men. Party religiosity is not static. Islamist hostility to women's advancement

might transform overtime in response to political challenges, women's resistance, and strategic maneuverings or when nations and parties find it in their interests to promote women. Islamists must mellow for the Moderation Theory to kick-in, and should not lose trust of the people in consolidating their powers. At the end of the day, the "will of the people" shall prevail: Witness the ongoing events in Egypt!

There can be no development without democracy and no gender equality without peace and democracy. Achieving this tripartite relationship guarantees a Women Spring in Arab countries. I leave you with the million-dollar question: *What kind of democracy do Arabs seek?* In his seminal work *Democracy and Its Critics,* Robert Dahl concludes:

> For the story of democracy is as much a record of failures as of successes: of failures to transcend existing limits, of momentary breakthroughs followed by massive defeats, and sometimes of utopian ambitions followed by disillusionment and despair. Measured against its exacting ideal, the imperfections of any actual democracy are so obvious and so enormous that the palpable discrepancy between the ideal and reality constantly stimulates unbounded hopes that the ideal may somehow be made real. (1989: 312)

Annex 1
*Questionnaire(s)**

Party Institutionalization

1. Age: When was the party established?
2. Outreach: How many branches nation-wide?
3. Strength: How many seats did the party win in last three parliaments?
4. Membership: What is the total, female, and denomination or sect-disaggregated membership?
5. Mobilization: Bylaws to join the party: Application forms? Interview process?
6. Pluralism: Is membership open or exclusive to a specific sect?
7. Charter: Are there specific references in official party literature on women's advancement?
8. How is party leadership transferred by elections, succession, appointment, acclamation? What is the term of the leader?
9. Are decisions centralized or decentralized? How are decisions taken? Who is the decision maker: party leader, party elites, or via consultation?

Women's Leadership in Parties

1. Executive Committees: Name the top-level executive and legislative committees. What is the number of members in each of these committees?
2. What is the number of women in each of these leadership bodies?
3. What is the number and share of women in parliament from the party?

4. What is the share of women on party nominations for public office?
5. Does the party have internal or electoral quotas for women?
6. What are your views regarding internal gender quotas?
7. Does the party have special women's wing? What are the main functions? Are they effective in mobilizing women?
8. Are women involved in decision making?

Individual and Party Religiosity

9. Is religion important for the party? Or, is religion a private affair?
10. Do you pray daily? Do you practice all religious rituals?
11. Why did you join the party? (a) Religious affiliation? (b) ideology (c) pressure to get a job (d) elections (e) women's rights (f) other
12. Does the party platform contain religious goals? Does the party use politics to achieve religious aims?
13. Do you include the sect on membership application forms and/or cards?

Attitudes vis-à-vis Women's Leadership: Views of Female MPs and Candidates

1. What are the main challenges in getting nominated by the party?
2. Did the party nominate you?
3. How did you run the electoral campaign? How did you mobilize support?
4. Fundraising: What methods did you use to raise funds to run for elections, or to run and manage your campaign? Did the fact that you are a woman assist or hinder? If neither, did your financial situation or any other specific factor help?
5. Campaign organization: Did you appoint women to help in running your election campaign?
6. Media portrayal: Did women support you or vote for other men competing for the same seat? In your opinion, how did the media portray your candidacy as a woman? Was this different from men candidates?
7. How do elected women progress and access leadership roles within their parties and in the parliament?

8. How do women work together in politics?
9. In your opinion, why didn't other women run for elections?
10. Are you a member of a political party?
11. Do you serve in any executive committee in parliament?
12. Did you run for office and did not win? Why didn't you make it? What are the main reasons for failure? Will you try again? Explain.
13. Is there a difference between men's and women's attitudes toward women in politics: voter turnout; behavior within parties; behavior within parliament? Explain.
14. How do elected women progress and access leadership roles within their parties and parliament?

Mobilization Strategies and Municipal Elections

1. Do you think that parties are the main vehicle for women's leadership?
2. What are party-level characteristics that enhance women's leadership?
3. Do you think secularism and/or religiosity influence women's leadership?
4. *Religion*: Is religiosity a barrier to women's leadership in political parties, municipal, and parliamentary elections?
5. *Family*: Did family and domestic duties deter women's active participation in parties? Are there any statistics on the percentage of married women in party membership?
6. *Culture*: Is culture (traditions and norms) a barrier to women's leadership and active political involvement?
7. *Municipal elections*: Did the party nominate women in the last municipal elections? What is the percentage of women nominated and elected?
8. Do you think women have more chances in municipal than parliamentary elections?
9. *Mobilization strategies*: Is there a difference in strategies used by the party before and after the civil war?
10. *Religious mobilization*: What is the role of women religious counselors? Did they succeed in mobilizing women and encouraging them to veil?
11. Are there financial incentives for women to veil and to join the party?

12. *Female membership and leadership in religious parties*: There is huge female membership in Shiite religious parties, but very low share in leadership bodies. Explain.
13. *Commitment to gender*: Does party-related features like liberalism, equal opportunities, tolerance, diversity, pluralism, and democratic practices enhance women's leadership?
14. Which parties offer women more leadership chances: religious, secular, leftist, progressive, democratic, modern, civil, or confessional parties?

Annex 2
Women in Parliament and Country-Level Indicators on Development, Political Regimes, and Electoral Systems in 80 Muslim-Majority and OECD Countries, 2010

Country	*Female MPs %*	*GDP/ Capita (US$)*	*Democracy Polity IV*	*Electoral Systems*	*Electoral Lists*	*Quotas Legislated*	*Quotas Voluntary*
League of Arab States (LAS) Countries							
Algeria	7.7	4477	2	List-PR	Closed	No	Yes
Bahrain	2.5	19641	–7	FPTP	Open	No	No
Comoros	3.0	819	9	TRS	Open	No	No
Djibouti	13.8	1382	2	PBV	Closed	Yes	No
Egypt	1.8	2771	–3	TRS	Open	Yes	No
Iraq	25.2	2625	–66	List-PR	Closed	Yes	No
Jordan	10.8	4435	–3	SNTV	Open	Yes	No
Kuwait	7.7	32530	–7	BV	Open	No	No
Lebanon	3.1	10019	7	BV	Open	No	No
Libya	7.7	12062	–7	N	Open	No	No
Mauritania	22.1	1096	–2	TRS	Closed	Yes	No
Morocco	10.5	2868	–6	List-PR	Open	Yes	Yes
Oman	0.0	18040	–8	FPTP	Open	No	No
Palestine	13.0			Parallel	Closed	Yes	No
Qatar	0.0	74422	–10	N	N	No	No
Saudi Arabia	0.0	16641	–10	N	N	No	No
Somalia	6.8	600	–77	N	Open	Yes	No
Sudan	25.6	1642	–4	FPTP	Closed	Yes	No
Syria	12.4	2892	–7	BV	Open	No	No
Tunisia	27.6	4160	–4	Parallel	Closed	No	Yes
UAE	22.5	47406	–8	N	Open	No	No
Yemen	0.3	1230	–2	FPTP	Open	No	Yes
Non-Arab Muslim-Majority Countries (50 % +)							
Afghanistan	27.7	560	–66	SNTV	Closed	Yes	No
Azerbaijan	16.0	5764	–7	FPTP	Open		
Albania	16.4	3661	9	MMP	Closed	Yes	Yes
Bangladesh	18.6	640	5	FPTP	Open	Yes	No
Bosnia-Herzegov	16.7	4157	–66	List-PR	Open	Yes	Yes
Brunei	. . .	28340					
Burkina Faso	15.3	590	0	List-PR	Open	Yes	No
Chad	5.2	742	–2	TRS	Closed		
Gambia	7.5	605	–5				
Guinea		420	–1				
Indonesia	18.0	2963	8	LIST-PR	Closed	Yes	No
Iran	2.8	4484	–7	TRS	Open		
Kazakhstan	17.8	8326	–6	Parallel	Closed	No	No
Kyrgyztan	23.3	816	1	TRS	Closed	Yes	No
Mali	10.2	649	7	TRS	Open	No	Yes
Nigeria	7.0	1324	4	FPTP	Open		
Niger	10.0	383	–3	List-PR	Open	Yes	Yes
Pakistan	22.2	1049	5	Parallel	Open	Yes	No

Country	*Female MPs %*	*GDP/ Capita (US$)*	*Democracy Polity IV*	*Electoral Systems*	*Electoral Lists*	*Quotas Legislated*	*Quotas Voluntary*
Senegal	22.7	964	7	Parallel	Closed	Yes	Yes
Sierra-Leone	13.2	325	7	List-PR	Open	Yes	No
Tajikistan	19.0	732	–3	FPTP	Closed		
Turkey	9.1	10206	7	List-PR	Closed	No	Yes
Turkmenstan	16.8	3663	–9	TRS	Open		
Uzbekistan	22.0	1335	–9	FPTP	Open	Yes	No
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development Countries (OECD)							
Luxembourg	20.0	104390	10	List-PR	Closed	No	Yes
Norway	39.6	84543	10	List-PR	Closed	No	Yes
United States	16.9	47132	10	FPTP	Open		
Switzerland	29.0	67074	10	List-PR	Closed	No	Yes
The Netherlands	40.7	46418	10	List-PR	Closed	No	Yes
Ireland	13.9	45642	10	STV	Closed		
Australia	24.7	54869	10	AV/FPTP	Closed	No	Yes
Canada	22.1	45888	10	FPTP	Closed	No	Yes
Iceland	42.9	39563	10	List-PR	Closed	No	Yes
Denmark	38.0	55113	10	List-PR	Closed	No	No
United Kingdom	22.0	36298	10	FPTP	Closed	No	Yes
Germany	32.8	40512	10	MMP	Closed	No	Yes
Belgium	39.3	42596	8	List-PR	Closed	Yes	Yes
Finland	40.0	43134	10	List-PR	Closed		
France	18.9	40591	9	TRS	Closed	Yes	Yes
Spain	36.6	29875	10	List-PR	Closed	Yes	Yes
Japan	11.3	42325	10	Parallel	Closed	No	No
Italy	21.3	33828	10	List-PR	Closed	No	Yes
New Zealand	33.6	31588	10	MMP	Closed	No	Yes
Greece	17.3	27264	10	List-PR	Closed	Yes	Yes
Israel	19.2	27085	10	List-PR	Closed	No	Yes
Slovenia	14.4	23008	10	List-PR	Open	Yes	Yes
South Korea	15.6	20165	8	Parallel	Closed	Yes	Yes
The Czech Republic	22.0	18721	8	List-PR	Closed	No	Yes
Portugal	27.4	21030	10	List-PR	Closed	Yes	No
Slovak,R	15.3	15906		List-PR	Closed	No	Yes
Hungary	9.1	13210	10	MMP	Closed	No	Yes
Estonia	22.8	14416	9	List-PR	Closed		
Poland	20.0	11521	10	List-PR	Closed	No	Yes
Turkey	9.1	10206	7	List-PR	Closed	No	No
Chile	14.2	11587	10	List-PR	Closed	No	Yes
Mexico	26.2	9243	8	MMP	Closed	Yes	Yes
Other Non- OECD Member Countries							
Austria	27.9	43723	10	list-PR	Closed	No	Yes
Sweden	45.0	47667	10	List-PR	Closed	No	Yes

Sources: 1. Female MPs www.ipu.org, November 2010. GDP/Capita (in US$) www.worldbank.org; www.imf.org, December 15, 2010. Democracy scores: Polity IV 2006–2009: The "Polity Score" captures regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from –10 to +10 or from least democratic to most democratic. Autocracies are assigned scores from –10 to –6 and are coded 0, democracies are assigned scores from +6 to +10 and are coded 2; regimes in-between autocracies and democracies are assigned scores from –5 to +5 and are coded 1.

2. Electoral systems: www.quotaproject.org; www.idea.int; www.ipu.org, November 2009.

Note: Abbreviations for electoral systems: List-PR (Party-List Proportional Representation); MMP (Mixed Membership Proportional); FPTP (First Past the Post); BV (Bloc Vote); Parallel systems; PBV (Party Bloc Vote); STV (Single Transferable Vote); SNTV (Single Nontransferrable Vote); TRS (Two-Round Systems); N (No electoral system in place). This is a listing of all electoral systems. If you feel strongly about it, then remove parallel systems. As stated earlier, I like to provide full information and to let each table stand on its own.

PR systems are coded 1; all others 0; Closed lists are coded 1; Open lists 0; Legislated and voluntary quotas if employed are coded 1 and if not employed 0.

NOTES

Introduction

1. United Nations. *World Survey 2009: Role of Women in Development.* New York: United Nations, 2009; International Labour Office (ILO). *Trends in Econometric Models*. Geneva: ILO, 2009; UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), *Progress in the World's Women 2008/2009: Implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).* New York: UNIFEM, 2010; www.worldbank.org; www.ilo.org.
2. Female participation in nonagricultural labor increased from 36 percent in 1990 to 40 percent in 2005 (ILO. *Women in Labour Markets: Measuring Progress and Identifying Challenge.* Geneva: ILO, 2010, 72). Also, in 32 countries worldwide more women than men are now enrolled at the tertiary level. Overall, the rate of female to male enrolment was less than half in 1970 and now it is nearly 70 percent (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP]. *Human Development Reports 1995 and 2009.* New York: United Nations).
3. UNDP, *Arab Human Development Report 2005: Towards the Rise of Women in the Arab World*. New York: UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States, 2006.
4. Phillips 1995; Pitre 2006; Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Kittilson 1997; Basu 2005.
5. One need only consider the different roles that women play in political parties. For instance, women may be leaders of parties or heads of government as in the Christian Democratic Party in Germany or in the Labour Party in Britain. However, their role is virtually nonexistent in the Taliban in Afghanistan, or in the Calvinist Party in the Netherlands, where women were initially not allowed to become members or compete for leadership.
6. http://faculty.rsu.edu/users/felwell/.

One Toward a Theory of Party Religiosity and Women's Leadership

1. UNDP 1995, 2006, and 2009; UNIFEM 2010; Sbaity Kassem 2006a.
2. Gandhi 2008; Tessler 2002; Donno and Russett 2004.

3. The Gender Equality Measurement (GEM) and Gender Development Index (GDI) depict wide disparities in the status of women, gender equality, and female representation worldwide (UNDP 2010). One wonders how much of this is endogenous in the same way that Adam Przeworski et al. (2000) link development and democracy in that economic development does not necessarily lead to democracy but sustains it (www.womenwatch.org).
4. Other electoral systems include Two-Round Systems (TRS), First Past the Post (FPTP), Single Non-Transferrable Vote (SNTV), Parallel, Party Bloc Vote (PBV), or No system (N).
5. Norris 1985; Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Inglehart and Norris 2000; Kittilson 1997; Sacchet 2005; Basu 2005; Htun 2005; Krook 2005; Dahlerup 2006; Frechette et al. 2006; www.idea.int.
6. See Sbaity Kassem 1998; Krook 2005; Dahlerup 2006; www.idea.int.
7. Inglehart and Norris 2004; Htun 2005; Dahlerup 2006.
8. Brian S. Turner, *Religion and Social Theory,* 2nd ed. London: Sage, 1991. In Fox and Sandler 2005: 1.
9. Norris and Inglehart 2000; Tessler 2002; Clark and Schwedler 2003; Donno and Russett 2004.
10. Kristof 2009. Op-Ed on the Parliament of the World's Religions, Australia, December 2009.
11. Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Phillips 1995; Ballington and Matland 2004.
12. Frances Rosenbluth et al. (2006) argue that the key to female representation lies in welfare state policies that empower women economically and create incentives for parties to compete for the female vote by including more women in their parliamentary lists and delegations. This line of argument rests on national interests, which should prompt and motivate the state and political groups to involve more women in politics. Rohini Pande and Alexandra Cirone find that "[w]omen's participation in democratization and development is important, and an increased political presence could positively benefit societies" (2009: 7). Bjarnergard (2008) also points to male domination in parliaments offering an argument based on corruption within political parties such as clientelism and vote-buying, which impede women's leadership prospects.
13. Norris 1985; Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Phillips 1995; Kittilson 1997; Brand 1998; Basu 2005; Sacchet 2005.
14. Kittilson 1997; Brand 1998; Charrad 2001; Clark and Schwedler 2003; Basu 2005; Sacchet 2005; Deeb 2006.
15. This may not apply to the 1960s and 1970s, when Ba'athist and Nasserist regimes were openly secular, at least initially.
16. Katz and Mair 1994; Janda 1970, 1980.
17. See also Kittilson 1997; Lovenduski and Norris 1993, 1995; Inglehart and Norris 2004.
18. Hatem 1994; Brand 1998; Charrad 2001; Clark and Schwedler 2003; Schuster 2007.
19. UN "Security Council Resolution 1325 (S/RES/1325)" on *Women, Peace and Security*. New York: United Nations, 2000. This is the first resolution ever passed

by the Security Council that specifically addresses the impact of war on women and women's contributions to conflict-resolution and sustainable peace.

20. I follow the protocol of human subjects for interviewing approved by the Columbia University Review Board. I am committed to maintaining anonymity and privacy of my respondents in line with survey best practices (see Corstange 2012: 15).
21. Freedom House index (FHI) in World Survey 2009; Polity IV Country Time Series 1800–2009; and Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 2010 websites.
22. The Taliban in Afghanistan; PKS, PKB, and Nahdatul-Ulama (NU) in Indonesia; Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwan*) in Egypt or Jordan; Hamas in Palestine and Hizbullah in Lebanon; SHAS in Israel, and the Calvinists in the Netherlands are just examples of how religiosity might vary across parties.
23. These may include all types of progressive, labor, liberal, and democratic parties.

Two A Traveling Theory of Party Religiosity and Women's Leadership

1. The cross-national dataset is deposited with Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), www.icpsr.umich.edu/cgi-bin/bob/dd?/depno=23355 (doi:10.3886/ICPSR30742); and archived with the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA), Pennsylvania State University. www.theARDA.com.
2. The 49 Muslim-majority countries include 22 Arab (Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates [UAE], and Yemen plus Palestine); and 27 non-Arab (Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Chad, Gambia, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan).
3. Among LAS members, Comoros is closest to a "Free" country scoring 3 on the 7-point FHI scale. Lebanon scored 3 until 1975; thereafter its ranking dropped significantly due to 15-year civil war and presence of foreign armies on its soil affecting sovereignty. Its ranking rose to 5 when the Israeli occupation ended (2000) and Syrian troops left (2005). Nine Arab countries drop out (Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Libya, Sudan, and Syria) because they do not allow parties to form, do not hold elections, and/or have ruling parties. Somalia is a failed state. Iraq is an anarchic state since 2003, although parties form and elections are held. Palestine is not an independent state but is included, because it allows parties to form and holds elections periodically in which powerful religious (Hamas) and nonreligious parties compete and women are politically active. This research was done before the 2011 Arab uprisings and the split of Sudan into two countries. In

November 2012, the United Nations accorded Palestine a nonmember observer status. Palestine is a full-fledged member of LAS.

4. Kennedy and Valenta 2006 argue that "With the attacks of September 11 and the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh, the public fear of Islam has led to a rethinking of the relationship between state and church in the Netherlands" (in Schuster 2007: 4). See also Stepan and Robertson 2004; Norris and Inglehart 2004; Clark and Schwedler 2003; Fish 2002.
5. For a comparison of women's leadership in Muslim, Christian, and Jewish parties in the Arab, non-Arab Muslim, and Europe plus Israel subsets, see Sbaity Kassem 2011: 302–343.
6. This is based on IPU, Appleton and Mazur, Norris and Inglehart, and Kolinsky.
7. Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Kittilson 1997; Sanbonmatsu 2006.
8. Norris and Lovenduski 1993; Norris 2000; Lovenduski 2005; Dahlerup 2006; Frechette et al. 2006.
9. Dahlerup 2006; www.idea.int, www.quotaproject.org.

Three Why Lebanon? The Puzzle and Pool of Women in Party Politics

1. Lebanese Central Administration of Statistics—ww.cas.gov.lb; Lebanese National Commission for Women (LNCW)—www.lcnw.org.lb.
2. In conservative Gulf countries, women are often not allowed to study abroad without a male guardian (*Mahram*). Thus, they enroll in national universities. The overwhelming majority of young men are either employed in the public sector with lucrative salaries or study abroad. This tips the gender balance of higher education in favor of women.
3. World Bank Gender Stats (June 2009): www.worldbank.org; Mona Chemali Khalaf 2009. *Women's Control over Economic Resources and Access to Financial Resources*. New York: UN-ESCWA.
4. "Electoral Reform in Lebanon: A Quota for Women?" May 4, 2009; lebelections.blogspot.com/2009/05/women-and-elections-part-2.html.
5. A study on a sample of 74 Yemeni female candidates in 2003 and 2006 elections, of which 63 percent are party members and 36 percent are independent, shows that 62 percent of party members won, while only 8 percent of independents made it to parliament. Freidreck Eibert Stifung Foundation, "Breaking the Stereotypes: Yemeni Female Candidates in Elections" (San'a: Al-Majed, 2008).
6. Norris and Inglehart point to exception in the case of the late Osama bin Laden who was extremely rich but fanatically religious (2004: 5).
7. See also Jelen and Wilcox 1994: 1171–1186.
8. Donno and Russett 2004; Lane and Ersson 1987; Norris and Inglehart 2004; UN-ESCWA, *Women and Peace*. Beirut: UN-ESCWA, 2004; Sbaity Kassem 2006b, 2006c, 2005a; *UN Annual Report(s) on Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325*. New York: United Nations: www.womenwatch.

9. Mohamad Sha'ya, "Why Are We Divided When Faced with Existential Questions?" *An-Nahar*, August 31, 2006; Sami Ofeish, "Confessional Imbalance Ensures Instability in Lebanon," *An-Nahar*, September 18, 2006; Mas'oud El-Daher, "Towards a Serious Confrontation with Sectarian Discourse in Lebanon," *As.Safir*, April 26, 2008; Patriarch Georges Khodr, "Lebanese Politics and the Clergymen," *An.Nahar*, May 3, 2008; Former Prime Minister Salim El-Hoss, "We Are All Sectarian," *As.Safir*, June 24, 2008; Raghid El-Solh, "Consociational Democracy in Lebanon: Competition or Consensus. Beirut: Issam Fares Center for Lebanon, 2008.
10. The number of effective parties is calculated by dividing one by the sum of squares of shares occupied by the relevant parties: Ns = 1/∑p2. The fractionalization index is the complement of the number of effective parties, calculated as 1–1/N. The number of parties equals the effective number of parties only when all parties have equal strength. In any other case, the effective number of parties is lower than the actual number of parties. For instance, the number of effective parties stood at 2.1 in India, 2.4 in Austria, 3.2 in Germany, 3.6 in Israel, 3.8 in the Netherlands, 3.9 in Italy, and 7.0 in Belgium (Linz and Stepan 1996: 181–182).
11. The resurgence of a rich debate on the sacred and secular recognizes the fluidity, persistence, permanence, centrality, and complexity of religiosity in secular lives. The theory that secularism will overtake religiosity with the advent of modernism in industrial and postindustrial societies is being called into question. Social scientists are revisiting and rethinking theories of secularisms and religiosities and their connection with political, social, and cultural spheres. See Norris and Inglehart 2004; Deeb 2006; Stepan 2009.
12. Ted Gurr's Polity IV, Freedom House Index, and the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 2010.
13. Arabic names may be unisex (Nidal, Najah, Rida, Claude, Nour); unidimensional names (Ramzi, Karim, Leila, Hiba, Hana, May); Christian and Muslim surnames may overlap (Saab, Haddad, Jabr).
14. All interviews were conducted in Arabic, audiotaped by permission, and translated into English by the author without formal editing. Unless given in citations, anonymity of interviewees is honored. I follow the Human Subjects Protocol, approved by Columbia University Review Board (IRB). I am committed to maintaining anonymity and privacy of my respondents in line with survey best practices (see Corstange 2012: 15).

Four Party Religiosity, Political Culture, and the Civil War

1. Saad-Ghorayeb 2002 and Deeb 2006 on Hizbullah; Cammett and Issar 2010 on Hizbullah and Mustaqbal, and Corstange 2012 on religion and pluralism in Lebanon; Brand 1998; Charrad 2001; Clark and Schwedler 2003; Wickham 2002;

Hatem 1994; Khalaf 2012 on women in Islamist parties in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, and Egypt, respectively; Arat 2005 on Islamist women in Turkish Refah party.

2. LaPalombara and Weiner 1966; Duverger 1969; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Sartori 1976; Janda 1970; Lane and Ersson 1987.
3. Messara 1997; El-Khazen 2002; Adib Karam 2003; Shtay 2004; Saadeh 2007; El-Solh 2006; Krayem 2006; Traboulsi 2008.
4. Schuster refers to other definitions of religion by Joseph 1978; Stark and Bainbridge 1985; Layman and Carmines 1997; Layman 2001; Jelen and Wilcox 2002; Einstein 2006.
5. The author personally conducted all 150 interviews. I use self-identified or generic party labels and refer to parties by their official names. I honor anonymity of interviewees as mandated by the Protocol for Human Subjects approved by the IRB of Columbia University and follow survey best practices by ensuring respondents privacy and anonymity (Corstange 2012: 15).
6. "Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has given the one more (strength) than the other, and because they support them from their means. Therefore the righteous women are devoutly obedient, and guard in (the husband's) absence what Allah would have them guard. As to those women on whose part ye fear disloyalty and ill-conduct, admonish them (first), (next), refuse to share their beds, (and last) beat them (lightly); but if they return to obedience, seek not against them means (of annoyance)." *The Book of Women 4.34,* translated by A. Yusufali; www.csmonitor.com/2001/1219/p10s1-wogi.html.
7. PBUH stands for "Peace Be Upon Him."
8. "Fanatic" is irrational and inflexible in his religious commitment but not extremist.
9. The *Merriam-Webster Dictionary* defines sectarian as "of, reflecting to, or characteristic of a sect or sectarian." The *Free Online Dictionary* adds: "Adhering or confined to the dogmatic limits of a sect or denomination; partisan."
10. These include Labor, Socialist, Arab Nationalist, Arab Ba'ath, which split into Iraqi and Syrian chapters, and the Nasserites Murabitoun, a Muslim Sunni militia supported by armed Palestinians in refugee camps.
11. Conflict-bearing offshoots of Salafist (Sunni) Al-Qa'eda are irrelevant (Jund El-Islam, Fath-el-Islam, Jundullah). These were silenced in 2007 by the Lebanese Army. The Islamist Al-Ahbash provides social and welfare services to Sunnis and manages charity projects. (See Cammett and Issar 2010).
12. Smock and Smock 1975: 109–151; Messara 1998: 279–282; Traboulsi 2008; Corstange 2012.
13. Janda 1970 and 1980; Sartori 1976; Norris 1993; Corstange 2012 on the sectarian nature of Lebanese parties and politics.
14. Norris and Lovenduski 1993; Kittilson 1997; Htun 2005; Krook 2005; Dahlerup 2006.
15. For discussion of authoritarianism, Islam, and women's advancement, see Huntington 1995; Tessler 2002; Fish 2002; Stepan and Robertson 2003 and 2004; Donno and Russett 2004; Schuster 2007; Hatem 1994; and chapter one.

16. Interviews were not possible with Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, secretary-general of Hizbullah or Sheikh Nai'm Qassem, his deputy, due to high security alert following the July 2006 war. Qassem's book, *Hizbullah: The Story from Within*, and rich information gathered from male and female party elites sufficed.
17. Mona Fayyad, Sami A. Ofeish, among others, debating this issue in An-Nahar, various issues in July and September 2006.

Five Unpacking Party Institutionalization

1. Norris and Lovenduski 1993 and 1995; Fish 2002; Tessler 2002; Donno and Russett 2004; Basu 2005; Deeb 2006.
2. Kittilson 1997; Lovenduski and Norris 1993 and 1995; Norris and Inglehart 2004, among others.
3. There are minor (irrelevant), plural parties (National Secular Democratic or Democratic Left).
4. Elections took place during summer 2013 and a female was elected vice president of Tajaddod.
5. The Sunni Salafist Welfare Projects Association (Al-Ahbash) and the Christian Democratic parties are not relevant.
6. Josie Ensor, Center for Arab Christian Research and Documentation (CEDRAC), writes that "Christians tempted to emigrate as Lebanon grows increasingly 'Islamized.'" Christians who constituted 50 percent in Lebanon are down to 34 percent: One-third left during the civil war and over 70,000 fled in July 2006 Israeli invasion. Information International poll shows that half of the Maronites are considering emigrating because of Hizbullah. Similar situations are witnessed among other Arab Christians in Iraq, Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Jordan, and Palestine, which prompted Pope Benedict XVI to call for a special Synod of Bishops in October 2010. He cites an enlightened Christian patriarch who remarks that "Lebanon has always been a bastion of religious tolerance, but now is moving toward a model of 'Islamization' seen in Iraq and Egypt" (*Daily Star*, September 29, 2009).
7. "Alawites" are a subsect of Shiites. This is a heterodox Muslim sect that split off from the Twelver Shiites. There are minor differences in jurisprudence and in religious rituals and practices (Moojan Momen, *Introduction to Shi'i Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi'ism*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).
8. There are two competing but plural political blocs, March 8 and March 14.

Six Finding that Special Niche: Women for Parties

1. Clark and Schwedler 2003; Clark 2004; Basu 2005; Arat 2005.
2. Dar-El-Fatwa is the government body entrusted with interpreting Shari'a and administering religious courts for Sunnis. The Shiites are administered by a Supreme Council.

3. *Bid'ah* refers to aberration from the doctrine or heresy.
4. *Urfi* (*Muta'h* or pleasure) is marriage without an official contract and is not recognized by Shari'a courts. Couples repeat their vows in the presence of two witnesses and sign a contract in duplicate, absolving the man from financial responsibilities in case of separation or children. It may have a fixed or prolonged duration. This is common among the Shiites, but also in Egypt. It is close to a "common law" marriage in the West. *Misyar* is a traveler's marriage, which is popular among Sunnis in Gulf countries and is officially recognized to sanction extramarital relations. Both partners give up their rights willingly and continue to live separately. It is temporary and may be dissolved at any time without financial obligations like alimony.
5. Kandiyoti 1991; Hatem 1994; Brand 1998; Charrad 2001; Tessler 2002; Clark and Schwedler 2003; Basu 2005; Arat 2005, covering parties in Algeria, Morocco, Palestine, Jordan, Egypt, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, India, and Turkey, respectively; and Roula Khalaf 2012 on Muslim Sisterhood in Egypt.
6. Sheikh Naim Qassem of Hizbullah argues that "Western democracies have often failed the test of freedom of expression, as when some students wearing headscarves were denied enrolment in French and German public schools under the pretext that such dress is a demonstration of religious ceremony that challenges the traditions of Western society. This was done despite the knowledge that this dress code is a part of the faith and not a form of competition for a slogan. They also failed to recognize the freedom of the other when they stood up to the Islamic movements in Algeria and some other countries, discrediting their elections under the pretext of an impending Islamic danger" (2005: 212).
7. Such statements support the 5-point ordinal measure of religiosity developed to code parties (chapter four).
8. After 9/11, the issue of women's Hijab occupied center stage in international and regional media that often highlighted the dark side of veiling. For instance, the French magazine *Paris Match* (February 7, 2010) reports that two men disguised as women wearing the *burqa* robbed a bank. In a veil-hostile setting as in the West, the article flags that the veil is used as camouflage for criminal acts. Further, it was reported in Jordan and Lebanon that veiled women stopped vehicles on the road, seemingly stranded and asking for assistance. In the meantime, their male companions committed crimes as hijacking, kidnapping, abducting, or stealing. The hazards of veiling are also raised in connection with official exams or voting in elections, where personal identification is concealed (pictures showing only eyes). Clark and Schwedler report that in 1993 Yemeni elections, "[c]onservative voices within Islah ... questioned whether it was acceptable for women to vote because they would have to reveal their faces to a stranger to be photoed for their voter registration card. Aware of this potentially pivotal role female voters might play in elections, Islah officials urged the party's (elected) spiritual leader, ... to issue a *fatwa* stating that it was acceptable for women to be photoed in order to vote. They need to mobilize voters and win seats to enable the party to realize its goals, they argued, far outweigh other concerns" (2003: 300). Anecdotal evidence also denote that a Lebanese veiled woman running for *Mukhtar* (registrar)

in 1998 municipal elections posted her husband's picture in the campaign with the caption "vote for my wife." She won the post.

9. An earlier version of this section is published in *Bahithat* 2012.
10. Hatem 1994; Charrad 2001; Clark and Schwedler 2003; Basu 2005; Arat 2005; Khalaf 2012.
11. This is comparable to the new roles that women assumed in the United States after World War I, when the welfare state extended benefits to veterans and to women, which led to expanding the franchise for women in the 1920s. Women got organized and lobbied for new policies. As pressure groups, they were able to push the government to adopt public social policies for women and families. Theda Skocpol finds that "Acting in pursuit of their career interests, and engaged in conflicts or alliances with one another, political leaders try to use existing governmental and party organizations to devise and implement policies that will attract support of various groups…In the 1920s American women built voluntary associations and engaged in the 'municipal housekeeping' and proposed public social policies. They believed that their moral and educational styles of political practice could help clean up political corruption in the USA. Women built parallel organizations to male-dominated ones. They were more organized and could spread a policy idea quickly. They served as pressure groups and lobbied for their demands. The USA government…separately administered benefits and protection for women" (1992: 527–535).

Seven Party Politics Explaining Women's Leadership

1. Weber 1965; see Lane and Ersson 1987 on culture and religion; Barry 2000 and Brand 1998 on multiculturalism.
2. *Hadeeth* is the Prophet's judgments on controversial issues. Conservative clerics and enlightened Ulama differ widely on interpretations.
3. She is the only Islamist woman to ever run for public office. The party did not support her, but nominated her husband, the founder and leader. This forced her to withdraw from the race and the party. She holds a PhD and is president of an Islamic university for women.
4. Basu 2005; Sacchet 2005; Arat 2005.
5. In the meantime, during 2013, the Saudi King appointed 30 highly educated women to the Shoura Council, which raised female representation from 0 to 20 percent.
6. Scholars studying voting patterns within families also find that husbands and wives vote similarly.
7. Religious mobilization and financial and in-kind incentives explain why women, especially the poor and deprived, join Islamist parties in large numbers. Employment of *Money for Veiling* by affluent religious parties is confirmed by a cleric, leader of an Islamist party, and by female interviewees citing monetary quotations. This tool is employed in Iran, which has an incontestable influence on Lebanese Shiite parties. Emulating these practices and modalities is not

far-fetched. None of the veiled interviewees belongs to the poor and deprived category of women—potentially receiving money for veiling—being all highly educated and in leadership posts.

8. According to Laakso and Taagepera, the index of effective parties in Lebanon is borderline (close to 5), which reflects the high degree of fragmentation in society due to widened religious cleavages after the civil war.
9. Dummy variables are created for secular and civil-confessional parties to replace secularism. This would capture their effect on the predicted marginal increase in female leadership above and beyond that in religious parties, controlling for everything else. One model takes all independent variables, while another one drops party age. Comparing the two models with dummies, we get much higher coefficients in regressing leadership on secular (5.7) and civil-confessional (6.1) parties than in the model with only the coefficient on civil-confessional parties statistically significant. Their effect on leadership compared to religious parties is about the same judging by the closeness in magnitude of these two coefficients. This indicates that variations in leadership shares are less pronounced in the category of civil-confessional and secular parties compared to religious parties. Hence, we can be confident in stating that secular and civil-confessional parties are likely to offer women more chances in leadership than any other category, all else remaining equal. However, the adjusted R^2 explains only 53 percent and 51 percent of the variance in leadership. This is lower than what the full model can do (68 percent), when secularism as a whole was used. The advantage is that using the secularism categorical variable with a 5-point scale allows us to pick up the variations across the full range of parties.
10. Indirect effects of female membership on women's leadership cannot be large or statistically significant. As the model shows, the coefficient on female membership itself is not significant for the sample as a whole. Moreover, estimating a separate model for female membership produces only party age as significant. Therefore, female membership cannot have significant indirect effects on women's leadership. Given this lack of significance, a path analysis is not conducted. The model was also tried with the interaction terms of female membership with secularism, but did not produce statistical significance. In principle, I do not expect party religiosity to influence female membership as it does leadership, since women join parties voluntarily; while their promotion to leadership is determined by party politics, ideology qua religiosity, and strategy.
11. This has also been observed in the 1950s in the United States (Skocpol 1992), in conservative European parties (Lovenduski 1993), in South Asia (Basu 2005), and in Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, Yemen, Albania, Malaysia, Turkey, and Iran (Charrad 2001 and 2007; Clark 2004; Arat 2005; Tezcur 2011).
12. If party age is dropped, the model explains between 4 to 8 percentage points less of the variations in female leadership than when party age is incorporated. This implies that party age does not capture much of the variation in women's leadership across parties. Dropping party age from the model changes the magnitude of the coefficients, not their direction.

8 Can Women Break Through the Political Glass Ceiling?

*An earlier version of this chapter has been published online in *Journal of Women's Studies International Forum*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (July–August 2012): 233–255; doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2012.04.002.

1. See also Tessler 2011. Matland and Tezcur (2011) find no gender bias in Turkey and argue that religious voters are not less likely than secular voters to support female candidates. However, voter preferences fall beyond the scope of this research.
2. Duverger 1955; Rule 1987; Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Inglehart, Norris, and Baker 1997.
3. The best fit for female representation is to combine BV with a quota of reserved seats. Reserving a tier where only women can stand is guaranteed to elect as many women as the quota makes provisions for. Another combination with BV is "reserved seats best loser system," as the one used in Mauritius and Palestine for underrepresented groups, albeit not specifically for women. This combination works unless there are not enough women candidates. It gives parties incentives to field women candidates in order not to lose any seats to competing parties, as in the case of Jordan. See Dahlerup 2006; www.idea.int; and www.ifes.net.
4. In the meantime, the June 2013 have been postponed for six months.
5. The 1989 Tai'f Accord increased parliamentary seats to 128, equally split between Christians and Muslims.
6. Official data on elections are only available by gender and electoral districts from the Ministry of Interior and the Universal Center for Information (UCI) in Lebanon. Estimates for distribution of municipal candidates by rural/urban divide, denomination, and political party are based on actual sex-disaggregated data by electoral districts. These estimates are based on official zoning into urban and rural areas, predominant denomination, and associated with parties having a stronghold in these electoral districts.
7. Norris and Lovenduski 1993; Dahlerup 2006; IDEA 2007.
8. To establish a pattern, a follow-up survey must be undertaken for 2004 and 2010 elections.

Epilogue The 2011 Arab Uprisings: Will a "Women Spring" Ever Dawn?

*Written before the second popular revolt in Egypt of June 30, 2013 that toppled President Mohamad Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood.

1. At the time of publishing the book, the June 30, 2013 counterrevolution had taken place. Around 33 million people took to the streets. The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) were thrown out of office with the President. The situation in Egypt remains unsettling.

Annex 1 Questionnaire(s)

*During 2006–2009, this questionnaire was used to gather information from officials in political parties (party leaders, elites, administrators, and female activists), MPs, and ministers, and national experts. This was used for the cross-national and Lebanon case studies.

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